

**TO PHILLIP SOBER
A GUIDE TO THE COMMUNAL
PROBLEM IN INDIA**

· TO PHILLIP SOBER

**A GUIDE TO THE COMMUNAL
PROBLEM IN INDIA**

By
ANUGRAHA NARAYAN SINHA,
Ex-Finance Minister, Bihar.
=====NAGARJUNA=====

HIMALAYA PUBLICATIONS
=====PATNA=====

1945

PREFACE

JOHN CHRISTOPHER lay dying and yonder in his hearing some one was mishandling a tune. The disharmony grated on his soul and in a struggle to get up, to stop that "murder" of music, he fell down in a shock and died. All of us have this grain of intolerance in us ; all of us hate slovenliness ; all of us want to stop mischief and mismanagement. It is in this spirit of stopping the communal question being mishandled that I write this book.

It happened thus. A year ago I had no thought of ever tackling this subject. But the frustration that lay over the country and the ebbing away of the revolutionary fervour had numbed our nerves and for sheer survival we all indulged in wishful thinking. If only the communal problem were solved and we confronted Britain as a united people ! This was how hundreds of Indians thought and this is how the problem swam into my consciousness. In the months that passed the problem returned to my mind again and again and for weeks I was literally haunted by it. And as I looked at the problem more and more steadily it began to shed the cloud of mist in which it was shrouded and to assume stable proportions. I was able to see its many faces and I thought I had got the measure of it. Like a small 'Buddha' I felt the joy of 'enlightenment'.

I realised that we were caught in a bad maze when

we said we would face Britain as a united people after the communal problem had been solved. I saw that the communal problem would be solved not before but only after we had faced Britain and compelled it to retire. This had a new bearing on our tactics. The diversion of energy to a "solution" of the communal problem was a wasteful move. It was tactically wrong. We were being sidetracked.

The more anxiously I looked for light the greater grew my conviction that Britain would cling to India as desperately as the drowning man catches at straw. Her stakes in India are too great ; her dependence on us too complete ! We are suffering from a dangerous illusion if we thought Britain was on a goodwill mission in our land and would shortly retire. As this illusion grips most liberal minds and as at times even Gandhiji seems to suffer from it, I thought it was an urgent task to dispel it from Indian minds. This conviction threw new light on the communal problem. It showed that Britain would play at the game of divide and rule to the bitter end. The importance it had for me is reflected in the apparently large space I have given to a consideration of British Imperialism in this book.

I have never been able to admit the possibility of pure contemplation in the social sciences. I despair of people who solve social questions as cross-word puzzles, as if the solution were a mere matter of skill, as if it had no past and pointed to no future. Social questions, to my mind, do not arise as pure acts of thought but are incidental to

concrete situations and struggles. Any solution of them cannot afford to neglect the concrete context, and no solution has the finality of a mathematical equation. As the concrete context must obtrude itself the solution must be more in the nature of a guide than as an absolute answer like 2 plus 2 makes 4—true in all situations.

The concrete situation in India today is that India is ridden by an imperialism, that we are struggling to liquidate it and that the liquidation of imperialism has a determinate importance for our very existence as a people. Every social question in India must be judged in this light. Every movement must strengthen this central purpose and none tend to defeat it. If we accept this position the solution of the communal problem will not be an academic exercise in which publicists, foreign and native, can indulge to display their skill. It will be a lead which only those are qualified to give who see the communal question as related to this wider issue—who are actively working to realise the great central purpose. This central purpose is the bedrock on which this thesis is built.

Although the instinct that drove me to write this book is to see that the communal problem is not mishandled I cannot claim to be wholly right or entirely impartial. Who can ever know everything, or believe nothing? My bias is abundantly clear. My only claim is that I have tried to see all aspects, to look impartially for facts; to have drawn on as wide a circle of facts as

possible and to derive impartial conclusions from them. This I regard as as rational an approach as is humanly possible. As generally there is impatience of facts and as the rational approach is distressingly rare, I thought this attempt was worth making. As most of the extant literature—which is not too abundant—ignores the living context of our fight for freedom and as little of it has tried to show up the real nature of imperialism there is still a great gap to fill. We are a great people and have a complicated problem to solve. We must throw open the subject for as wide a discussion as possible. There is little by way of precedent yet. We are all pioneers. Since I groped my way to “light” I thought, I should not keep it to myself.

And, therefore, I make it public.

PATNA,

N.

October 9, 1945.

CONTENTS

Part I—The Genesis

	<i>Page</i>
CHAPTER I.—The Approach	1
CHAPTER II.—The Problem	13
CHAPTER III.—Are Muslims a distinct political group? The theory of 'Muslim Nation' ...	37
CHAPTER IV.—The physical factors	68
CHAPTER V.—The role of consciousness: Clashes and conflicts	73
CHAPTER VI.—The role of consciousness: Political parties and Leadership	78
CHAPTER VII.—The role of consciousness: The British Arm of the Triangle	129
CHAPTER VIII.—Retrospect	170

Part II—The Way Out.

CHAPTER IX.—The first principles	175
CHAPTER X.—Constitutional guarantees and arrangement	186
CHAPTER XI.—Social encouragement	200
CHAPTER XII.—Economic programme	215

	<i>Page</i>
CHAPTER XIII.—Other solutions : Special Responsibility	233
CHAPTER XIV.—Other solutions : Special Electorate and Weightage	237
CHAPTER XV.—Other solutions : Reservation of Services	243
CHAPTER XVI.—Other solutions : Adjustment of Provincial boundaries	246
CHAPTER XVII.—Other solutions : Pakistan	248
CHAPTER XVIII.—Method: "Mass education and a Constituent Assembly"	300
CHAPTER XIX.—Epilogue	306

PART I
THE GENESIS

CHAPTER I

THE APPROACH

JOSEPH STALIN, the first serious student of the 'nationalist' question in Russia, in his famous pamphlet "Marxism and the Nationalist Question" written towards 1912 came to this conclusion :

"The Nationalist struggle is a struggle of the middle classes among themselves."

What is called "nationalist question" in Russia is almost identical with the communal question in India. The two countries are continental in dimensions and each has a bewildering variety of peoples. Thus although based on a study of Russian conditions his summary accurately described the communal question in India. For until recently the communal controversy exhibited a well-marked curve. It shot up in importance whenever a constitutional advance was contemplated and sagged down when the advance had been made and hopes had been either fulfilled or frustrated. The parties to the struggle were a handful of the middle classes and these classes are notoriously small in India. The struggle was not broad-based and the small middle classes had little to quarrel about fundamentals. The "bone of contention" was the positions of power and profit that government was throwing out for Indians. The sons of the middle classes competed for them and the communal question consisted in the efforts of the various communities to secure as large a share as possible for themselves.

Constitutional advance itself meant little more than taking on a larger and larger number of Indians to man the periphery of the imperial administration. The citadel of imperialism remained intact. It is remarkable at what petty pace we are creeping politically. In over half a century since Lord Ripon dreamt of teaching us self-government we have progressed from the complete absolutism of the British Secretary of State to considerable self-government for the British Governors and the Governor-General. Self-government has still to descend to the people.

Of late the setting has been altering with great rapidity. These things are symptomatic. The communal controversy has come to the fore at a time when instead of expecting political advance thoughtful men in India expect a long term of political degradation. More minds are being exercised by this controversy than at any other time. Instead of the zest of war for division of spoils, there is pain and anguish in most hearts at the very thought that we are fighting over the communal question. There is a greater desire to yield than to grab. The view-point is charged with generosity.

What explains this transformation? For it signifies nothing less than a great mental revolution. Ideologically we are miles ahead of where we stood twenty-five years ago.

In the first place our minds are being rapidly cleared of the imperialist illusions. Imperialism has come to be seen as a vampire that is sucking away the life blood of India. The country seems to have woke up from its torpor and become aware of its surround-

ings. The moral and material ruin of the people has burst on our consciousness. Thought has naturally quickened and we have begun to shake off the imperialist yoke. The awareness, however it came, is being deepened by the mass upheavals of 1921, 1930 and 1942. The sufferings through which the people went served as the surgeon's knife that would cure an obstinate sore. Already these movements have come to be regarded as the dress-rehearsals of the final revolution that will root out imperialism for ever.

This intolerance of imperialism is itself a potent force. But another movement of ideas has deepened its meaning. This latter movement is still weak and is not older than 1931, when, under the inspiration of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian National Congress adopted the 'Fundamental Rights' resolutions at Karachi. It gave a shattering blow to the middle class view of the world, where the vast masses paid for the comforts of the rich and the handful of the middle classes of lawyers, merchants and civil servants managed the rich man's estate.

As the smug middle class view of the world disintegrated, the masses marched to the centre of the stage. Our ethics broadened. Instead of jobs for a few we wanted to win a decent life for all. The 'nationalist' question could no more remain a struggle of the middle classes among themselves.

Unfortunately this second set of ideas has still only imperfectly percolated to the mass and has not yet been adequately formulated by any political party. It has not been made manifest as a challenging popular programme. That would have gone a long way to liquidate

the communal controversy. That would have shown how we shall all fit into the new world.

Even the intolerance of imperialism has not gripped the people uniformly. Our people are, therefore, in different stages of ideological growth and we cannot move in step. Leadership has, therefore, a hard task. It must fight on two fronts. It must see that no one falls too much behind and no one marches too far ahead. We must all march as close together as possible.

For let us not forget that our goal is the very conquest of freedom: that we are to struggle against a powerful imperialism. That we are pained at the thought that the communal controversy has not been solved does us credit. For it shows that we want to conquer our freedom with the least possible delay. It shows that we realise that so long as the controversy is alive our energy is diverted and we cannot march as a united people.

But even though these unconscious ideas are unquestionably wholesome, it is not they but our conscious thoughts that would show us the correct path. Let us bring our assumptions into the open and test them in the light of conscious reason.

It is impossible to stress this too much. For at the moment we seem to have lost our sense of proportion when we talk of the communal question. It seems to have focussed our entire attention to itself. It seems we have lost sight of the goal, that we do not see the communal question as a link in a vast chain.

To some extent this is natural. For after the ebbing away of our revolutionary fervour, after the spirit of

revolution was temporarily crushed by the full might of imperialism since August, 1942; after our human material underwent such a strain that it must needs have time to recuperate—smaller problems, less tiring, came to the fore. It seems that we are incapable of thinking anything except in extremes. But this must not be. We must not be blown off our feet. We must keep steady.

Perhaps it is incorrect to say that we are thinking of the problem. Most of us know it very vaguely. Most of us live on suggestions which come in an inchoate mass and gather like a snowball. The inequality of ideological growth sets up strains. Those who do not quite understand the goal want to be sure that their future is not being jeopardised. Their natural doubts are given the shape of horrid certainty by certain elements in our society which it should be our task to expose. Suspicion is like an acid that dissolves. Even those who are conscious of the goal cannot but react bitterly to their suspicious comrades. The emotions grow. Sabre-rattling pronouncements are made by sectional politicians. The newspapers blaze them forth and the mass cannot resist the appeal of the sensational and devours them avidly.

Thus is shaped the attitude of the mass to the communal question. Even those who are capable of thought cannot easily keep themselves steady when the atmosphere is so unfavourable. Thus it comes about that the communal question is viewed as the sole impediment in our road to freedom; that demand is made for its solution and that people rush in with their ill-considered remedies.

Coupled with this is the fact that whoever has tried to solve the problem—and there have been many such people—has been too readily pronounced as failure. A feeling has grown that the problem cannot be solved. There is, therefore, both alarm and despondency among the people and fatalism grips our mind.

Such an atmosphere is not conducive to thought. As the problem weighs on Indian minds like a ghost in the twilight, it must be tackled; it must be brought into the light of reason, measured up and faced.

It is in this spirit and with this background that we must approach the problem.

How has the ideological disparity come in? Why are divergent demands made? What are we going to do about them? These questions demand careful investigation.

As we set about answering these questions we launch upon a complex socio-psychological study.

There are in it elements of general human nature as well as of local peculiarities. It is fashionable to speak of the communal problem in India as a unique phenomenon which has no correspondence with universal facts of human nature. This is, however, a mischievous and perverse view and makes it possible to talk arrant nonsense on this issue. The very fact that we use language generally understandable and translatable makes this theory meaningless. We, therefore, believe that it is possible to make statements about the problem that will command general acceptance. The peculiarities will have to be pointed out but even the peculiarities are not entirely peculiar to this country.

Now the general observations that can be made are observations on the nature of groups. Of late much fruitful study of groups has been made by the pluralistic thinkers in sociology. Society has been seen to be composed of varieties of groups and associations ranging from the Bridge club to the State—and possessing different degrees of stability and definitiveness. The individual is associated with numerous groups to express himself. The larger the number of such groups, the richer is supposed to be the individual life.

These groups command positive loyalty of their members—largely an unreasoning process. The larger the number of common elements of the group, the greater its integrity and the more powerful the loyalty it can command. But the common elements that distinguish a group may be obscured or accentuated by other fundamental agreements or differences.

So far the existence of the groups is a mere physical fact. It will lie inert and raise no problems. Problems are raised with an awareness of the relative position of the group. The awareness may arise from a recognition of its successful constructive role in which case the group gains in prestige and is viewed as a benefactor of society. Witness, for instance, the activities of the Institutes of Science; or of the All-India Spinners' Association.

Unfortunately this hard road to recognition is rarely taken. The almost universal method is to force recognition by propagating group antagonisms. This is indeed a very cheap and effective method. As soon as one begins to talk about groups, differences leap to the eye. Normality, precisely because it embraces the fun-

damental features of the group, is rarely noted. So in psychology abnormal behaviour gets all the emphasis. It is, however, clear that abnormal behaviour is of small importance. The same can be said of the differences of the groups. They distinguish the group, but they are only a small part of the social life.

The perspective is, however, easily lost when one comes to speak of the distinctive role of the group.

Men become aware of the antagonism slowly by actual participation in disputes about some immediate issue. The awareness becomes deeper at repressions. Slowly the awareness gets crystallised in allegiance to abstract ideals. Ultimately men become convinced that success of the group aims and ideals is the most equitable also from the general point of view. At this stage the duck has dived too deep and got entangled in the weeds and it becomes a hopeless task to drag it to the surface. A militant and intolerant psychology is created and there seems to be no way out but to bang the issue.

This is how innocent differences prove to be the latent germs of oppositions and the latent oppositions focalise themselves in consciousness and struggle.

The process, however, is not spontaneous or automatic. Human will and reason is involved and this aspect of the matter deserves the closest study.

It is clear that the group-patriotism develops unequally in different minds. Those in whom this patriotism is most deeply operative seek to convince others and to organise for acceptance of their point of view. The attempt at carrying conviction gives rise to

the phenomenon of leadership and the attempt at organisation to the formation of political parties. Leaders and political parties are thus inevitable agencies of focalising this consciousness and struggle.

Much interesting study has been done on the working of these two phenomena, but it is not possible to dwell on them here. It will suffice to remark that leadership arises from the fact that discussion—a necessary condition of equality—is at best a costly and often indeterminate process. Action on large scale must depend on leadership. But unfortunately there is no mechanics of intelligent and moral leadership. That does not, however, take away from the fact that the type of leadership is of decisive importance. The leader develops enormous influence and self-reliance and can very largely bend the social energy to purposes that appeal to him. To him the particular group is a mystical entity representing a set of special values. He craves for a super-individual end and comes to believe himself to be the destiny of the group.

Side by side with this evolution in the leader the common man also evolves. The firmer the leadership, the greater the flight of the common man from active to passive attitude; from reflective to emotional; from rational to romantic. The circle is complete when from discussion one runs to hero worship, and, more comfortably to one's dignity, the led merges in the leader in a mystical participation.

This relationship of the leader and the led and the mental state to which it gives rise is fostered by what must be admitted to be a no less operative motive, however ignoble,—the scarcity of the positions.

of **eminence** in the group. As such positions are limited, the leader makes a relentless use of all agencies of success. The group leader thus develops enormous powers. This is important in that most major adjustments can be effected by agreement among leaders. It is also important in that widening the field of agreement will diminish the leader's chances to maintain a position of eminence. This is a simple law of mathematics. A large empire can satisfy the craving of only one man for Leadership of State. The same empire broken up will have more States and more heads of States. The group leader is, therefore, instinctively loath to compromise; and prone to exaggerate the distinctiveness of the particular group. And it is a legitimate expectation that the group to which a person has given cohesion should end by crowning him.

These then are the possibilities and dangers of leadership. In a sane society the possibilities should be strengthened and the dangers guarded against.

The second of the phenomena, namely, political parties is a necessary adjunct to this principle of leadership. Political parties make explicit what is only a chaotic discontent of the people. They formulate programmes and popularise them. They organise elections and other agencies to throw them into power so that they can give effect to their proposals. They run newspapers; hold funds; and by thrusting themselves in all manifestations of group discontent become the accredited spokesmen of the populace. They thus help to sharpen the consciousness of the group by myriads of suggestive and educative devices and at the

same time make the group ideal a powerful challenge to other ideals.

It is only when this last stage has been reached that a problem ceases to be academic and urgently presses for solution. It becomes in the true sense "the problem".

This is, however, the normal working of a group when the leader and the parties are themselves consciously shaping its ends and guiding its struggles. There have been, however, deluded fanatics and mad men who, at least for some time, manage to get the confidence of a group and gather a party round them. In such cases the working of the group becomes erratic and unpredictable. But the commonest and the most pathetic situation is one in which the leadership and the party-agencies function at the inspiration of some other force not clearly on the surface, or when such other force has power and opportunity of swaying the working of the group. In such cases an apparently conscious and militant group functions as a puppet and serves ends which are not its own.

This digression was necessary to focus attention on the actual working of groups and to make it clear to the largest audience. This essay in persuasion has to be as complete as possible.

A genesis of the communal problem in India has to be found in the light of the general principles described above. No other approach would be consistent with science and reason—and in social studies we can adopt no other guide. It is necessary to emphasise this, as for a variety of motives—mostly dishonest—it is being

sedulously propounded that what is true of other countries is not true of India—and general principles have no application here. This is certainly not the view of the students of human nature, who, on the contrary, emphasise the essential identity of man.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROBLEM.

BEFORE we proceed to apply the principles to the communal problem in India, however, we should understand what the problem is and in what context it is raised.

Undoubtedly there is a variety of communities in India based on race, language and religion. No one, however, seems to refer to racial distinctions in India. In the first place, racial fusion has proceeded to such great length that except for some aboriginal communities it would be preposterous to class any large section of the population in a definite racial category. Secondly, where distinct racial groups can be found, e.g., the Parsis and the aboriginals they also happen to be distinct religious groups.

In the same way, language does not seem to be the criterion. Else the Bengali-speaking Muslims of Bengal would not be in the same community and under the same leadership as the Pushto-speaking tribesmen of the North-West Frontier.

Thus the only criterion of communities relevant to this discussion is religion.

Now all the religious communities do not necessarily raise any problem. The Indian Christian community's leadership is generally broad-minded and advanced enough not to think of raising problems of exclusivism. The Parsis, mostly professionals, merchants and indus-

trialists with nearly the highest education among Indians, have developed no exclusivism either.

The Sikhs indeed are a compact community confined mostly to the Punjab and as the second largest religious minority in that province which has a Muslim majority they are somewhat peculiarly placed.

The other religious communities are too small and scattered to raise any serious issues.

Among Hindus there is no doubt a large percentage of socially backward people—officially termed scheduled castes—but this backward class is yet largely unconscious. The leadership of this backward class is mostly nationalistic and conscious of the attempts made by Hindu intelligentsia to ameliorate their condition. We are not ignoring Dr. Ambedkar and his tribe, but their cry rings artificial and nobody outside the governing classes recognises them as the true spokesmen of the backward Hindus. In any case except for simple adjustments within the community the scheduled castes raise no problems of exclusiveness.

The Hindus are the largest majority and are spread all over India. They naturally believe that their problems are in harmony with the Indian problem. Instead of developing exclusiveness they tend to work for absorbing all elements in a general outlook.

Between themselves Hindus on the one hand and the Sikhs, the Christians and the Parsis on the other have no problems whatever. Between themselves the Sikhs, the Parsis and the Christians also have no problems. From this point of view most of the communities have identical interests and pull together.

The real problem is exclusively the Muslim problem. It is not in fact a problem of Muslims *versus* Hindus, but of Muslims *versus* the rest of India. In practice, however, as the Hindus form the largest community, the communal problem has come to be viewed as Hindu-Muslim problem. There is another reason also for this development, namely, that the common problem of India has been focalised mostly by Hindu leadership. This Indian problem is the real problem, as Louis Fischer has put it, of India's poverty and enslavement. For a quarter of a century Mahatma Gandhi has epitomised the Indian aspirations and Mahatma Gandhi is a Hindu; although he protests, and rightly, that he speaks for all India. The quickening of Indian thought in other departments of life has been also largely under Hindu inspiration. The result has been that Hindus have acquired a self-consciousness by the rare method of constructiveness and in fact have been largely unaware of their distinctiveness from other communities. Their pervasive psychology is of Indian greatness rather than of Hindu-exclusiveness. Yet the fact that they are in the forefront has defined the communal opposition as one between Hindus and Muslims.

The present Hindu temper, however, is not entirely free from a sense of exclusiveness and opposition. The voice of the Hindu Mahasabha although still faint is gaining in volume. But this sad reaction in the Hindu temper is largely a reflex action of sharpening Muslim exclusiveness. Even so the opposition offered by Hindus is in general terms—such as Akhand Hindustan and integrity of India *versus* Muslim threat of disruption; a strong central Government capable of helping co-ordinated development of India's economic and political

power as against recalcitrant confederal units; joint electorate *versus* separate electorate; proportional representation *versus* weightage; representative government *versus* dictatorship. The ideals put forth by Hindus are sought to be justified by generally accepted social norms the world over. In fact these ideals are equally urged by the Parsis, the Sikhs and the Christians.

But while the opposition still remains consciously based on accepted social and moral norms, fanaticism and intolerance is also slowly developing corresponding to and largely inspired by similar developments among Muslims. The symptoms are such phenomena as stiffening attitude to cow-sacrifice, a tendency to insist on music before mosques, organising demonstrative processions and parades like Mahabiri Jhanda, opposition to Muslim processions such as Muharram, etc.

This Hindu communalism based on "feelings" and emotions is of recent growth and is associated with the development of the Hindu Mahasabha. Before 1924 little is known of the activities of the Mahasabha, and thereafter for a number of years the Mahasabha was holding its sessions along with the sessions of the Congress and many Congressmen like Pandit Malaviya were prominent members of the Hindu Mahasabha. In the beginning the Mahasabha was entirely in agreement with the nationalist aims of the Congress and its declared programme was social and cultural rather than political. The violent swing in its policy, however, has come over since the communal award towards which the Congress in the beginning took the attitude of "neither accept nor reject." The militant and communal politics of the Hindu Mahasabha owes its origin

to this award, particularly in its effects on Bengal. The Congress nationalist party is only the rational wing of the great swing in feelings in Hindu India on this issue. We shall have occasion below to study the Moslem League politics since the communal award and we shall find almost exact parallelism in the Hindu Mahasabha politics during this period. As the Muslim League was growing more and more hostile to Hindu interests, and as the Congress was not actively countering the growing extravagance of the Muslim League; the Mahasabha politics came to have a double character. While it became a virulent opponent of the Moslem League, its opposition to the Congress gained in bitterness and lately this opposition has become so pronounced that the old political animosities between the League and the Mahasabha are being obliterated. We shall have occasion to comment on the peculiar parallelism in the two movements, but it is enough to point out at this place how, in the origin, the communal politics of the Hindus is a reflex effect of the communal politics of the Moslems. The Moslems claimed a separate nationality. Mr. Jinnah, in his presidential address at the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference in October, 1938, revived the dormant relics of irrationalism among Moslems by declaring that Hindus and Moslems were two nations. He called the Moslem League politics fully national and progressive. He was met on his own ground by Mr. V. D. Savarkar who, in his presidential address at the Ahmedabad Session of the Mahasabha in 1937, remarked: "India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation but on the contrary there are two nations in the main—the Hindus and the Muslims—in India." m.

December, 1938, the Mahasabha at its Nagpur Session resolved that it is the only national organisation in the country. To the remark of Mr. Fazlul Huq that "if Mohammad Bin Kasim, an eight-year-old lad with eighteen soldiers could conquer Sind, then surely nine crores of Muslims could conquer the whole of India", Lala Hardayal responded that "If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and convert (them and) all the mountain tribes."*

Moslem League resentment at Congress intervention in the Moslem States of Hyderabad and Bhopal is echoed in the Mahasabha resentment at Congress intervention in the Hindu States of Travancore and Kashmir. As Moslem League asks the Congress to keep away from Moslems, the Hindu Mahasabha asks the Congress not to fight the elections but to leave the field free for the Hindu Mahasabha.

By its activities the Hindu Mahasabha is arousing the irrational among the Hindus as the Moslem League is doing among the Moslems. When this irrational attitude of opposition grips the Hindu mind the problem will certainly transform itself into Hindu-Muslim problem. Unfortunately there are developments that may hasten this consummation. But the tendency is still weak and imperceptible. It still remains true that in general the Hindus preserve an open and inclusive attitude. Even today, therefore, the communal problem can be equated with the Muslim problem.

Having thus delimited the significance we shall now consider in what context the problem is raised. Unfor-

* Quoted in *The Communal Triangle*, p. 156.

unately expressions of Moslem politics have been confused and contradictory. It has become a difficult task to distil the context in which the communal problem is raised. In the early days it looked like a minority problem and with the nationalist wing of the Moslem politics it still remains a problem of safeguards for the Moslem minority. Such safeguards have been generally conceded in principle by all parties and the problem in that shape has been liquidated. The Moslem League, however, does not regard it as a minority problem only. But it has not clearly defined its position and we have to make the best guesses in the matter that we can. At one time the famous "Fourteen Points" of Mr. Jinnah formulated in 1928 represented the sheet anchor of Moslem League demands. When Pandit Nehru asked of Mr. Jinnah what the Moslem demands were, after a series of evasions Mr. Jinnah reminded him "Perhaps you have heard of the Fourteen Points". Pandit Nehru retorted that after the communal award the fourteen points have been outmoded. Mr. Jinnah, however, threw no more light, and the matter was dropped.

1. That Bandemataram should cease to be the national anthem;
2. that provincial boundaries should not be changed in any manner so as to affect the existing Muslim majorities prejudicially;
3. that Hindus should withdraw all opposition to cow-slaughter;
4. that there should be no interference with Muslim 'Azans';

5. that free exercise of personal law and culture should be guaranteed by the constitution;
6. that Moslem share in the state services should be defined;
7. that the communal award should not be opposed;
8. that the position of 'Urdu' should not suffer in any way;
9. that elections to local bodies should be separate;
10. that the tri-colour flag should be dropped or suitably amended; and
11. that the League should be recognised as the sole organisation of the Moslems.

These eleven demands are a curious mixture of the sublime and the ludicrous, but it is clear that they do not envisage a change in the social and economic sphere.

The demands about cow-slaughter and Azan may be viewed as religious and those about "bandemataram", personal law and Urdu probably as cultural. It is amazing, however, that the League entertains fears on such small matters. If these issues were definite in number and stable in character they would not be incapable of solution. But the issues are notoriously unstable. For shortly after these demands were formulated the League discovered that certain old passages in the Satyarth Prakash, certain very old symbols of the Calcutta University like the Shri and lotus and certain new names of institutions such as Vidyamandir would be damaging to Islam. It is clear, therefore, that these details come under what

Prof. Laski happily calls the art of government and do not involve fundamental issues on which communities may agree in advance. These issues apparently religious and cultural are of no great significance in our life and it is amazing that leaders invite communities to crusade over them. The freedom with which the list of anti-Islamic facts is growing leaves no doubt in a discerning mind that such questions are raised in the garb of religion and culture only to generate antagonism between communities. There is no guarantee that tomorrow there will be no agitation to expunge from geography books the name "Himalaya" as it is of Hindu origin. We should not be so foolish as to exercise ourselves over them. Martyrdom for such causes is Quixotism of the rankest idiocy.

It is clear, therefore, that the religious issues are only incidental and subservient to other issues. Such other issues, I suggest, are political. This is manifest both from the character of the Muslim leadership and from the concrete measures they want to be taken. Fashionable Mr. Jinnah is no theologian nor is Nawabzada Liyakat Ali Khan. If anything Muslim divines like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema distinctly favour a non-sectarian approach to the State and are nationalistic. So is Maulana Abul Kalam Azad an erudite scholar and a great lover of Muslim religion and culture.

The concrete measures suggested are evidently not so much for religious and cultural safeguards as for adjustment of political power.

Thus the demands for non-interference with provincial boundaries which may prejudice Muslim position; for definite share in State services; for retention of com-

munal award; for separate electorate in local bodies,—are all calculated to give as many positions to the Muslim intelligentsia in the local bodies and legislatures and as many jobs under the State as possible. Frankly, it is a shameless squabble for “loaves and fishes”. This was glaringly manifest during the deliberations of the Round Table Conferences which shaped the present constitution. The communal leaders like Henry Gidney, K. T. Paul, Muhammad Shafi and Sirdar Ujjal Singh who freely talked of protection and safeguards only meant guarantee of employment and services. Jobbery and opportunism ran rampant. Pandit Nehru in his ‘Autobiography’ thus sums up his impressions (page 293): “It was all jobbery—big jobs, little jobs, jobs and seats for the Hindus, for the Muslims, for the Sikhs, for the Anglo-Indians, for the Europeans; but all jobs for the upper classes, the masses had no look-in.” It was thus politics of the crawling belly; of the hand-ful of communal intelligentsia.

The impression is deepened when we consider that after the inauguration of provincial autonomy Mr. Jinnah demanded 50 p.c. share in the governance of the country. Concretely it meant that half the ministers in the provinces should be Muslims. This was an aggressive search for jobs by the Moslem advanced class at the cost of the corresponding classes of other communities. Government is an integral function and there cannot be such things as division of the Government into parts—Hindu and Muslim. Mahatma Gandhi’s blank cheque to Mr. Jinnah and his declaration that he would be agreeable to the entire power being transferred to Mr. Jinnah is basically an attempt at satisfying Mr. Jinnah’s craving for jobs for the Muslim ‘classes’. For from

the very logic of government the administration will not be affected appreciably by functionaries being exclusively drawn from a single community.

The latest Moslem demand for Pakistan is also a colorable attempt at finding more jobs for the Muslim classes. For the 'Pakistan' goal has no orientation towards the mass and has not yet been given any social or economic content. More provinces and states mean multiplicity of government machineries and larger chances for leaders even of average ability.

Desire to share in the 'loaves and fishes' of office is thus the basis of the communal question. This is a political problem of a handful of the educated classes who have drawn upon religion to lend weight to their demands.

The problem is, however, complicated by certain features of the Muslim League leadership. This would appear from the eleventh demand of the Muslim League to which the tenth demand only lends colour. The Moslem League insists on being recognised as the sole spokesman of the Muslims of India. This is indeed the recurring note of Mr. Jinnah's pronouncements. On this rock all attempts at rapprochement between the Congress and the Muslim League have foundered. It is this demand of Mr. Jinnah that has led the nationalist Moslems belonging to various organisations to converge into an independent Moslem conference. This eleventh demand has sinister implications which must be grasped clearly. It leads to totalitarianism and dictatorship of one party. The essence of liberal democracy is that the citizens should be free to organise into parties of their choice. Political

freedom is inconceivable without such liberty. Mr. Jinnah would refuse the Moslems the right to form another party. Muslims must be born as Muslim leaguers. This is being systematised into a philosophy. Punjabi's "Confederacy of India" is providing theoretical basis for this faith. He says, "They (the Muslims) are born into a system (political system). 'The system is not thrust upon them. Religion and politics are the same to them.....'" (pages 88-89). 'This philosophy leads to the denial of elective principle in politics and to the assertion that western democracy is unsuited to India. Mr. Jinnah has been repeatedly propounding this principle since he first declared in 1940 when he wrote in the *Time and Tide*, 19th. June, 1940: "Western democracy is totally unsuited to India and its imposition on India is the disease of the body politic." It is thus helping the British Government to deny freedom to India for Indian progressive classes understand democracy and freedom only in the sense in which it has been preached and practised in the west. From a mere aspirant for 'jobs' it is emerging as a great obstacle to Indian freedom. Whatever its pretensions the stubborn facts cannot be glossed over.

Mr. Jinnah demands more seats and jobs for the Muslims than are warranted by their numerical proportion. The demand is growing more and more extravagant. The only conceivable limit to it will be found in a realisation of complete monopoly of jobs and seats for the Muslims. This is the unmistakable aspiration of the Muslim League. The rewards will, however, not go to Muslims outside the Muslim League. There is no other meaning in the Moslem League being equated with Islam. We are to have a rigid and closed corpora-

tion of 'Jesuits'. This corporation, however, will not be a repository of final powers but only a subservient monopoly—a monopoly of Muslim bailiffs to manage this Slave Empire for the British masters. Muslim League has no quarrel with England. It only wants all the seats and jobs for itself. Under a camouflage of militancy, it is a degenerate variety of Fascism—a servile Fascism that dare not seize power but aspires only to the crumbs that may fall from the imperial table.

The communal problem is deepened.

But the problem will fall into proper perspective only when we examine its absolute magnitude and when we relate it to the central problem of our time.

Absolutely speaking the communal demands are made on behalf of the literates of the various communities. The test of literacy for the purpose of the Census is ability to write a letter in any language and to be able to read a letter in the same language. Even by this minimum standard male literacy in India in 1941 was 31 p.c. and female literacy was only 8 per cent. As the demands relate to shares in government services and to seats in local bodies and legislatures the class on whose behalf the division in spoils was demanded was not the "small" class of 'literates' in India but only the still more "microscopic section" that was literate in English. Generally such persons would be matriculates for the matriculation standard is the minimum literary qualification even for the inferior clerical posts. Literates in English including sub-matriculates formed only one-tenth of the literate population of the country, i.e., about 2 p.c. The jobs available under the State in 1931 includ-

ing the employment in the Army, Navy and Air Force; in the Railways; in the Posts and Telegraphs Department and in the Police formed only 1.34 per cent of the total employment in India. They are, however, prized as alternative openings where literacy in English may be an advantage are difficult to find. They also carry better emoluments and security. Thus less than 2 per cent of the literates in English competed for 1.34 per cent of all jobs. Almost the entire employable population of India was out of the range of the communal politics.

As for seats in the legislatures the total of seats in the Federal and the provincial legislatures comes to 2,220 which can provide a field only to one adult in a population of a hundred thousand.

The absolute range of the communal problem is thus infinitesimally small. When we relate it to the central problem of our times, the communal problem sinks into nothingness.

This central problem burst into a world of debts and property relations with the birth of the machine in the middle of the eighteenth century. Our ancestors celebrated the harvest home with solemnity and rejoicing. They rejoiced at having snatched their meagre harvest from an uncharitable earth. They were solemn because the gods and the spirits of their fathers who had helped them to win the harvest had to be propitiated by offerings and incantations. Both hopes and joys had to be restrained. Humanity was too timid to enjoy this life in abandon. Exuberance would annoy the gods and the unseen spirits while the inscrutable earth was an eternal challenge.

But power-driven machinery harnessed to industry promised to dispel the cloud of uncertainty and want that lined men's hopes. It increased the tempo of production and opened up prospects of plenty.

There was, however, a fly in the ointment. Industrialisation in an environment of private property and debts made it possible for owners of industries and creditors to pile up claims against industry in the shape of profit and interest. The claims were for a periodical dividend till the ends of time. Capital and debts had a value that must remain intact and that must yield a determinate return in perpetuity. Those who controlled industry and those who financed it made profit and interest the sole driving motive of industry. Other considerations were subordinated to maximising the 'dividend'.

Now 'dividend' can be maximised in two ways. We can keep the rate of return constant but increase the supply of capital and necessarily expand production. This, in fact, happened in the early phase of capitalism when competition was substantially possible. The early phase of capitalism was, therefore, a liberating force that tended to expand production and so long as supply of capital ('investment' in the jargon of economists) can be increased capitalism remains in sound health.

But it was soon realised that 'dividend' could be maximised even without expanding production. Lenin has analysed this second phase of capitalism in his pamphlet 'Imperialism'. This second phase established itself about the beginning of this century. This phase is marked by the growth of cartels, combines and monopolies of all kinds that severely limit the field of compe-

tition. Monopoly is a restrictive force and yields 'revenues' which can be kept at any artificial level by suitably limiting production and supply.

In the first phase sources of raw materials were required to feed the expanding production and the colonial and agricultural countries were developed. In the second phase sources of raw materials were required not so much for development as for keeping the sources from competitive exploitation. In the second phase, therefore, colonies and agricultural countries were sought to be controlled without developing their dormant resources. The first phase made for gradual rise in the standard of living in the colonial and agricultural lands until life in the colonial and agricultural countries could come to a parity with life in the industrial countries. The second phase has snapped this tendency and the present role of monopoly capitalism is to keep the standard of life in the industrial and the raw material-producing countries wide apart.

Thus has come the first great unbalance in the world economy. In the industrial countries has arisen a large class of rentiers who can live simply by 'clipping coupons'. Besides the rentier class there is a vast class of workers who get the incidental advantages of industrialisation. Both these classes enjoy relative comfort at the cost of the primary producers even in their own country but much more so at the cost of primary producers of agricultural countries and colonies which have remained immune from industrialisation. Monopoly capitalism has no interest in developing the productive resources of these countries and can dump on them industrial products

at monopoly prices. The people lose both ways. Thus has it come about that while about a third of the world enjoys industrial prosperity, two-thirds comprising almost the whole of Asia and Africa, and eastern Europe and Latin America remain misshapen with poverty.

This terrific economic cleavage is the basis of the current social and political ideology. While industrial countries can preserve their prosperity only by retarding the economic development of the colonies and primary producer countries, the latter, cognisant of the sharp contrast of poverty within their own borders and plenty in the industrial countries, naturally aspire to industrialise themselves. The industrial countries must control the non-industrial countries or perish. Empire whether of the naked sword or of the mailed fist under velvet gloves strides over the non-industrial world. It marches with slogans of 'cosmopolitanism', 'open door', 'free trade' and 'good-will' but its real aim is to organise poverty, ignorance and degradation in the colonial lands. The non-industrial world rises in protest against imperial domination and meets it with the slogans of self-determination, national sovereignty, autarchy and nationalism. The struggle of the colonial people for freedom, justified by volumes of political theories, is fundamentally aimed at breaking the strangle-hold of monopoly capitalism.

The second great unbalance is the conflict of interests between the industrial countries themselves. The drive towards monopoly capitalism can succeed only if the owners of the monopolies agree over the division of profits. Unfortunately even while capitalism was in the first phase of competition opening up sources of

raw materials and markets involved division of the world into spheres of influence. Countries that were the earliest to industrialise were the first to partition the world among themselves. These like England, France and Holland became the "haves". The others like Germany and Japan became the 'have-nots'. When monopoly capitalism came the early divisions of the world among the great powers were found to be inequitable by the new industrial powers. Yet the monopoly gains were sought to be proportioned to the old legacies. Hence in spite of the profitability of monopolies the rentier classes in the various industrial countries could not develop solidarity. There grew up the contradiction of monopolies linking up countries and the rentier classes pulling them apart. Each industrial country sought to close itself against the products of the other. On the other hand each sought to dump its own products on the other country. Alongside, the various countries fell out between themselves over division of the world. Economic warfare complicated by armed conflicts and world wars became the crucible in which the conflicts between the great industrial powers sought to resolve themselves. Into these wars the colonial people are dragged by appeals and counter-appeals of the contesting powers.

The third great unbalance that follows from the piling up of claims against industries and the growth of monopolies is that profits and interests mount and get concentrated into the hands of a small class. As profit and interest rise wages fall. Thus it comes about that even the industrial countries which should be overflowing with plenty find the vast mass of the people just above starvation level while a small class has enough

and to spare. The bulk of the people have barely income enough to provide for a balanced consumption. The small class has income that cannot be spent over consumption and is almost helplessly accumulated into savings. Now what is saved does not go to purchase consumption goods. Unless it goes to purchase production goods the sum represented by savings would be a net diminution from prices. What industries pay out as costs including profit and interest must re-appear as prices realised by the sale of the products or there will be a fall in prices and production cannot be carried on at the old level. Savings must, therefore, be invested in capital goods or capitalist industries would collapse. In the early stages savings were invested in industries and industrialisation was helped in the mother country and abroad. With the growth of monopolies and economic warfare and autarchy and when the country where savings accumulate has all the rail-roads, shipping-yards, factories and other conceivable devices of production, the possibility of investment diminishes. This expresses itself in a fall of prices and in economic depressions whose true role is to write off the value of investments so as to make new investment at the old rate of profit possible. It seems, therefore, that capitalism must spin faster and faster if it has to maintain itself. For when production falls, the fall becomes progressively cumulative until inflated values of investment are written off and capitalism can start at a low enough level to begin further expansion. This problem of savings out-running investment, or, in other words, failure of effective demand is responsible for all the uncertainties in the industrial countries. The magnitude of the disparity will be clear from the fact that in 1935 the

U.S.A. provided new savings to the tune of 14 billion dollars while total investment in American industries was only 4 billion dollars. Ten billion dollars paid out as income and cost did not appear in prices and prices were bound to be depressed. This saving forms roughly 14 p.c. of the national income of the U.S.A. in 1935 at full employment. The same is true of England where saving formed 13 p.c. of the national income in 1913. England developed social services and in 1935 redistributed £150 million from the higher income groups to the lower income groups and thus helped consumption. Even so saving in England remained at 10 p.c. of the total income in 1935. It has been calculated that in fully industrialised countries like the U.S.A. and Britain barely 4 p.c. of the national income is needed for replacement of capital to set off against necessary wear and tear and obsolescence. The excess of savings becomes Midas's curse—a source of real poverty.

Not that Britain and the U.S.A. have reached the limit of their development. In 1935 when employment was highest after 1929 the U.S.A. had 10 million and Britain 2 million people unemployed. Britain with its enormous savings still tolerates the 'means test', the 'hunger-marches and the 'depressed' and special areas. In 1939 one-third of the people of Great Britain were below the minimum standard of physical health, clothing and housing. In the U.S.A. over a quarter of the urban houses, two-thirds of the rural non-farm houses and a quarter of the rural farm houses are substandard, lacking bath and proper repairs. Five-twelfths of the people are undernourished. Among first 2 million people of draft age for the army .9 million were physically or mentally unfit for army jobs. The selective

service Administration found in 1940 that over 10 million adults of 25 and over had less than fourth grade of education and could not understand newspapers.

Yet in 1938, the last pre-war year, British national income was £4,490 million and the American national income was \$64.2 billion. For a family of five persons this worked at Rs. 531 and Rs. 555 per month respectively. In India the monthly income of a family of five persons is only Rs. 27, i.e., one-twentieth of those of the U. K. and the U. S. A. Is it possible to speak of a standard of living for us ?

The stubborn fact is that while there is still room for development before standard of living in advanced industrial countries could come up to the proper level, development is not possible unless rate of profit approaches zero when no investment would be called unprofitable. In other words development is limited by the existence of profit motive in industries. The alternative is socialism, and the abolition of private property and profit.

Thus in industrial countries the real problem is to liquidate capitalism and to establish socialism; between the industrial countries the problem is to avoid imperial wars which is possible only if monopoly capitalism can be abolished; and in colonial and primary producer countries the problem is to industrialise after throwing away the strait-jacket of monopoly capitalism and imperial domination. All these problems spring directly from the contradictions and crisis of monopoly capitalism and all these will be solved if we can solve the problem of effective demand so as to ensure mass production economy to run at top speed. Then so far as physical

needs are concerned life will become a journey to be enjoyed rather than a battle to be fought. Men will no more suffer from 'chill penury' like brutes but will be tragic in the human and godly way. Animosities traceable to base materialism will be unthinkable.

In the context of India the three major un-balances are revealed in this way. As India is a colonial land the problem of waging imperial wars is not ours. We have been dragged into this world conflict merely because we are serfs of England. Our problem is how to turn this imperial war to our own advantage. Our real problem is to free us from the imperial yoke and to establish a total mass production economy in our country to raise our sub-human standard to the level of civilized human beings. Our problem is to see that the mass production economy that we are going to build up does not suffer from the demonstrable evils of private property and profit.

For let us not lose sight of the fact that fully 7 crores of our people go with one inadequate meal and 21 crores of us do not reach the standard of fair meal. Let us not forget that over 80 p.c. of our people are steeped in ignorance and illiteracy. Our expectation of life is 27 years against 62 years of England and 162 children out of a thousand die within one year from birth. Malaria, Cholera, Influenza and Tuberculosis play havoc with the under-nourished population.

Yet Providence never meant to doom us like this. We possess one of the greatest high grade iron-ore deposits in the world with reserves three-quarters of the size of those in the U.S.A. We have vast deposits of bauxite, chromite, mica, magnesite and copper. We

have great reserves of hydro-electric power, the third in the world.

But barely 3 p.c. of our power resources have been utilised. In 1931 less than 2 p.c. of the Indian workers were engaged in all firms of modern industry and this was a decline over the percentage of 1911. In the war production peak of 1942 we produced 2 million tons of finished steel against 16 million tons which was the peace year production in the U.S.A. in 1936. The American Economic Mission headed by Henry Grady that visited India in March, 1942, found that India's magnificent metallurgical resources were largely unused. Indian Industries were largely assembling plants. Indian labour was not inefficient. The chief engineer of the Mission found that Indian workers earning 65 cents. (Rs. 1/11-) a day in poorly-lighted factories were turning out excellent machine tools; that in the Fire-Stone Rubber plant in Bombay Indian workers were turning out as much per man as in the Fire-Stone works at Detroit; and that productivity per man in the Tata Steel works at Jamshedpur was as high as that in Pittsburg.

Our man power and resources promise us a standard of living at least as high as in the west. Preoccupation with seats and jobs under the state is wholly unreal. When education becomes universal, when 80 p.c. of the people who are pressing on land are reclaimed and spread over industries, it will be impossible to attach any importance to 1.34 p.c. of jobs under the state-jobs which are numerically fixed for generations.

Nor can appeal to religion be real. Those who take it into their heads to make religion the true or even the major determinant of our social life today must also.

assert that the present devastating world war is motivated by religion; that Russians and Americans quarrel over Persian oil and make their pilgrimage to Iran to inspire themselves with Islamic and Iranian ideas, or to redeem the Iranians by preaching to them the gospels of Christ: that the Japanese with their 'co-prosperity' slogans and the Allies with their 'four freedoms' are spreading their tentacles over the old world for religion: that the Allies' failure to agree over a world monetary arrangement or a world security plan can be traced to religious incompatibility.

No one would venture to make these assertions openly. Yet these problems have kept the world in turmoil and no others. To build a snug world on old religious ideas is like papering up yawning fissures of an unstable earth.

The communal problem in India is, therefore, a froth on the surface of the turgid social current. The superficial eddies may appear to move in all directions but the mighty sweep of social energy is moving with all the eddies in one direction only—to winning a decent and satisfactory material life by abolishing privilege, profit and property. We must keep our perspective. The communal problem is not fundamental. It is a superficial symptom of a corrosive social disease. It is this social disease that challenges our intelligence and effort.

CHAPTER III.

ARE MUSLIMS A DISTINCT POLITICAL GROUP? THE THEORY OF 'MUSLIM NATION.'

HERE baffled and lapped back by rocks, there sluggish over shoals and elsewhere sweeping through hollows, the flood of social energy is moving inexorably to overwhelming the great unbalances—the contrasts of wealth and poverty, privilege and degradation. In this general movement nothing is stable and no anchor too strong. Yet the surface eddy of communal politics spins faster and faster round privilege amidst froth and foam in a vain effort to keep stable in a crumbling world. This apparent stability of communal politics derives from the notion of privilege that is being fast uprooted. There are members in each community who aspire to a division in spoils. This alone would make communal politics bloodless. It is the desire to get more than what is due that sustains the communal controversy. This desire is most pronounced among Muslims. The Muslims under the leadership of the Moslem League first wanted special representation, then separate representation, then weightage, then equality in representation and lastly vivisection of India—all calculated to give priority and privilege to Muslims. But priority and privilege have their necessary negative pole—denial and degradation. The privileged must necessarily face the hostility of those who have been denied. This conflict cannot be resolved.

So much would be clear to the meanest intelligence. The glaring contrast is, therefore, sought to be mystified by appeal to foggy abstract slogans. Between privilege and priority the dividing line is thin and it is easy to confuse the two. Yet while privilege means unjustified inequality, some inequality is demonstrably justifiable. Thus an expectant mother needs more milk than an old maid and a child more than either. In a sane distribution the child, the expectant mother and the old maid will get their supply of milk in that order of priority. Yet it would be foolish to arrange them in the same order of priority if it were a question of providing cinema shows or giving tram rides. It is important to mark the difference. From the point of view of nutrition the classification according to the above categories is vital. From the point of view of entertainment it is meaningless. Yet there is a curious weakness in our understanding. We tend to assume that agreement or difference on one point must express itself in agreement or difference on all points. 'Some' tends to be confused with 'all'—an ordinary logical fallacy. A difference that justifies priority in some respects becomes the spearhead of privilege in many other respects.

This subtle foible in our understanding has been too much exploited.

The Muslims say they are different from the Hindus. Lest we may be too curious to analyse the difference and pin it down they say they are different nation. Nationality has been never clearly defined and its connotation is flexible. It is an unfortunate abstract expression which has become too intractable in India. If

The Muslims had said that they are different from the Hindus in that they are "*arbacadabra*" the difference would have been more far-reaching precisely because it would have been far less intelligible. If Muslims are different, as in some respects they certainly are, why should not they have a differential treatment, and, therefore, a privileged treatment? The argument seems irresistible to our lazy minds. So much has the difference been stressed that we seem to be prepared to believe that Muslims cannot be judged by rational canons. Hence the hush hush policy urged by otherwise eminent people who say we must not probe the mystery of the difference. By analysing it we would only offend Muslim sentiments more certainly.

Yet if our analysis is sound, the justification for privilege and priority must be sought in needs and not in fancies. What are the peculiar needs of the Muslims that must be protected? In other words, what are the significant differences? What are the differences at all?

We need not wade through the formulations of petty theorists to find out the differences. Let us go straight to the Arch-Muslim—the Qaid-e-Azam. In him, if anywhere, Muslim exclusivism must be most fully developed. He refers to the differences with militant insistence. He wants to establish the dictatorship of the Muslim League and must show the League as the Muslimest of all Muslim organisations. He would thus be most conscious of the uniqueness of Islam. He is also universally regarded as a competent and clever advocate of his cause. His formulation would, therefore, be most authoritative and enlightening.

COMMUNAL PROBLEM IN INDIA

Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah has been very reluctant to enumerate the differences. Beyond repeating that Muslims are a separate nation, he has contented himself with merely hinting that differences exist and that they are serious. In his letter of 17th September, 1944 to Gandhiji, he was, however, led to formulate his position with the greatest concreteness that has ever been attempted by him. In this letter he says:

"We are a nation of 100 millions with a distinctive culture and civilization; language and literature; names and nomenclature; sense of values and proportion; customs and calendar; history and tradition; aptitude and ambition; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life."

Mark the phrases 'culture', 'civilization', 'sense of values and proportion', 'aptitude' and 'outlook'. These phrases are abstract like ether and cannot be grasped. They cannot be pinned down to concreteness and thus defy judgment. About them any statement will be equally valid. They are too much of the mind and the heart and too little of the external reality of the army, navy and air force; of international politics; trade and commerce; currency and coinage; railways and post; electrification and industries; of agriculture; of universities and laboratories; of forests and mines with which the state has to grapple.

The array of abstract phrases we have quoted from Mr. Jinnah has a deceptive magnitude. In fact they do not stand for distinct things but indicate the same ethereal nebula which could be as well summed up in the single phrase 'outlook'. Mr. Jinnah has attempted

an essay in synonyms but repelition cannot add to an argument.

'Outlook' in any case is too subjective to be recognised as a significant difference for purposes of social life. Even as it is, it is impossible to speak of a single outlook predominating the Muslims. Mr. Jinnah wedded to European ways, taking pride in speaking the language of our masters, having no religious inhibitions in matters of matrimony and social intercourse with non-Muslims (witness his daughter's marriage with a Christian Parsi) cannot have the same outlook as the stolid Muslim peasant in the village who clings to the ways of his fathers. Nor can the Aga Khan who carries his medieval religious role with the same indifference as his modern activities on the 'turf' have an outlook identical with the outlook either of the Muslim divine or of the Muslim peasant. The fact of the matter is that while there is a sense in speaking of the individual's outlook there is no mystic connection between the Muslims as a group and it is misuse of language to speak of the Muslim as having a single outlook distinct from outlook of other groups.

When we emerge from the cloud-cuckoo land of dreams and fantasies where in the words of the Shakespearean witches "fair is foul" and 'foul is fair', we find Mr. Jinnah taking his stand on certain other factors on which judgment is possible.

Thus he asserts that Muslims have a language and literature different from those of the Hindus.

Is there any truth in the assertion that Muslims have a distinct language? What language do the Muslims in the Punjab, in Bengal, in Sind, in the

N.W.F.P. and for that matter anywhere else in India employ except Punjabi, Bengali, Sindhi, Pushtu and the other local languages which are equally employed by the Hindus of those localities? These languages have nothing peculiarly Muslim about them. Nor have they any mystical identity that would link them with a Muslim language. The Hindu converts to Islam had no overwhelming reason to change their territorial language when they embraced Islam.

In supersession of these provincial languages the Muslim League has been popularising Urdu which has begun to be held out as a Muslim language par excellence. Urdu, however, is an indigenous language. The nauseating controversy over Hindi *versus* Urdu in which mainly ignorant agitators have joined issue cannot make Hindi and Urdu two different languages. The true test of language is in the syntax and inflexions, and not in the roots. Hindi and Urdu are an identical language by this test. When the handful of Muslims came to India it was not possible for them to impose an alien language upon the people. Some few could learn the language of the Muslim aliens but sheer logic of economy drove the outsiders to adopt the languages already at hand for communication with the people. The aliens carried into these languages words and phrases of their own language but the indigenous languages could not be metamorphosed. The influx of Arabic, Persian and Turkish words was common to all the provincial languages of India—to Punjabi on the west as well as to Bengali on the east. But as accident of history made the Delhi and Meerut region the metropolis of India, it was the local dialect of this region which became the standard language of the educated classes during

the Muslim rigime. This local dialect of Delhi-Meerut region was quite allied to Brajbhasa, Magadhi, Bhojpurī, Awadhi and other sister dialects and even the illiterate mass found no difficulty in adopting this language. Except for some confusion about gender and other provincial peculiarities they can speak and understand this standard language all over northern India.

This standard language which is more correctly called Hindustani—is the language both of Muslims and Hindus in northern India. Confusion seems to have arisen mainly by forgetting that language is primarily the spoken word. When people contemplate the language controversy, however, it is the written and printed page that dances before their eyes and the written pages are very dissimilar indeed. This dissimilarity is, however, on account of the difference in scripts. Now script is not the essence of the language. The Roman script serves as a medium for English, French, Spanish, and practically all the west European languages. Even Turkish has abandoned the archaic and defective Arabic script and assumed the Roman garb. In India Santali and other tribal languages which had no definite script are being given the Roman garb by the missionaries. Similarly Sanskrit is written in Devanagari script in the north, in Tamil script in the south and in Roman script in the European continent. The essentials of the language are not changed by the variety in the scripts. Hindustani whether in Persian or in Devanagari script remains Hindustani.

It is indeed true that the Persian script is mainly popular among the Muslims and the Devanagari script among the Hindus. The former go to Persian and

Arabic for words that are not already in popular use and the latter to Sanskrit. Hindustani written in Persian script—popularly called Urdu—has thus a larger admixture of Arabic and Persian words than Hindustani in Devanagari script. This is, however, only a difference in style on the lines of the difference between Latinised English and Pure English. Basically the choice of words is a result of personal factors—upbringing and education. Until recently the two styles of Hindustani—Hindi and Urdu—tended to get wide apart. But a new healthy trend has appeared towards preference for simple, indigenous and easily understood vocabulary. The two styles are rapidly coming close to each other. As writers and thinkers of vigour arise who must demand hearing from Kashmir to the Cape the affected style will pass out of vogue. Literature will no more remain imprisoned in the jargons of a coterie of scholars but would emerge into the spaciousness of popular understanding. Hindi and Urdu would have then become identical. Bold adoption of standardised scientific and technical terms as used in the west would also obviate vain search for uncouth equivalents in Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit. Science has been the distinctive contribution of the west and we must not fight shy of western expressions in which science has garnered its results.

Inevitably, therefore, Urdu remains only a style of Hindustani and has little that is Muslim about it.

If there is no Islamic language in India, the very medium of an Islamic literature is lacking. After all Hindus and Muslims have the same world of matter and idea to speak and write about. As human psychology

is uniform—two and two makes four for all who are at all rational—our reaction to ideas and matter is fundamentally alike. If there is difference in experience, it is purely an individual and not a group characteristic. That is why labelling science and literature according to nationalities and groups is a pedantic nonsense. When true they are one for all humanity. Were it not so we would not be able to enjoy and appreciate literatures remote from us in time and space such as modern English and ancient Greek.

Whatever literature in Persian, Arabic and Urdu has been produced in India has been the joint product of Hindu and Muslim genius. Munshi Premchand set a standard in Urdu novels before he turned his genius to enriching fiction in Hindi. Any *moshaira* in Allahabad and Lucknow would show Hindus invoking the Muses in Urdu as successfully as Muslims.

But apart from Urdu, Indian writers have written little in Arabic and not very much in Persian. With the classics going out of fashion literary creation has been more and more confined to Urdu which we have found only to be a variation of Hindustani. When Muslims claim that they have a distinctive Islamic literature they refer to appreciation much more than to creation of literature. A larger proportion of Muslims read Persian and Arabic, it is said, than do Hindus. This is indeed true but the proportion of Muslim literates attaining high literary merit in Arabic and Persian is declining with the triumphant march of the vernaculars. Even as it is Hindus particularly in the Punjab and the U. P., are not very much behind hand in their appreciation of literature in Persian, Arabic

and Urdu. Pandit Motilal Nehru and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru have delighted in these literatures as innocent Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Fazlul Haq have never done. And today the great poetry that Qazi Nazrul Islam is pouring forth in Bengali thrills millions of Muslims even as it thrills vast millions of Hindus in Bengal. Hindus repeat the simpler poems of Iqbal with as much pleasure as the Muslims. His 'Hindustan hamara' is a literary heritage of all-India. And have we not heard unaccustomed Muslim lips reciting rich and ornate Hindi poems popularised by the great leveller—the cinema ?

Literature and language do not distinguish Hindus from Muslims except in the most superficial sense.

From the heights of language and literature Mr. Jinnah stumbles to the depths of 'names and nomenclature'. As if the two have an importance coordinate enough to be mentioned in the same breath. But we cannot trifle with this distinction. Have not battles raged round objectives as inessential as names like 'Vidya Mandir'? But perhaps we are fated to stumble on Hindu names which throng the horizon. Till 1000 A.D. when Islam came, India had not been slumbering. The mountains, rivers and the seas and all the splendours of the universe had been noted and named by the Hindus. When Islam came there was little in the external nature to be named afresh. It is, therefore, futile to be angry if the northern mountains are called 'Himralaya' and the rivers called "Ganga" and 'Sindh'—all Hindu names.

New nomenclature has a meaning when you have a new idea to express. When Hindus have achieved

the renaissance, the creative new ideas were inevitably expressed by Hindu nomenclature. Expressions like 'Satyagrah', 'Kisan-Sabha', 'Talimi Sangh', 'Charkha Sangh', 'Vidya Mandir', 'Vishwabharati' and 'Swarajya' have been of Hindu origin as it was Hindus who conceived the sublime ideas which had to be named. Similarly Muslims perfected a revenue system and many legal and revenue words are of Muslim nomenclature. 'Malguzari', 'Dewani', 'adalat', munsif, 'vakil', 'abwabs', and other expressions stand for ideas conceived by Muslims. Significant new names can arise only as incident to creativeness. Instead of quarrelling over nomenclature let us be creative.

Unfortunately we conceal tremendous trifles behind imposing names. We carry the load of servility to ridiculous lengths. In China a Muslim can be a good Muslim without an Arab or a Persian name. His Chinese name indicates his true identity. So in Russia. In India, however, the convert to Islam borrows an outlandish Arab or Persian name and conceals his true identity behind borrowed feathers. "Etwarei Dome" when converted to Islam becomes Abdur Rahman and might falsely pass as an Arab.

'Names and nomenclature' do not make a fundamental difference. The essence of things is not varied. The skies will not be bluer nor honey sweeter if instead of 'akash' and 'madhu' we called them 'asman' and 'shahad'. Nor will the mystery of life be solved if instead of 'atma' we used the word 'ruh'.

'Customs and calendar' is mentioned as another distinction. Muslims do determine their days of feasts and fasts with reference to the Hijri calendar. The

religious customs and practices are also bound to be different from those of the Hindus. Both these flow from the religious difference which we shall consider shortly. Such differences are, however, very few indeed. The more important social customs and behaviours are identical both for Hindus and Muslims. Islam when it began to take recruits from the natives—and 95 per cent of Muslims are sprung from Hindu converts—could not write off the social heritage of the ages. The converts carried the existing customs and practices bodily into Islam, and, in the process, instead of becoming Islamic in the foreign mould, Indianised Islam. Today Sheiks and Momins form rigid castes even as Brahmins and Sudras among Hindus and the believer in one God worships at the 'dargahs' of Pirs.

Nor can it be said that Hindus all over this subcontinent have uniform customs and calendars. Feasts and fasts of one region are not found in another. Even in a single province, say Bihar, agricultural and business year varies from place to place—being Fasli, Amlī or Sambat as the case may be. We are familiar with the two main varieties of Hindu law, the Dayabhag school of Bengal and the Mitakshara school of the rest of India. We know that calendars also differ according as they are of the Benares school, Mithila school or Madras school.

Thus customs and calendars cannot be regarded as an essential and invariable difference.

What is the truth in Mr. Jinnah's assertion that Muslims have a distinct history and tradition? Now we are already outgrowing the usual history that consisted of intrigues of royal harems, dynastic wars of the

emperors and the chronology of personalities. Our history began long before there were historians to chronicle it. In the words of Walter de la Mare "very old are we men".

Will the Muslims of India regard the history of man in India before 1000 A.D. as of no interest to them? Will the vistas that the excavations of Mohenjodaro open up before our eyes fail to thrill the Indian Muslims? Will the caravans of various races descending into the plains of Hindustan and mingling together under the magic spell of this great land be visions that the Muslims of India must shut out?

Will the hoary literature of the Vedas and the Upanishads, and the epics of the Ramayan and the Mahabharat be of no worth to the Indian Muslims even though the Germans in spite of their Christianity find abiding sustenance in them and the Soviet state is making the immortal Mahabharat available to its citizens in a translation that is proceeding even during this total war? Does not Christian Europe turn to the pagan history of ancient Greece and Rome for sustenance and is it not proud to call itself the child of 'Hellas'?

Are Indian Muslims going to be upstarts on the stage of history who can trace no noble ancestry before 1000 A.D.? Is it to the credit of Muslims in India that Arabs spread their empire to the shores of the Atlantic? Are they to glory in the destruction of the noble temples of Mathura and Somnath? In the imposition of 'Jiziya' on the non-Muslims? In the persecution of the Sikh Gurus? In the destruction of the great library and university of Nalanda?

Or shall we both Hindus and Muslims drink at the founts of wisdom to which the Sufis gave rise; which Akbar sought to broaden; which Kābir, Raskhan, Khan-khana, Malik Mohammad Jayasi and other nation builders deepened with their unfailing toils?

Shall we not, Hindus and Muslims, equally lament the passing away of Indian freedom in the middle of the eighteenth century and our common humiliation over the two centuries of alien domination when the glory of history-making was denied to Hindus and Muslims impartially?

Shall we again not venerate the fighters of freedom both Hindus and Muslims, men to whom our hearts open instinctively—men like Badruddin Tyabji, Sir Ali Imam, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Maulana Azad as well as Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr. Rajendra Prasad? Are not these men creating our common history? Are not our poets like Tagore and Iqbal and scientists like Sir C. V. Raman, Sir Mohammad Sulaiman, Sir J. C. Bose, Dr. P. C. Roy and philosophers like Sir Radha Krishnan adding lustre both to Hindus and Muslims?

When true history of India comes to be written we all shall find much to rejoice in our non-Muslim ancestry and much to shame us in what passes as Muslim history in India today? Equally we shall find much to condemn in our past and much to cherish in our Indo-Muslim history.

We have already referred to the distinctive elements "civilization and culture", "sense of values and proportion," "aptitude and ambition" and "outlook". These soothing phrases lull the senses and Mr. Jinnah seems to

have been hypnotised by them. We search for a stable kernel of meaning in them in vain. So far as the material aspects of 'civilisation' are concerned, it would be preposterous to call the Hindus and Muslims distinct. Both of them have the civilisation of an agrarian country with decaying artistic industries and handicrafts. Both of them are essentially rural for towns are few in India. Both of them are innocent of the use of modern devices in their homes and surroundings for the industrial civilisation that is slowly spreading over the world, swamping out the mosaic varieties of the past has left India largely untouched. The food and dress and housing of both comes from the rural economy in which they are enmeshed—grains and cereals with little by way of fruit, meat and milk in food; cotton textiles for wear and mud houses with tiled or straw roof for living. If civilisation is to be judged by external tests, there is only one civilisation in India: agrarian—rural.

The outlook engendered by this material environment must be also similar for both Hindus and Muslims. Dependence on wind and weather must make for fatalism; isolation of rural life must make for ignorance and narrow-mindedness; the steadily diminishing size of the small farms must make for jealousy and discontent. The Hindu and Muslim, helpless and resigned to fate, ignorant and narrow-minded, jealous and discontented, may differ in outward appearance. One may carry his tuft of hair in a patch on the head and the other on the chin; one may carry a *lota* and the other a *badhana*; one may invoke his God as Allah and the other as Bhagwan; one may pray in a building different in appearance from the prayer hall of the other. But those who cannot penetrate through these surface masks to

the 'tragic soul of every Indian—essentially alike in his hopes and regrets; joys and sorrows, are verily blind. They have not been able to see the grain within the chaff.

It is these visionless men who exploit the mischief of abstract words. They tell us with a show of profundity that civilisation and culture as indicated by music, painting, the arts, literature and language, philosophy and metaphysics differ for Hindus and Muslims. Sober students have not been able to detect anything distinctively Hindu or Muslim in these fields. In fact the same language has become the vehicle of different religions and philosophies. Witness the Hebrew language which enshrined Jewish culture and faith serving equally well as a medium for the Christian Bible. Witness, too, how Sanskrit served ancient Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism alike and has been available equally for philosophies so widely apart as the 'Sankhya' and the 'Yoga'. English is as handy for the crudest description of the cosmos by a smug churchman as for the description of Jeans's Mathematical God.

Thus all that has language for medium such as poetry and folk-lore; religion and philosophy; the sciences and arts including music is from its very nature universal. It is true that motif and idea depends on the individual who creates and expresses himself. In Hindustani a Hindu may strike a note recognisably different from a Muslim. But for this Hindustani would not be a Hindu language at one time and Muslim at another. Nor will the poem be a Hindu poem in one case and Moslem in another. The truth of the matter is that both art and literature in India are the composite product of Indian genius—several strands mingling in a grand harmony.

In his letter to Gandhiji Mr. Jinnah does not say that socially Hindus are different from Muslims. But he has frequently used the argument of 'untouchability' and caste among Hindus to prove that Hindus are inherently incapable of an equalitarian democracy. Islam, on the other hand, is shown to be equalitarian through and through. It is true that Hinduism did not find a place for Muslims and Christians in its own familiar caste structure. Non-Hindus have been always looked down upon as outcastes. But caste breaks even the Hindus and between two castes generally there is no contact through intermarriage or common participation in water and food. Yet merely because there is restriction about food and matrimony castes do not fight among themselves. Transcending the caste distinctions, is the great fact that culturally all Hindus are one. The same is true when we consider the relations between Hindus and non-Hindus. By long association they have forged contacts and assimilated a culture that binds them together.

Even untouchability as a social stigma is largely disappearing. And if there is snobbishness of birth and pedigree among Hindus, the Sheikhs and the Momins are not immune from the vice. The theoretical equality of Islam does not prevent the emergence of a social hierarchy as rigid and watertight as among Hindus and anywhere else. Even in England where the social system admits of the greatest flexibility a commoner would in vain look for matrimony with a nobleman's family.

But money is a great solvent of social snobbishness. The rich man surmounts all the impediments offered

by his caste and creed and race. The poor man founders even when his blood is the bluest.

This leads us to the economic position of Muslims vis-a-vis other groups. Studied efforts have been made to guard against searchlight playing upon the economic position of the various groups. Louis Fischer with his fresh outlook clearly saw the equality in hell enjoyed by all Indians—pathetic followers of mighty Islam no less than of eternal Hinduism. The destitution, the squalor, and the fatalism that stalks the land embraces all Indians impartially. It is sometimes said that Muslims are a poorer and a more backward community and for this reason they must have special treatment. Wealth and poverty, however, do not go by religion. The only truth in this assertion is that the decline of Indian industries, particularly textiles; the disappearance of indigenous powers with their large armies and retainers; the languishing of the maritime trade of India; and so forth spelled greater disaster to the Muslims who were prominently employed in these avenues. No alternative avenues offered to absorb them and Muslims had to suffer real hardship for a time.

A more positive cause was provided by the early Indo-British history. Hindus have been providing the personnel of the revenue administration of the successive governments in India, native and foreign; Muslim and British. Todar-mal and Mansingh are classic instances of Hindu domination of revenue administration in the Mogul days. The British stepped into the pre-existing system and found the Hindu personnel indispensable. The Hindus were, therefore, the first to come into contact with the British and were obliged to learn English.

The early attraction of English was, however, not for its wealth of literature and science but because it enabled the 'Baboos' to understand their British master's instructions and because it enabled the British officer to ignore the native language. Thus arose the 'Baboo' English which draws the British ridicule to this day. In 1832 Macaulay's efforts introduced English education earnestly. Macaulay's aims were not to give widespread literacy and education to Indians and English could not serve as a suitable medium. He wanted to win over the handful of the Indian aristocracy to English ways and clearly gave out that the English education was intended to create "a class Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect". The rise of the Indian educated class which was in the beginning Hindu was thus an accident of British decisions. By 1858 there were universities in the three Presidency towns and education made rapid strides. In 1882 came the Punjab university and in 1887 the university at Allahabad. By 1885 the Calcutta university was already overburdened. The Muslims both because they were suspects after the Mutiny and were humiliated, and because they had not the early start, were very late in adopting English education and naturally the jobs as they were being thrown out to Indians went mainly to Hindus. The latter also established themselves in law and the professions. The result was a disparity between the Hindu and the Muslim intelligentsia in employments and professions. The disparity was to no small degree a result of British discrimination in favour of the Hindus until the eighties of the last century of which more would be said later.

The operation of the two factors did put the Muslims to some disadvantage but they affected only the handful of the traditional professional classes and the Muslim higher class. These classes, however, do not comprise more than a very small percentage of the Muslims and the masses both Hindus and Muslims have been reduced to the same abject state of destitution by the steam-roller of British imperialism. Against the background of the vast mass this disparity in the growth of the "classes" would appear to be a minor problem of economic adjustment which has little to do with religion. Besides the slight backwardness of the Muslims is not a stable trait that may require special treatment permanently.

One real difference between Hindus and Muslims is of religion. The Muslims have their own form of prayer, their own days of feasts and fasts, and their own method of organising religious parades, pageants and processions. Does anything material follow from this distinction? Very little. For so long as religion remains a matter of the brain content of the faithfuls no adjustment is demanded from society. It matters very little whether you walk the highway sad or jubilant; gay or pensive; what society demands of you is that you shall obey the laws of the road and not clash with your fellow pedestrians. Hindus and Muslims can yet walk in peace while their hearts may be filled with the awe and mystery of a divine and supernatural order.

Expressed outwardly religion raises no other issues than those of freedom of movement and association, speech and observances. Whether these rights are demanded in the way of God or only to further trade

union and political aims, the same essential principles are involved—principles of civil rights. The secular authority of the police, the courts and the magistracy is daily regulating the exercise of the civil rights. The one consideration that matters is that the freedom of one will be consistent with the freedom of others.

We mean no irreverence to the faithfuls when we reduce their solemn religious processions to the category of the political demonstration of the noisy mob. For to society the regulation of the form is important and not the content.

Religion is, however, the slender foundation on which much is being built. This becomes possible because 'religion' is notoriously vague in its content. It includes, for instance, ethics and moral precepts. It prescribes methods of marriage and in most cases laws of succession. It includes a theory of the origin and structure of the cosmos. All these elements are changeable with the developing life of humanity. Science, metaphysics and philosophy have already cut the umbilical cord that bound them to organised faiths. Laws of marriage and succession are being daily changed. Ethics itself is growing and none would deny that a general world consciousness is shaping on the conception of good life firmly rooted in reason.

Yet on these fading religious relics and petrified dogmas Mr. Jinnah bases the theory of the 'Muslim nation'. The word 'nation' is a magic chant. In its name imperial powers have justified wars of enslavement. In its name privileges have been demanded from the weak and the poor states. What, would not be.

tolerated in the behaviour between individuals is readily accepted in the behaviour between nations. War and blackmail mark their uneasy relationship. Mr. Jinnah is trying to create a nation out of the religious community of Muslims so that demands that would be shocking when raised by a citizen could be tolerated when made by a Muslim.

Can the Muslims be called a nation? The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'nation' as 'an extensive aggregate of people so closely associated with each other by common descent, language or history as to form a distinct race or people, usually recognised as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory'.

Are Muslims united by a common descent? Do they form a homogeneous racial stock in India? No anthropologist believes in the existence of pure races. Race has no doubt been used in politics, notably in Germany, but it remains a mystic political expression. The fusion of races in India has proceeded to such lengths that it is now difficult to disentangle the racial make up of any one of us.

There are indeed mixed ethnic groups which as a result of history and mainly by homogeneity of language can be recognised as distinct and stable historical communities. Thus while it is not possible to find an Indian who is an Aryan or Dravidian, there are languages and culture-patterns answering these types. Ethnic groups and nationalities can be identified but cannot be defined. They are the result of lasting identity of language, territory and economic life and psychology. When traceable such nationalities would be found to be occupying compact areas which would be convenient

administrative units. Roughly such groups are the Andhras, the Tamils, the Malayalese and the Kánarese in the south; the Gujeratis, the Sindhis and the Marathas on the west; the Oriyas, the Bengalis, and the Assamese on the east. In northern and central India such groups are hard to find. Muslims are not a distinct race and except for the Sindhis are not even a historical community.

Language and history we have considered already and there is nothing distinctively Muslim about them.

Nor have the Muslims been under a distinct political organisation. The steam-roller of British conquest obliterated all political organisations and for a century now India has been governed as a unit even in spite of the pseudo-sovereignty of the princes in their own states-

The common political life and a common legal system enforcing identical conduct among all has not encouraged variety in communal life. What the British system has achieved has been a common all-out thralldom of all Indians—the ruthless exploitation by an alien imperialism of all our moral and material resources. If nothing else our common slavery unites us all and demands of us a common struggle for freedom. This unity transcends all divisions and Mr. Jinnah's distinction between old slaves and new cannot mystify this flaming fact.

As to territory Muslims do not have exclusive occupation of any. Even in the so-called Moslem zones of north-west and east, they are swarmed by the vast masses of non-Muslims. While these factors do not make the Muslims a distinct nation, they certainly make Indians a homogeneous nation. Indians are agreed in

having a common descent, a common history, identity of language, a common political organisation, and, what is most important, a common territory and a common imperial subjection.

Mr. Jinnah has, therefore, wisely refrained from mentioning territory and a common political, economic and geological environment—the major determinants of nationality. His own bases of nationality are hollow and untenable and he knows this well. Churn as much as we would, Muslims differ from Hindus only in the minor religious sense. They are thus only a religious minority. The petty religious difference cannot rear them into a nation. Muslims in China and Russia are not nations and cannot demand exclusive treatment. What is logic in the Soviet Union and in China cannot work differently in India. Everywhere in India, in the hundreds of thousands of villages and the scores on scores of towns, Muslims are surrounded by overwhelming masses of Hindus. Living for centuries in close neighbourhood of Hindus, speaking the same language, governed by the same laws, dominated by the same economic environment—the Muslims have become assimilated with Hindus and the narrow religious difference has been drowned.

'Muslim' and 'Hindu' have become personal attributes. These phrases cannot be employed as a source of power and privilege. Merely because a Muslim is a Muslim he cannot need and far less deserve greater material comforts than Hindus. As a Muslim he deserves greater faith but not more jobs, more food, and more power. The differences between Hindus and Muslims are evanescent and are not significant enough.

to justify discrimination. Moslems are no distinct political group and certainly not a nation.

The difference in religion did not stand in the way of evolution of the Indian people into a more or less homogeneous society. No other result is possible when people live in close neighbourhood for centuries. Action and reaction between the people is inevitable and myriads of agreements are necessarily forged. The culture and way of life cannot be immune from the fertilising influence of contact. The fruitful association has left its mark on history. The Urdu language; the cult of Satyapir; the liberal patronage of Jaunpur and Bengal of the Sanskrit language; the translation of Sanskrit books into Persian and Arabic and vice-versa; the Sufi mysticism; Nanak, Kabir and Chaitanya; Amir Khusru, Khankhana and Ras Khan; and Akbar, the dreamer of a united India, are symptomatic of the great fusion of distinct cultures, of the evolution of a common culture. After Plassey Indian people also came to have common historical tradition. Social and political life developed through the centuries in entire disregard of the religious differences. Hindus are quite conscious of the pervasive new culture. The discordant note has been struck only by some Muslim leaders of recent days. This note is absolutely novel during the thousand years of Muslim history in India. This discordant cry of a handful of Muslim Leaguers is a political slogan and does not represent authentic history. Little has happened since 1935 to justify the reversal of all history. Against the strained arguments fashioned for imperial ends by the European Principals of the Aligarh College and lately revived by Mr. Jinnah that Muslims are a separate nation we have the consistent views of illus-

trious Muslims whose knowledge and scholarship is beyond reproach. These Muslims cannot be supposed to be working against Muslim interests and their views have greater force than those of even impartial outsiders. They have the evidentiary force of admission.

Here are samples :

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, father of Muslim politics, whom nature meant to be the leader of all India and who was a nationalist in the beginning but whose views were warped after 1885 by the insidious influence of the Aligarh Principals, while championing the Indian demand in the Viceroy's Council said :

"In the word nation I include both Hindus and Mohammedans because that is the only meaning I can attach to it."

"With me it is not worth considering what is their religious faith, because we do not see anything of it. What we do see is that we inhabit the same land, are subject to the rule of the same governors, the fountains of benefit for all are the same and the pangs of famine also we suffer equally..."

On another occasion he pointed out : "Those who live in any particular country constitute a nation. Hindu and Muslim are religious terms Hindus, Muslims and Christians who live in this country constitute one nation. When they form a nation, their civic interest must be the same. The time has passed when inhabitants of a country following different religions could be considered separate nations."

Sir Ali Imam presiding at the session of the National Muslim Party at Lucknow said :

* Quoted in *Communal Triangle*, pages 123-124.

"If I were asked why I have such abiding faith in Indian Nationalism, my answer is that without that India's freedom is an impossibility. Separate electorate connotes negation of nationalism."

He also asserted that as President-elect of the Conference he had been flooded with messages from every corner of India from the different leaders who one and all insisted on the basic principle of joint electorate.

Sir Syed Wazir Hasan, ex-Chief Judge, Oudh Chief Court, presiding over the Bombay Session of the League in April, 1936, said: "Even in the past there was no difference on essentials and there is none now. The differences in detail have ceased to exist. Is there any moral justification left for perpetuating differences, when the supreme need of the country in its struggle for freedom is unity?"

In March 1940 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who has been recognised as a great Muslim savant all through the Islamic world and whose great insight into Islamic religion, culture and philosophy is unequalled; presiding over the fifty-third session of the Indian National Congress at Ramgarh uttered words of deep conviction and wisdom when he said:

"It was India's historic destiny that many human races and cultures and religions should flow to her, finding home in her hospitable soil and that many caravans should rest here..One of the last of these caravans following the footsteps of its predecessors was that of the followers of Islam. This led to a meeting of the culture-currents of two different races. Like the Ganga and the Jumna they flowed for a while through

separate courses; but Nature's immutable law brought them together and joined them in a Sangam.

"The thousand years of our joint life have moulded us into a common nationality. This cannot be done artificially. Nature does her fashioning through hidden processes in the course of centuries. The cast has now been moulded and destiny has set the seal upon it. Whether we like it or not we have now become an Indian Nation, united and indivisible. No fantasy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity."

In April, 1940, Khan Bahadur Allahbux presiding over the All-India Independent Muslim Conference at Delhi said :

"A majority of the ninety million Indian Muslims who are descendants of the earlier inhabitants of India are in no sense other than sons of the soil. The nationals of different countries cannot divest themselves of their nationality merely by embracing one or the other faith."

At the same conference Mufti Kifayetullah, president of Jamiat-ul-Ulema, moved the main resolution : "India with its geographical and political boundaries is an indivisible whole and as such it is the common homeland of all the citizens, irrespective of race or religion, who are joint owners of its resources. All nooks and corners of the country contain hearths and homes of the Muslims and the cherished monuments of their religion and culture. From the national point of view every Muslim is an Indian."

Sir Md. Iqbal felt this unity with the intuition of a seer and enshrined it in his immortal poem "Hindustan hamara".

These eminent Muslims whose powers of observation and experience cannot be challenged and whose views are consistent with the thousand years of Muslim history in India cannot be hostile to Islam. Their statements undermine the very foundation of the new-fangled cry of the Muslim Leaguers that Muslims are a separate political group. This separatist cry must have other explanations.

Baffled by the enormous pressure of facts, Mr. Jinnah seeks his refuge in fancies. If facts unite us, why cannot we be different in dreams? Mr. Jinnah, therefore, invokes 'aptitude and ambition' as a cohesive force to bind the Muslims into a nation.

What is the peculiar aptitude of the Muslims and what is their ambition has never been clearly stated in the polemical literature of the League. The refrain, however, seems to be to developing a free Islamic life in a distinct 'homeland'. It is glibly asserted that Muslims must live their own cultural life. Now Islamic culture or way of life whatever it may mean is generally supposed to be a static idea. Ways of life opposed to or different from the established Islamic conception would be called un-Islamic or non-Islamic both equally damnable. This is, however, a most unsatisfactory view of culture. Culture is ever growing and changing and is not susceptible of being forced into particular moulds. To fix culture precisely is to pronounce its doom.

But even if we sought to preserve a mummified culture would it be possible to live according to the laws of Islam? Kahlil Gibran, the mystic, has a beautiful parable to tell of the 'Blessed City' where every one lived according to the laws. A stranger visiting that city was shocked to find that every one in the city had only one eye and only one arm. The mystery was solved when the priests took him to the altar where lay a heap of eyes and arms all withered. "What conqueror hath committed this cruelty upon you," asked the stranger, amazed and shocked. "God hath made us conquerors over the evil that was in us," said the deluded citizens. They were living according to the Christian maxim that if the right eye offend or the right arm, it should be plucked out or cut off "for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell". By the time they had grown into adulthood the right eye and the right arm had certainly offended and consistent with the laws were as certainly cast away. The maxim did not speak of the 'left' eye and the 'left' arm, and, even though they might offend they remained intact. The stranger ran away as he had two eyes and was an adult and knew the scriptures. He did not fit into the "Blessed City".

The moral is clear. The faithful must mutilate himself and commit suicide. We cannot live as a "whole man" if we live according to the laws and maxims laid down at one particular time and in one single book. The tragedy of Islam is that it is heavily weighed by authority and is reluctant to depart from the stereotyped tenets. The inexorable law of growth baffled by the barrier of authority proceeds in devious

ways under the subterfuge of comments and the mask of prudery.

In the words of Emerson : "A foolish consistency is the hob-goblin of little minds. He who would be a man must be a non-conformist." In fact, we cannot conform, even if we would. For has not the Gita said, "one is helplessly driven to action, such is the property of Nature?" Situations are arising that the Islam of the sixth century could not have anticipated. They must be met in non-Islamic ways even by the Muslimest of Muslims.

And could the purity of an Islamic homeland be respected, even if achieved? In the capital of Muslim Iran Stalin and Churchill—non-Muslims—plan new tasks for the world and yoke the noble Iranians to those aims. In Cairo of Muslim Egypt the British and American troops are polluting the sanctity of Islam. In the Soviet Union directions from a non-Islamic Kremlin mould the lives of millions of Muslims. If the stalwarts fall, could the Indian Muslims, poor, enslaved, broken into fragments, succeed in pursuing a free Islamic life in the sequestered zones of Pakistan?

It is a mad ambition, Mr. Jinnah. You are pursuing a mirage. Shall we reduce the Indian polity to a playground of blind emotions and of ambitions demonstrably insane? In Central Europe they have found out what it means to base the state on passion and prejudice. The tortured, the expropriated, the hunted fugitives walk ghost-like on the darkening scene. Let us be wise in India and build on reason. Reason tells us to respect the logic of facts. Muslims do not differ from Hindus politically. The theory of 'Muslim nation' is a dupe.

CHAPTER IV

THE PHYSICAL FACTORS

WE have seen that Muslims except for certain small groups as the Sindhis agree only in having a common religion. The other determinants of nationality are lacking. Religion includes also laws of marriage and succession which are the personal laws of the communities. Outside these narrow spheres the civic problems which bring the people into contact are the same for all the peoples of India. The Moslems are, therefore, a minority only in this religious sense.

But, while it is true to say that certain aspects of religious behaviour are the only difference between a Hindu and a Muslim, in some circumstances this difference is deepened by the presence of other differences, which are often the more fundamental. Yet as religious cry is a mystic chant that attracts people even these fundamental non-religious differences express themselves under religious labels.

These fundamental differences are mainly economic. Thus in Bengal the landlords and capitalists are mostly Hindus while the mass of the peasants and debtors are mostly Muslims. Laws against landlordism in Bengal such as the tenancy legislation take on an anti-Hindu and pro-Muslim tinge. Similarly laws against money-lenders in the Punjab are shown as anti-Hindu as the money-lenders are mostly Hindus.

In the famous Bombay riot following on a strike in some of the mills during the Congress Ministry the overwhelming mass of the workers who struck work were Hindus. The mill-owners sought to admit blackleg workers who were mostly Pathans. The clash between the strikers and the blacklegs rapidly took shape as a clash between Hindus and Pathans—a communal riot.

There are in society "classes and interests". In India "classes and interests" grow like mushrooms in the congenial atmosphere of British imperialism. 'Classes' and 'interests' are generally economic alignments but imperialism introduces complications. No one would suggest that every economic alignment must have a separate political life and function in isolation. Politics comes in precisely because the 'interests' and 'classes' function together and call for an adjustment. Lack of education and understanding together with the mystic and irrational appeal of religion prevents the emergence of conscious classes. It is thus that the working of forces in society is obscured under the garb of religion. Whenever groups in opposition can employ religious distinctions to lend weight to their interests the communal question arises.

The educated class is furthest from religion but exploits religion most. It happens thus. The small educated class is finding opportunities of employment dwindling. As this class has grown in expectation of finding jobs and as jobs have not been growing at the same rate we have the phenomenon of educated unemployment. The discontent of the educated class drives it to politics and as it is a vocal section it attracts undue notice of society. Unemployment makes com-

petition for jobs keen. If this class were a homogeneous group its politics would have taken a different turn. The class is not homogeneous. This small body is made up of sub-groups in unequal stages of development. The backward and the less developed sub-group joined the competition late, and, as the competition was bound to be difficult, it developed into a militant sub-group. As the Muslim educated class joined the competition later their politics took the shape of opposition to the corresponding Hindu class which had entrenched itself in the jobs thrown open to Indians. True, the jobs reserved for the Europeans were so many that Indianisation of services did not mean substantial employment to Indians except in the lower clerical and administrative lines. But what few jobs were available became rare prizes that drew the educated classes into a grim competition. These classes drew upon religion to lend them weight in their struggles.

The same phenomenon can be witnessed even in homogeneous religious communities. Thus non-Brahmins in Madras, who are caste Hindus and are as much against the untouchables as the Brahmins, organised an unreal opposition to the Brahmins because the latter had the advantage of an earlier start. In Bihar the Tribeni Sangh that furtively made its appearance during the elections of 1936-37 is an organisation of backward caste Hindus like Kurmis, etc. The Bhumihar-Kayastha and the Bihari-Bengali controversies in Bihar are equally controversies about shares in services; the Bhumihars having been later in coming to the field against the Kayasthas, as the Biharis came later against the Bengalis.

Even among Muslims, the Momins who are a backward class have now organised themselves as a separate political body. Their demands are clearly for a share in the 'loaves and fishes' of office.

Thus caste and religion were indifferently pressed into service to subserve ends that were economic and that concerned the handful of the forward classes. The masses in the words of Pandit Nehru "had no look in".

One other reason that made religion, caste and sect so prominent in our politics is the failure of Indian enterprise in general during the British connection. The British 'state' in spite of a few farsighted men like Munro and Elphinstone took no interest in Indian music, art or literature which languished for want of state support. Trade and industry could not be organised under Indian enterprise until very recently. There were no great causes to absorb the Indian genius in constructive effort. The petty individual life could offer no satisfaction to men of energy and drive. Religion and caste and sect were familiar phenomena and the frustrated individual could feel that he was participating in extra-personal large causes when he served these ends. He, therefore, took to religion, caste and sect as the drowning man catches at straw. This was not the only course possible. Another course was to join the cause of rooting out this all round frustration, namely, to fight imperialism. This latter had its dangers and perils that could be faced only by very stout hearts. Those who had such hearts joined the struggle against imperialism and fulfilled themselves in a supra-rational consciousness and exhilaration. The feeble individual

turned to the safer and less onerous course of communalism.

The development was a very subtle psychological process. The communal leaders are often not aware of it and apparently they have an honest conviction that they are following goals worth following. But it is also true that for reasons of their own people have taken to communalism even consciously.

The condition of the communal problem is provided by these basic physical factors, namely, existence of classes and interests and their conflicts; the illiteracy and ignorance of the people; the mass having not yet been consciously drawn into politics; the vocal aggressiveness of the small educated classes and their unequal development; the failure of Indian enterprise; the danger and difficulties of anti-imperialist front; and the existence of the age-old phenomena of religion, caste and sect. Some of these are stable factors but others are of temporary significance and largely a result of our warped political history during the last two centuries.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: CLASHES AND CONFLICTS

THE complex of factors we enumerated in the last chapter provides the 'condition' of the communal politics. The factors, however, are in themselves inert. It is human will that brings them out of slumbering into the arena of consciousness and struggle.

The process is twofold. Indirectly, clashes and conflicts between religious communities produce an inchoate feeling of separateness. The clashes may be over some immediate issue of no great significance. They rise from mere emotional tension to open and bloody riots. They are most variously motivated. It would be foolish to deny that religious labels do separate 'God's children' into groups that look askance over each other. In the past religious ideas had very great dominance. Christian Europe was often bathed in blood by warring groups that interpreted Christianity in their own ways. There was the Jesuit tyranny and the Quaker liberty. But religious feuds have become a thing of the past over the European continent and Christians now fight over issues that are frankly economic.

In India we seem to be still living in the quiet backwaters of religion. The upsurge of tides we feel at times is not quite correctly understood. On the surface, therefore, the clashes look like crusades in the service of God. Muslims are more prone to this attitude

than other communities. For, in the first place, Islam is one of the youngest faiths and has not had the mellowing effect of age that teaches tolerance. It has not had the many ups and downs of fortune that would compel adaptation to a changing world. By declaring that Muhammad is the last prophet and the 'Quran' the sole book of wisdom, it abruptly called a halt to the evolution of human genius in the sixth century stage. Bernard Shaw in the allegory of the "Adventures of the Black Girl in search of God" sounds the note that God is developing and that the Bible is still being written. The sorrow and the joy of an unfinished evolution that calls for human effort have not been allowed the same play in Islam as in the older faiths. "Faith" without a proper dilution of reason has been the significant feature of Islam. The only discoverable content of this 'faith' is to rejoice in and to impose sixth century conceptions as the final goal of human endeavour.

The result is that Islam zealously seeks for converts. As it is difficult to prescribe tests of 'faith', the convert is accepted as a Muslim if he calls himself a Muslim and follows the customary prayers at the usual time and in the usual manner. This is indeed the way of all religions that proselytise. Adding to the number of 'labelled' beings becomes the hallmark of success of the faith.

The converts to Islam have naturally to come from other faiths. In India it is most often Hindus. If the conversion were a solemn spiritual re-awakening there would be little to say against it. Unfortunately, in the zeal for conversion, force and fraud is frequently employed; and the proselytising activity thrives most

among the marginal type of people who are not full adults either physically or mentally. Spiritual conversion of an adult person in full possession of his senses might be a matter of pain to the community which he is leaving, but it is not likely to cause riots. As such conversions are rare, the change of faith is often marked by bitterness, by clashes and by riots.

The same weakness for 'labels' is responsible for the riots that occur over observances and processions of the different communities. The Moharrum procession is becoming an anathema to Hindus as the Holi procession is to Muslims. The 'Azan' and, 'Music before mosque' are other examples of this perversion of ideas causing conflicts.

'Labelling' drags in God to the material world. Not only are men and their ways affected. Portions of the earth and structures over it are also appropriated for God. Moslem conversion of Hindu temples into mosques, disputes like the Sahidgunj affair between Sikhs and Muslims, and so forth are instances in point.

The religious motives for clashes and conflicts, however, must not be too much stressed. The recent conflicts have almost invariably been motivated by economic factors. The writer knows of a riot which arose over a Hindu butcher opening a stall for *jhatka* meat and thus breaking Muslim monopoly in retailing meat. Similarly, a Muslim *bidi* manufacturer made it a grievance that Hindu *bidi* manufacturers were responsible for enticing away Hindu *bidi* makers under the Muslim manufacturer. We have already referred to the famous Bombay riot that followed on a strike in some of the cotton mills. In all this, however, the economic con-

flict is of the middle classes among themselves. Hindu workers left the Muslim master as wages offered by the Hindu manufacturers were higher and not because the Hindus had developed a perfect solidarity.

This is indeed recognised by all discerning students. Their studies confirm that in India as elsewhere the real conflict is economic and not religious. Thus Rahmat Ali :

"The British colonial world attributes the problem to religious fanaticism of Indian masses. Indian nationalism considers it as creation of British imperialism. The whole social system of India needs a radical transformation and the complete emancipation of the country is but a step towards the disappearance of the Hindu-Muslim conflict. The lack of homogeneousness in the development of Hindu and Muslim sections of the Indian bourgeoisie is at the root of the conflict between Muslims and Hindus."*

Thus Clifford Manshardi, American missionary :
 "There is scarcely a communal disturbance in the rural areas in which the thread of economic oppression cannot be distinguished in the tangled skein of causes."

Whatever the motives, the riots whenever they occur only exacerbate feelings between the communities. Losses caused are often great. The trail of controversy generated in the law courts, in the press and on the platform is rarely dispassionate. For both these reasons the localities are infected with a virus of ill-will and the communities are confirmed in their hostility to each

* Contribution à l' Etude du conflit Hindu Musalman, Paris, 1933.

† The Hindu-Muslim Problem, p 54.

other. The echoes reach distant places. The events rankle in memory. Communal hatred is accentuated.

It is fortunate, however, that the countryside is still largely immune from this poison. The writer knows of an old Niyamat Chacha who is still the village patriarch organising the customary annual Kali-puja and the goat sacrifice as zealously as the customary Moharrum. In a country so badly steeped in ignorance, so ill-trained for citizenship and so much dominated by middle class conflicts, it is surprising that the clashes are so rare. It is clear that a few years of vigorous national life will cure the communal ills and give a quietus to the activities of the ignorant firebrands of communalism.

CHAPTER VI

THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND LEADERSHIP

INCOMPARABLY more important than the clashes and conflicts is the activity of political parties and leadership. This factor concentrates and makes vivid the inchoate feeling of separateness that clashes and conflicts generate. It is this factor that lends the sporadic local clashes the colour of skirmishes in a general campaign. It is this that lifts the communal problem from the realm of law and order to that of racial disharmony.

Now the three parties that dominate Indian politics are the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League and the Congress in the ascending order of importance. There are other parties in India but organisationally they are weak and their following is not considerable. We have, therefore, to study the working of the three major parties more closely.

We have already referred to the role of the Hindu Mahasabha in a preceding chapter. Basically it is a reflex effect of Muslim communalism and its development since the Communal Award has been almost exactly parallel to the development of the League. Its influence among Hindus is still small. Hindus as a whole remain non-communal and nationalist in temper.

The Indian National Congress is by all admission the only well-knit party that has developed a tradition.

In spite of Mr. Churchill's sophistry that showed Congress following at minus forty-five millions, it has the largest following in India. It arose as a middle class organisation but since its very inception in 1885 it has been progressively developing into an anti-imperialist mass force. Even by the early nineties of the last century the imperial government recognised it as a hostile force. Since then the Congress has been always a thorn in the side of the Empire and the latter has been setting up forces to oppose the Congress. Under imperial inspiration a number of reactionary parties have grown up like mushrooms. They have, however, only served as a propaganda smoke-screen. They never took root in the mass and never attracted men of vigour and leadership. The only exception is probably the Muslim League which does possess a vitality.

In spite of oppositions Congress grew into a mass force. The Surat split of 1907 gave rise to the moderate politics of Gokhale on the one hand and to the militant politics of Tilak on the other. The split of 1918 threw off the moderates who under Sapru, Chintamani and others formed the All-India Liberal Federation. The split of 1934 threw off the communal elements who under Pandit Malaviya formed the Congress-nationalist party. After each purge the Congress became more and more certainly a mass radical force. Its programme and struggles deepened.

The Congress in its open rebellion against 'Imperialism' necessarily drew the masses into the political struggle. It thus revolutionised Indian political thinking by centering it round the needs of the masses. Almost inevitably the struggle against imperialism

became a struggle for a better social order. Congress, alone among the political parties of India, felt logically driven to define the new social order that would arise on the ruins of imperialism. This orientation came in 1931 when at the Karachi session the Fundamental Rights Resolutions were adopted under the lead of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. It gained in concreteness from the Agrarian Programme, the Mass Contact Programme, the Election Manifesto of 1936, and from the activities of the National Planning Committee with each of which Pandit Nehru was intimately associated. The evolution of the Congress ideology, apart from Gandhian influence, got an indelible imprint from the personality of Pandit Nehru, from his intense awareness of "one world", his burning faith in socialism and his deep humanitarian sentiments.

Thus, apart from its indirect influence in neutralising communalism by by-passing it and by drowning it in larger conflicts, its positive effects on the communal outlook were tremendous. The middle class outlook had to give way to a general outlook. Against the rabid, extravagant and antithetic claims of communal leaders it had to urge moderation. It had to be an arbitrator to see that every one in this land had equal opportunity. It was only logical that it should denounce the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha as communal bodies with which Congressmen must have no truck.

For the communal leaders through the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Scheduled Caste Conference were interested in competing for 'spoils' and there was no rational limit to their demands. Congress as an arbitrator necessarily came up against them,

There was little in which they could agree. The Congress had a definite external programme, namely, the independence of India; and it courted suffering to implement this programme. It had a definite internal programme of solving the common problems of the Indian people. It boldly adopted direct action as its weapon and invited all the wrath of the imperial power. The communal parties had no external programme. Their internal programme was pale and they lacked the stout heart that dared to adopt direct action as a weapon. Thus both in their aims and methods the Congress and the other parties drifted apart. As a matter of fact the communal parties having little desire to change the familiar world agreed more among themselves than they differed. This is why against the Congress they pooled themselves together.

As a step towards concretising the new world order the Congress had to take in hand the settlement of the communal problem as incidental to its struggles. Its labours are embodied in the Lucknow Pact of 1916, in the All-Parties Conference of 1928 and in the various attempts of the Congress leaders to come to terms with Mr. Jinnah. No agreed solution has been possible on account of the fundamental contradiction between the views of the nationalist and mass-based Congress on the one hand and the sectarian and class-based League on the other.

Congress was, therefore, driven to pronounce its solutions unilaterally.

The scheme placed before the second session of the Indian Round Table conference in 1932 by Mahatma Gandhi on behalf of the Congress was as follows:—

- (1) A Bill of Fundamental Rights guaranteeing protection of culture, languages, scripts, education, profession and practice of religion and religious endowment;
- (2) Personal laws to be protected by a specific provision;
- (3) Joint electorate;
- (4) Appointment to government services by a non-party Public Service Commission; and
- (5) Sind to be created a separate province.

The Working Committee at Bombay on June 17-18, 1934, defining its policy towards the Communal Award envisaged framing of the constitution and solution of the communal problem "by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult suffrage, or as near it as possible, with power if necessary to the important minorities to have their representatives elected exclusively by the electorates belonging to such minorities". This was an appeal to the mass over the head of the communal leaders; and in 1935 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru sponsored the idea of Mass Contact with the Muslims. All this was vehemently opposed by the Muslim Leaguers, and, when in 1937 Congress came into power for a brief interval of twenty-seven months in its long history of fifty years of opposition and formed ministries in the provinces without reference to the Muslim League, the League was deeply disappointed. In its frustration and anger it started to call the Congress a Hindu body and copying the Sudeten Germans started an 'atrocities' propaganda against the Congress ministries. The Muslim League, finding its chances blasted in spite of separate electorates, weightages and

all possible safeguards and the tide of nationalism rising, came forward with the demand for Pakistan in 1940. This was a new battle cry and the Congress Working Committee resolved at New Delhi in April, 1942, that "the committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian union against their declared and established will". This concedes the possibility of secession of certain territories from an Indian union as a result of a plebescite. The idea is not quite clear and since Congress is now a political outlaw, the position remains as it is. Rajaji's recent offer to Mr. Jinnah and the Gandhi-Jinnah talks in September, 1944, have no value other than as expressions of individual opinion. Even so they do not affect the Congress position of 1942.

Unfortunately the Congress ideal of the new social order and the Congress solution of the communal problem have not yet been driven into people's consciousness as they should have been. The mass contact programme of Pandit Nehru does not seem to have been seriously tried. The impressive membership of the Congress remains politically infantile. Congress workers have not been able to tear themselves away from the demonstrative politics of the cities. The sentimental appeal to patriotism has not been deepened by a glaring picture of the new world. For these reasons, there remain vast fields that have not been shaken out of their medieval torpor. The Muslim masses, particularly, have remained largely immune from the liberalising influence of the Congress, thanks to the accident of Muslim backwardness and the personality of Muslim leaders.

In these neglected and benighted fields the communal busybodies, sowed the seeds of communalism with redoubled vigour. The Muslim mass provided the most promising material and the communal leaders rushed to them with their anachronistic cry of 'Islam in danger'.

The history of the Muslim parties and leadership can be conveniently studied in five periods: 1857—1885; 1885—1909; 1909—1923; 1923—1936; 1936 onwards. Throughout these periods we would find forces of nationalism and communalism struggling with each other, the one or the other becoming dominant in turn. We shall also find that during these periods whenever the Muslim masses were drawn into politics, they tended to become radical and nationalistic. Unfortunately we would be meeting British imperialism at every turn and its baneful influence on the Muslim politics will be only too evident. Side by side, the evolution of Congress moulded the activities both of British imperialism and of the communal parties that came to be nursed by Britain as necessary counterpoise to Congress strength.

The first of these periods, namely, 1857—1885, has little political importance. By 1857 conquest and consolidation that had been proceeding independently of the Indian people had already filled in the broad contours of British India as we see it today. The century that had just closed can be called the darkest in Indian history when there was an all round decline in Indian leadership and enterprise. The mutiny was an outburst of the discontent among the powers that were being supplanted by the British.

As the mutiny was confined to northern and eastern India where Muslim influence was the

stronger, the Britishers were inclined to regard the Muslims with suspicion. Hence during the period 1857—1885 Muslims were in disfavour and correspondingly the Hindus gained. The Muslims had no defined advanced class and no politics and the only prominent Muslim of those days Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was trying to remove the lurking suspicion in the English mind against Muslims as best as he could do.

The next period 1885—1909 is more important. There were no Muslim parties yet except towards the end of the period, i.e., since 1906 when the Moslem League was founded. At least up to 1898 when Sir Syed Ahmad died he was practically the sole spokesman of the Moslems and his contribution to Muslim education and uplift gave him a unique position among them. Whatever Moslem opinion existed was dominated by his personality.

After his death the mantle fell on the Aga Khan. These two Muslim personalities provide the key to the Moslem politics during this period.

Both came from the budding Muslim intelligentsia and both of them were inherently incapable of appreciating a life of strenuousness and struggle. Psychologically they were driven to champion the cause of the Muslim intelligentsia which having come later into the field found the Hindu educated class entrenched into positions of power and profit. This gave them an extra-personal cause to fight for which is greatly satisfying. Besides as this fight was directed against the Hindu educated class, which, for several reasons, was getting into disfavour with the British rulers, it was, a safe agitation and attractive as here was promise of success.

The chief reason was the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 originally for seeking positions of power and profit for Indian educated classes. It was a petitioning body in the beginning but gradually it began to put forth inconvenient demands which although of little significance showed a spirit of criticism and independence that was galling to the British rulers. By 1892 the Congress was already a power. The Indian Councils Act of 1892 was in no small measure a concession to their demands. By 1900 Congress was being viewed as a seditious body. Lord Curzon was anxious to secure a quick demise for the Congress and thinking of creating a 'Council of Princes' to counteract the Congress influence. Lord Minto agreed with Sir Theodore Morrison, Principal of the Aligarh College, that "Ideas can only be combated by ideas, and you won't keep the younger generation away from the Congress unless you have another programme and another set of ideas to set up against theirs". It was to counter the Congress which was mainly Hindu that in 1904 Lord Curzon partitioned progressive Bengal. He openly offered Eastern Bengal with its capital at Dacca as a Muslim province and was able to win over Nawab Salimullah Khan to his views.

It was again in pursuit of the policy of counterpoise that Minto conceded double representation to Muslims.

The two Muslim personalities were indeed able to read the times; and as the Britishers were conspicuously favouring them as a counterpoise to the progressive Indians an alliance between the Government and the Muslims was naturally forged. The two leaders did

immense service to the Government. Sir Syed Ahmad used his influence to keep Muslims away from the Congress and so from the current of nationalism. In a famous speech in 1887, even at the time the Congress was holding its session at Madras, he declared, "Is it expedient for you to take part in this business on the absurd supposition that the demands of the Congress would, if granted, be beneficial for the country? Spurn such foolish notions. Government will most certainly attend to it (i.e., to demand for jobs as colonels and majors in the army) provided you do not give rise to suspicions of disloyalty". (Quoted by K. B. Krishna, pages 96—97.)

The speech is an index to Muslim politics of the period. Its key note was loyalty to British power; its demand was for jobs; and it was consciously against the Congress and nationalism.

The same service was performed by the Aga Khan in October, 1906, when he led the deputation to Lord Minto demanding separate representation for the Muslims. By this demand he laid the axe at the root of Indian nationalism. The sympathetic reception by Lord Minto encouraged the Moslems and to lend weight to their demands Nawab Salimullah Khan founded the Muslim League on the 30th December, 1906. Its aims and objects were :

- (i) to promote among Indian Moslems feelings of loyalty towards British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intentions of the Government with regard to any of its measures;

- (ii) to protect the political and other rights of the Indian Muslims and to place their needs and aspirations before the Government in temperate language;
- (iii) so far as possible without prejudice to the objects mentioned under (i) and (ii) to promote friendly feelings between Muslims and other communities in India.

In 1907 and 1908 there were several meetings held and branches formed. The labours were rewarded by a government anxious to oblige in the reforms of 1909.

The peculiarly communal development of the Muslim politics during this period was almost wholly inspired by the British people themselves. The insidious influence was brought into play most unobtrusively through the least suspect of all channels—pedagogues. The two leaders played to the tune set up by the British Principals of the Aligarh College from 1885 to 1909 until in the latter year the League shifted its office from Aligarh to Delhi and freed itself from their influence. The British Principals, whose story has been told in detail in "Muslmano-Ka Raoshan Mustakbeel" of Maulana Syed Tufail Ahmad Manglori, had tacit approval and encouragement from the British rulers. Sir John Strachey condoling the death of Mr. Beck, the first Principal, in 1899 referred to him as "engaged in empire building activities in a far-off land". Lord Minto was in entire agreement with Sir Theodore Morrison, the second Principal, in the idea that Congress could be fought by setting up new ideas against it. The third Principal, Mr. Archbold, had authority from the Viceregal Lodge itself to isolate the Muslims from the nationalist cause

Mr. Beck became the *de facto* editor of the *Aligarh Institute Gazette* although Sir Syed Ahmad Khan remained its titular editor. He warped the perspective of Sir Syed by his insidious influence and started the work of slowly propagating narrow communalism and anti-nationalism among the Muslims through this journal. Beck's influence is manifest in the speech of Sir Syed in 1887 which we have already quoted. In 1889 to oppose Charles Bradlaugh's Bill to confer democratic institutions on India he prepared a memorial on behalf of the Muslims and with the help of Aligarh boys collected 20,735 signatures from the streets and at mosques on the plea that it was intended to fight the Hindu agitation against cow-slaughter.

In December, 1893, he formed the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India with himself as secretary. Primarily it was to fight the Congress which was opposing the 'Forward Policy' of the Government of India in the North-West Frontier and was demanding reduction in the Army budget. The objects proclaimed, however, were (i) to acquaint Englishmen in general and Government of India in particular with the views of the Muslim community and to protect the political rights of the Moslems; (ii) to support measures that would strengthen British rule in India; (iii) to spread feelings of loyalty among the people; and (iv) to prevent spread of agitation among Muslims.

The crowning achievement of this British conspiracy to which Muslim leaders appear to be unsuspecting victims was the great scandal of the Aga Khan Deputation of 1906. The deputation was not conceived by

Muslims on whose behalf it was ostensibly organised. It was gathered by Mr. Archbold who in this nefarious scheme had tacit encouragement from the Viceregal Lodge. This will be clear from the revealing letter Mr. Archbold wrote to Nawab Mohasin-ul-Mulk, dated the 10th August, 1906.*

"Colonel Dunlop Smith, Private Secretary of His Excellency the Viceroy, informs me that His Excellency is agreeable to receive the Muslim deputation. He advises that a formal letter requesting a permission to wait on His Excellency be sent to him. In this connection I would like to make a few suggestions. The formal letter should be sent with the signatures of some representative Mussalmans. The deputation should consist of representatives of all provinces. The third point to be considered is the text of the address. I would here suggest that we begin with a solemn expression of loyalty. The Government decision to take a step in the direction of Self-Government should be appreciated. But our apprehension should be expressed that the principle of election if introduced would prove detrimental to the interest of the Muslim minority. It should respectfully be suggested that nomination or representation by religion be introduced to meet Muslim opinion. We should also say that in a country like India due weight must be given to the views of zamindars.

"Personally I think it will be wise of the Muslims to support nomination; as the time to experiment with election has not yet come. In election it will be very difficult for the Muslims to secure their due share. But in all these views I must be in the background. They

* (Quoted in *The Communal Triangle*, page. 62)

"must come from you. I can prepare for you the draft of the Address or revise it. If it is prepared in Bombay I can go through it as, you are aware, I know how to phrase these things in proper language. Please remember that if we want to organise a powerful movement in the short time at our disposal, we must expedite matters."

A deputation of 35 members did wait on the Viceroy with the address probably drafted by the Principal himself.

Lord Minto's reply (J. Buchan: Lord Minto, page 244). was pre-arranged :

"The pith of your address, as I understand it is a claim that in any system of representation, whether it affects a Municipality or a District Board or a Legislative Council, in which it is proposed to introduce or increase an elective organisation, the Muslim community should be represented as a community. You point out that in many cases, electoral bodies, as now constituted, cannot be expected to return a Muslim candidate, and, if by chance they did so, it would only be at the sacrifice of such candidate's views to those of a majority opposed to his community, whom he would in no way represent; and you justly claim that your proportion should be estimated not on your numerical strength, but in respect to the political importance of the community and the services it has rendered to the Empire. I am entirely in accord with you."

Thus the theory of 'political importance', of separate representation and of fear of majority that have become the stock-in-trade of Muslim League propaganda were fashioned by Lord Minto and not by a Muslim.

Discerning Moslems were not wanting who saw through the game. Maulana Mahammad Ali in his presidential address at the Coconada session of the Congress called it "a command performance" and Ramsay Macdonald (*Awakening of India*, page 176) described it as a result of wire pulling at Simla and Delhi by certain Anglo-Indian officials. But the role of the two Moslem leaders, the influence of the British Principals and the conspicuous favours shown by the Government to the Muslims, carried a false conviction to them that the British were their friends and would favour them against their non-Moslem rivals. The Muslim League was born amid such illusions and carries to this day the birthmarks of the ideology from which it sprung.

There were indeed Muslims who saw that the fundamental cause of degradation and ruin not only of the Muslims but of all people of India was the political subjection of India. Badruddin Tyabji who was associated with the Indian National Congress in its earliest days saw this. So did Maulana Shibli Numani, the great scholar and writer of Persian and Urdu who inspired a whole generation of Muslims including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Maulana Shibli Numani was shocked at the sudden change in Sir Syed Ahmad Khan which came over about 1885 and in a powerful analysis of the transformation of the erstwhile patriot said, "... Nature meant him to be leader of all India. But circumstances and his surroundings made him pull the Muslims back from playing their part in the nationalist movement. Why did it happen? The time for independent thinking has arrived."

Of the Muslim League politics he wrote in the *Muslim Gazette* of Lucknow:

"The object of the Simla deputation was, and it was frankly expressed, to get a share for the Muslims in the political rights obtained by the Hindus. .It was the biggest show staged on the communal platform. But are these quarrels between the two communities to be called politics? If they are politics, the High Court is the foremost legislature. Politics means defining the mutual relations between the rulers and the ruled and not the petty quarrels of the ruled among themselves. If our politics had been serious politics, they would have evoked a zest for struggle and a readiness to suffer and sacrifice for an ideal."

The nationalist wing of the Muslim politics, however, was eclipsed by the powerful conspiracy of the British and on account of the alluring favours shown to the Muslims.

The period 1909—1923 saw the ascendancy of the nationalist forces among the Moslems.

Several factors contributed to it. Sir Syed Ahmad was dead. Moslem politics had freed itself from the apron-strings of the Aligarh Principals. The most important single circumstance was the rendition of the partition of Bengal which demonstrated to the Muslims that it was opportunism of the British and not their love for the Muslims that guided their actions. Again, the 'Industrial Revolution' of India, however pale, had begun about 1880 and by 1909, the 'Swadeshi' movement and the demand for protection had become a new focus of nationalist politics. The famines had roused much

discussion and industrialisation of India was felt to be a major remedy.

On Moslem politics certain events abroad were bound to have their influence. The Young Turk movement which demanded reforms in the theocratic Turkish state tended to secularise Moslem politics. In 1912 Dr. Ansari led a medical mission to Turkey. About this time Maulana Abul Kalam Azad launched his Urdu journal *Al Hilal* and Maulana Mohammad Ali his *Comrade* and *Hamdard* which made powerful appeal towards nationalism.

With the beginning of the war politics quickened in India. The Home Rule movement was launched. Moslems could not remain unaffected. Sheikh-ul-Hind Mahmood-ul-Hasan of the famous Muslim seminary of Deoband (Saharanpore) dreamt of a 'Republic of Hindustan' and deputed Obeidullah Sindhi to confer with German and Turkish Ambassadors at Kabul and to persuade the Amir to rise against the British. He was deported to Malta along with Maulana Husain Ahmad Nadvi and Maulvi Aziz Gul. In 1915 the Ali brothers were interned and so also Azad and Hasrat Mohani.

In 1919 the Ulemas under Mahmood-ul-Hasan formed the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. The treatment meted to Turkey after the war brought the Khilafat movement. The Rowlatt Act, the Jalianwalabagh Tragedy and the disappointment at the reforms of 1919 brought the Non-Cooperation Movement under Mahatma Gandhi to which the Khilafat Movement was also joined. The great mass upheaval radicalised Indian mind and invigorated the forces of nationalism among Muslims.

The result on Moslem politics can be seen in the dethronement of the Aga Khan who resigned from the Muslim League in 1915; the emergence of Ansari, Azad and Ajmal Khan; the rise of the Ulemas; of Jinnah and of Mufti Kifaetullah—all united in the demand for Indian freedom and all above petty communalism. It is also apparent in the Muslim League resolutions. In 1913 the Muslim League resolved on "the attainment under the aegis of the British power of self-government suited to India". In the next session attended by Ansari and Azad and Ajmal Khan emphasis was laid on rapprochement with the Congress.

The collaboration was exhibited in the Lucknow Pact and in the Khilafat and the Non-Cooperation movements.

The period 1923—1936 witnessed a swing towards reaction. Revolutionary mass action which had lent perspective to the people ceased suddenly after the Chauri-Chaura incident. The reforms had already become an accomplished fact. Leaders were either persuaded to work the reforms or joined constitutional opposition. Politics was in doldrums. The dissatisfaction with dyarchy and growing Congress demand for transference of power led to the appointment of an all-white Commission with Sir John Simon at the head. The facts on which the constitution need be based were well-known. The Commission was only part of a dilatory tactics and only intended to offer a diversion. The appointment of the Commission, however, brought politics out of slumbering.

Primarily because the Commission was intended to be dilatory but also on other grounds, such as that it

did not include Indians, almost the entire country decided to boycott the Commission. Even Mr. Jinnah, who was not quite agreeable to Sir Fazli Husain's ideas, was in favour of the boycott; and it was in no small measure under his inspiration that the Nehru Report was agreed to in the All-Parties Conference in reply to a challenge by Lord Birkenhead that Indians could not produce an agreed solution.

The rift in the lute, however, came from the accident that Sir Fazli Husain who was then the accredited leader of the Moslems issued a whip that Muslims should not boycott the Commission. This direction of Sir Fazli Husain had undoubtedly something to do with the British policy that was wooing the Moslem leaders for an alliance. Lord Birkenhead in a letter to the Viceroy (quoted by K. B. Krishna in "The Problem of Minorities," page 308) wrote:

"I should advise Simon to see at all stages all people who are not boycotting the Commission, particularly Muslims and depressed classes. I should widely advertise all his interviews with representative Muslims. The whole policy is now obvious. It is to terrify the immense Hindu population by the apprehension that the Commission is being got hold of by the Muslims and may present a report altogether destructive of the Hindu position; thereby securing solid Muslim support and leaving Jinnah high and dry."

The judicial commission was working with such unholy intentions.

Jinnah was too weak to brave the isolation. Communalism triumphed. The Nehru report was dropped

and the Muslim League offered its whole-hearted co-operation to the peculiar British devices of delay, namely the Simon Commission, the Round Table Conferences, and all the committees that finally put into shape the Government of India Act of 1935. Nationalist Muslims, less well organised and having an uphill task with a backward community to whom religious cries appeal, kept away from these and in 1931 the National Muslim Party was formed with Sir Ali Imam as President.

The work of committees and conferences proceeded while in India Hindu and Muslim masses went together through the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930-31 and of 1933.

With the various Commissions, conferences and committees churning the political issues; with the Civil Disobedience sharpening the national struggle; with the Communal Award and the Poona Pact; these years were an era of great political ferment. For the first time political and communal questions were posed most sharply opening the eyes of all concerned. People definitely had to take sides. There could be no sitting on the fence.

There were numerous opportunities for the communal problem being discussed and wrangled about. All parties applied their minds to the solution of the communal question. As the atmosphere was tense and as the curve of communal temper rises most sharply on the eve of reforms, the communal parties came forward with their antithetic and extravagant demands. We have already seen how since 1930 Congress has been putting forward its solution and how in the 1932 session

of the Round Table Conference the Congress solutions were presented on the basis of adequate safeguard for minorities consistent with unity and nationalism.

The Hindu Mahasabha proposals through Dr. Moonje were not very different from the Congress ones.

But Gidney for Anglo-Indians, K. T. Paul for Indian Christians, Sardar Ujjal Singh for Sikhs and Mia Mohammad Shafi for Moslems demanded protection for the communities through separate electorate. Pandit Nehru rightly remarked that it was all "jobbery".

Except for these leaders whose representative capacity is not above doubt there was a surprising degree of agreement.

Among Muslims Sir Ali Imam stood for joint electorate. As President of the Nationalist Muslim Conference at Lucknow in 1931 he declared his abiding faith in Indian nationalism and said "...separate electorate connotes negation of nationalism." His solution with which, he claimed, all educated Muslims agreed was an incorporation of a declaration of fundamental rights in the constitution, universal adult suffrage, joint electorate with reservation of seats in Federal and Provincial legislatures on population basis for minorities of less than 30 per cent with right to contest additional seats.

This scheme is fundamentally in agreement with the Congress scheme as placed before the Second Round Table Conference.

During the entire discussion both in India and England no minority showed any case of political

oppression from the so-called majority community. Almost every one agreed on joint electorate with reservation of seats. All agreed to give priority to all-India interests and on a Bill of Rights safeguarding legitimate interests of various groups and on partial redistribution of provinces.

It is absurd to demand complete unanimity in such matters. Yet the British Government and even Indians declared that there was no agreement. The result was the announcement of the Communal Award.

The award takes no note of the enormous degree of agreement in Indian opinion. The British had the chance of a life-time to disrupt the nationalist forces, and, to this end, tipped the largest minority community, namely, the Moslems, against the Hindus and the nationalists. The Award without any substantial modification has been incorporated in the Government of India Act, 1935.

The distribution of British India seats, considering only those by communities and ignoring others based on sex and calling and so forth, in the two houses of the Federal Legislature as given in the 1st schedule of the Government of India Act as compared with the population strength of the various communities is shown in the Table below. Seats in the Provincial Assemblies have also been shown for comparison.

TABLE

	Federal Council of State.	Federal Assembly.	Provincial Assembly.	Population in British India (1931 Census) Indian cen- sus, Vol. I, Part II, Imperial Tables I, XVI and XIX.				
	No. of Commun- al seats	Percent- age	No. of Commun- al seats.	Percent- age.	No. of Commun- al seats.	Percent- age.	Number	Percent- age in population
.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sikhs	4	2.78	6	2.82	34	2.42	3,210,080	1.25
Moslems	49	34.03	82	38.50	482	34.31	60,392,766	25.85
Indian Christians	2	1.39	8	3.76	20	1.42	3,533,309	1.38
Anglo-Indians	1	.69	4	1.88	11	.89	101,380	.04
Europeans	7	4.86	8	3.76	26	1.86	238,592	.10
General	81	56.25	105	49.28	852	59.20	183,332,182	70.00
Total of communal seats	144	100.00	213	100.00	1,405	100.00	250,808,309	100.00

The insignificant population of Europeans forming only 0.10 per cent. of the British India population gets a weightage of 50 times in the Federal upper house, 38 times in the Federal lower house and 19 times in the Provincial Assemblies. The Anglo-Indians who are only .01 of the population get weightages respectively of 17.47 and 20 times. The Indian Christians get double weightage only in the Federal Assembly. The Sikhs are also doubly weighted. These communities in spite of all the weightages given to them are of no consequence. Both Jinnah and Savarkar speak of only two nations in India; and it is the effect of the Communal Award on the Muslims and the Hindus (general) that would indicate the true working of the policy of communal counterpoise. The Muslims forming 26 per cent of the population get weightages of 30 to over 50 per cent. The general population which is practically Hindu with 70 per cent strength gets only 49.28 per cent of the seats in the Federal Assembly.

In the British eyes as well in the eyes of the communal Muslims, Muslims against Hindus must be rated in the proportion 38.50/25.85 : 49.28/70.06. One Indian Moslem for the accident of his religion is equal to 2.1 Hindus in political importance. The discrimination is shocking in all conscience.

The discrimination within the provinces is more glaring still as would appear from the distribution of the communal seats in the provinces. For purposes of illustration distribution of seats in the Provincial Assemblies of the Punjab, Bengal and Madras is shown below:

0855

LE

	Punjab.		Bengal.		Madras.	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Percentage in Population	Percentage of seats in Provincial Assembly	Percentage in Population	Percentage of seats in Provincial Assembly	Percentage in Population	Percentage of seats in Provincial Assembly
Sikhs	12.99	18.79
Muslims	56.54	52.12	54.87	55.09	7.07	14.80
Indian Christians	1.76	1.21	.36	.02	3.79	4.59
Anglo-Indians	.15	.61	.95	1.85	.06	1.02
Europeans	1.76	.61	.04	5.09	.02	1.53
General	26.80	26.66	44.68	37.05	89.06	78.26

The table is revealing. In the Hindu majority province of Madras each minority gets a weightage. The weightage in the case of the Europeans and the Anglo-Indians is for obvious reasons fantastically large. But there should have been no reason to discriminate between the Indian Christians and the Muslims in the matter of weightage. Yet while the former get less than 50 per cent in the weightage, the latter get more than double. The Hindus form 89.06 per cent of the population but get only 78.26 per cent of the seats sacrificing about one-eighth of the seats due to them for the benefit of other communities, particularly to the Muslims.

In the Muslim majority province of Bengal, however, the arrangement is very different. The Hindu minority does not get any weightage. On the contrary the minority is robbed of one-sixth of the seats due to it and is weakened and emasculated still further. What is more surprising still even the Muslim majority gets a slight weightage.

Nor is the position very much better in the Punjab. Even here the Hindus fail to get their due.

Weightage has been invented, it is said, to strengthen the minorities. In the Punjab and Bengal where the Muslims are in the majority it has been used to prop the majority. To buttress the Muslims anyhow is the clear intention of the rulers. It is the justice of heads you lose and tails I win. It is inevitable counterpoise, right or wrong.

While the weightage is highly discriminatory in favour of the Muslims at the cost of the Hindus, the perpetuation of separate electorate and the fragmentation

of the electorate into 17 bits would serve as a millstone round the neck of nationalist forces.

The award was opposed by all sections of opinion and even by Muslim organisations like the Jamial, Ahrars, the Nationalists, etc. The reactionary Moslems thought it did not go far enough. But Sir Fazli Husain in a circular to the Muslim leaders wrote; "Moslems should decide to stand by Government. The Prime Minister's announcement gives the Moslems a position to which they could not have aspired. The announcement makes a distinct advance of Moslem rights. It is distinct and brilliant; effective against Mañasabha, Sikhs, Congress and liberals." (Sardar Sardui Singh Caveeshur: *Non-violent Non-co-operation*, page 307). This circular won over the Moslems.

The opposition of the Hindus to the award really gave a new programme to the Muslim League which emerged reorganised under Mr. Jinnah. The League Council met at New Delhi in April, 1934 and formally accepted the Communal Award.

The Communal Award was a distinct favour to the Muslims whom the British sorely needed as a counterpoise against the majority community which was asking the British Government to abdicate. The success spurred the Muslim League. This was followed up by another imperial favour. In 1934 for the first time Government formally announced that 25 per cent of the jobs in the Government of India services shall be reserved for the Muslims and $8\frac{1}{3}$ per cent for the other minorities.

These gains gave confidence to the Muslim League. It thought it was becoming a power to reckon with. It

could, therefore, take a defiant attitude against the Congress and other parties.

As the opposition grew the Moslem League came more and more to regard any opposition to the Award as hostile to Muslim interests. The League began to organize itself with Mr. Jinnah as President. The sheet-anchor of the League for the moment became this Award which had to be regarded as sacrosanct. Controversy over the Award comprised the communal politics with which this period closed. Dr. Rajendra Prasad on behalf of the Congress tried to come to an agreement with the League to present a united front. But Mr. Jinnah demanded that the League should be recognised as the sole Muslim party before it would discuss anything at all.

It was in this state of communal temper that the latest period opened at the end of 1935.

The period beginning with 1936 is the most important from the point of view of Muslim politics. It saw the unfolding of the new reforms and for the first time during the British rule there seemed to be a genuine opportunity of Indians sharing in the governance of the country. The reforms were much boosted and for a time even the sober and critical Congress seemed to be enthralled by the illusion of self-government. That it was merely an illusion should have been clear even on casual examination. The Viceroy remained the sole authority in respect of defence, of external affairs and of ecclesiastical department; while, with his special responsibilities, prominently in respect of the financial stability of India, of commercial discrimination and of services, his views would be decisive in all fields.

COMMUNAL PROBLEM IN INDIA

Mahatma Gandhi characterised the result as a self-government not for Indians but for the Viceroy. With the financial commitments as they are the Indian members of the Viceroy's cabinet would have at best 20 per cent of the Indian revenue at their disposal and their power to rule would be measured by this same percentage. Even this little power at the centre would come only with Federation which never came.

In the innocuous field of provincial administration which largely corresponds to local government in other countries there seemed to be better chances. But here also the governor's special responsibilities were clearly of an all-pervasive character. Even in this restricted field, therefore, ministries were playthings in the hands of the governors. Witness the over-throw of Mr. Fazlul Haq in Bengal, of Mr. Allahbux in Sind and the sickening disclosures of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee regarding the helplessness of ministers. There was indeed no chance of Indians governing themselves except according to the convenience of the British agents. This was so during the complacent months of peace. But the reality became grimmer during the war with the Defence of India Rules and tightening up of control all round.

But this uneatable apple of discord served the authorities well. The Congress pecked at it for a brief interval of 27 months and turned away in disgust. Others have been vainly searching these eight dreary years for some healthful kernel and the mere distinction of having the apple, however useless it is, seems to be their only satisfaction.

All parties for a time had their heads turned at the prospect of power and there was a feverish attempt at capturing power in the provincial fields.

Among Muslims, the Muslim League forged ahead, enlisting members, opening branches, holding meetings and making itself conspicuous with the Muslims by propaganda both in the press and on the platform. It achieved considerable success. In opposition to it the Hindu-Mahasabha also got its due share of prominence. The Congress had its own stormy propaganda and publicity campaign. Communal temper was rising. Amidst such excitement the country went to the polls.

The election results were overwhelmingly in favour of the Congress. To the profound disappointment of Mr. Jinnah the Muslim League was practically routed during the elections.

In the north-western zone comprising the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and the Punjab which figures prominently as the Muslim homeland, the Muslim League was treated with contempt. Mr. Jinnah got one Muslim seat and that in the Punjab alone against 155 that went to his opponents. In the eastern zone of his 'Pakistan' Mr. Fazlul Haq and independents secured 77 Muslim seats against 40 that went to Sir Nazimuddin. In Assam the Muslim League got 9 seats against 25 that went to the Non-Leaguers. While this was the position in the Muslim zones, in the six other provinces where the League could never aspire to power, it suffered a similar set-back. In Orissa, Bihar, and the C. P. and Berar the League did not get a single Muslim seat. In the U. P., Bombay and Madras it did better. All told it got 108 seats against 377 that went to Non-Leaguers.

The psychology of Mr. Jinnah whose craving for leadership is morbid can be imagined. His discomfiture was the single major factor that warped his perspective, and, it seems, irretrievably disturbed his mental balance. He began to see enemies where none existed.

The Congress which by all judgment was the single well-knit party went to office not for jobs but to implement a programme and quitted office on an issue that it could not approve of. It was in no hurry to enter the ministries and when it did so honourably after getting assurances from the Viceroy it went as a compact team. This very confidence and power made Mr. Jinnah jealous. Elsewhere also the Muslim League was not consulted in the formation of ministries. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan with the Unionist party in the Punjab, Mr. Fazlul Haq with his *Krishak-Praja* party in Bengal, and K. B. Allah Bux with independents in Sind formed governments; and everywhere they looked to the Congress for encouragement and support.

Unfortunately the Congress had no clear policies to guide its representatives in provinces where they were in minority. In the Punjab, Sind and Bengal, therefore, the Muslim Premiers were always insecure.

Now the League agitation naturally developed on two lines. In Muslim majority provinces it started a virulent communal campaign. In some of the by-elections Muslim Leaguers were returned. The Premiers were being daily threatened and abused by the Muslim League. The uncertainty of Congress attitude made them unable to face the Muslim League propaganda with courage. What is more they had no disciplined parties behind them united on a programme but only

individual sympathisers who naturally lacked cohesion. This was most so in Sind. In Bengal there was the solid group of Europeans which had no sympathy with the Congress or with the radical programme of the *Krishak-Praja* Party. They would naturally back up the reactionary League.

The Muslim League threats and abuses succeeded. In October, 1937 Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan and Mr. Fazlul Haq joined the League. With them went their followers. These wholesale change-overs were not at the verdict of the electorate but the choice of individuals. Indeed Muslim politics has hardly emerged from the rudimentary stage of rule of personalities. In Sind also certain members of the Assembly, joined the League.

While this may be regarded as a success of the Muslim League, the League in fact was never able to control these governments as the Congress controlled the Congress Ministries. It is a curious fact that the Muslim League high command comes from Muslim minority provinces. The Muslim majority provinces precisely because the Muslims are a majority in these areas do not quite understand the militant separatism of the Muslim League. These provinces tend to develop local politics which is inconsistent with the All-India politics of the Muslim League. This difference in view point has caused Mr. Jinnah and other Muslim leaders considerable headache and the Muslim League high command never won favour in these zones of 'Pakistan.' This is clear from the frequent bickerings between the Muslim Premiers and the Muslim League high command. Witness the chequered career of Mr. Fazlul Haq, the break with Tiwana and the dismissal

of Shaukat Hayat Khan, the quandary in Sind between G. M. Syed and G. H. Hidayatullah, the demise of League ministry in the Frontier and the League coalition with the Congress in Assam.

In the Muslim majority provinces, therefore, the League is not quite well-established. That is why it is the constant refrain of Mr. Jinnah that Muslim League is the sole spokesman of the Muslims. The Muslim League relations both with the Government and the political parties in India have been fashioned on this authoritarian demand.

While Muslim League remains unreconciled to other Muslim parties, it is in relation to the Congress that its hostility is the sharpest and the most pronounced.

We have already seen the basic antagonisms between the politics of the Congress and the League. This was deepened when Congress formed ministries not only in six Muslim minority provinces, but also in the N.-W.F. Province, the heart of Pakistan, and in Assam which the Muslim League does not want to admit as a Muslim minority province in spite of the fact that only one district of Assam, namely, Sylhet has a Muslim majority and the province as a whole has only 34 lakhs of Muslims against 52 lakhs of Hindus.

The Congress became the target of Muslim League fury. The Muslim League propaganda took the familiar shape. In the first place the Congress began to be called a Hindu body. As a Hindu body it came to be termed communal and discriminatory to the Muslims. As the next step came the 'atrocities' propaganda culminating in

the celebration of a deliverance day when Congress resigned on the war-issue.

The new strain can be traced quite early when Congress had not been in office for more than three months. They had not yet settled down and there could be no idea yet on what lines they would work. Of course the Election Manifesto was there; but the Manifesto itself was so eminently reasonable that the Muslim League found little to object in it. Yet arguments began to anticipate events that never happened. At the Lucknow session of the League (15th to 18th October, 1937) Mr. Jinnah who presided said: "The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Mussalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu and since they have formed government in six provinces where they are in majority they have by their words, deeds and programmes shown that the Mussalmans cannot expect justice and fairplay at their hands. On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus."

This judgment in advance of events is a wonderful illustration of wish being father to the thought. The alleged discriminatory "words, deeds and programmes" were never specified as they could not be. But the grievance was repeated at the special session at Calcutta on 17th and 18th April, 1938. Complaints were made against the tyranny of "Congress Raj". Congress refusal to form coalition was cited as an instance. Mr. Fazlul Haq worked up the audience in a feeling of

hatred towards the Hindus and argued that protection could not come through safeguards. He harped on militant violence when he declared: "If Panipat and Thaneshwar must repeat themselves let the Muslims prepare to give as glorious an account of themselves as their forbears." India heard this with amazement but section 153 A of the Indian Penal Code was as well as non-existent on the statute book. Mr. Jinnah called the Congress High Command a totalitarian and authoritarian caucus and the Congress a Hindu body and a menace to all. Indeed it was on this basis that Mr. Jinnah asked Gandhiji to represent the Hindus and none else.

The most significant and what is novel in the Muslim history of a thousand years in India is that arguments began to be advanced that Hindus and Moslems had nothing in common and that the Muslims were a separate nation. The argument was inspired by the idea that as a separate nation Muslims should have co-ordinate and equal importance with the Hindus—another argument for more positions of power and profit for the Muslims.

Now nationality as we have seen depends on a number of complex factors, namely, community of territory, of historic memories and traditions; a distinct language; religion; culture and so forth. Arguments based on these began to be fashioned. These arguments were naturally strained and fair-fetched but they were pressed with insistence. Thus historically the Muslims were shown to be conquerors of India and rulers from whom the British took over and as such the Muslims should succeed when the British abdicated. Any

one who has followed the rise of British power in India knows that the British took over from the Rajputs, the Marathas and the Sikhs, rather than from the Muslims whose rule had become ineffective but historical accuracy was fancifully brushed aside. Similarly, it was argued that a handful of Arabs conquered Sind and a small army of invaders founded the Muslim Empire. As the Muslims are now 90 millions they can conquer and rule the Hindus more effectively. In effect Muslim League began to say that Hindus are a decadent and supine race and that the Muslims are a race of conquerors. It was also argued that Muslims predominantly compose the Indian army and power should go with the sword. It was conveniently forgotten that statistically Muslims formed barely 32 per-cent of the Indian Army, as Sir Jogendra Singh of the Viceroy's Council declared in the Assembly.

Linked with these inflated notions were the Pan-Islamic dreams and memories of Arab glories, although Mr. Jinnah in his latest correspondence with Gandhiji calls Pan-Islamism a mere bogey. Pan-Islamism, which fires Muslim imagination as a romantic vision, is however, wholly impracticable. The pioneer Muslim state and the only one that is in a full sense a sovereign state, namely, Turkey has turned its back on Pan-Islamism as unsuited to modern tendencies of the secular state. There is indeed a Pan-Arab movement to combine Arabs who speak a distinct language. Indian communalism, however, loves to hug impracticable notions of medieval times. In a passage as ill-informed as it is unwise the authors of "India's Problem of her Future Constitution" (with a preface by Mr. M. A. Jinnah; page

61) thus linked the problems of Indian Muslims with those of Muslims outside India:

"Islamic problems are everywhere of an allied nature. Liberation of one Muslim country will directly affect another. The fate of Muslims in India will have direct repercussion in other parts of the world, particularly in the western provinces of China and the southern and eastern parts of Russia where Muslims are in a majority. Acceptance of minority status within the sub-continent of India will besides sealing once for all the fate of 90 million Muslims in India lead to permanent enslavement of 30 millions of Muslims in Soviet Russia and 50 millions in Western China." It is a Muslim League discovery that Muslim citizens of Russia and China are slaves that need to be liberated by Indian Muslims whose leaders, in the Muslim League have never striven for their own liberation.

Indeed Muslims are being doped in with the opiate of religion. Muslim League is exploiting it for a subtle purpose. We have seen how Punjabi's 'Confederacy' urges that the Muslims are born into a system, that Moslem League is the sole Moslem party and that isolation is necessary for the development of Islamic polity. It leads to one consummation only —to denial of democracy, to dictatorship of Moslem League, and, in isolation, to enabling the Moslem League *elite* to govern the religion-ridden mass. All this amounts to a mischievous type of Fascism, infinitely more powerful than the Italian and German types as the irrational appeal is powerfully reinforced by the smoke-screen of religion.

The 'Muslim nation' theory has been already exposed. Yet the vast fields of agreement were left out

of account and unsubstantial differences were magnified out of all proportion. The corroding influence of communalism was even carried into the field of education and a separate organisation was formed for Muslim students. Even into the ranks of the 'hungry ones'—the workers, communal differences were introduced.

While the 'Muslim nation' idea was being crystallised by the fanfare of hectic propaganda; while the cry of 'Islam in danger' roused Muslim suspicions that looked desperately real precisely because they could not be seen in the concrete; while the Muslim press was through all the twists, the suppressions and the exaggerations in its comments on daily events sowing alarm among the Muslims and transforming vague suspicions into solid distrust; an attractive mirage was conjured before Muslim eyes in the shape of Pakistan. Pakistan came to be described as the panacea of Muslim ills. The word got saturated with emotion. Realistic thinking about it became impossible. In this state of turgid emotions the Lahore Resolution of March, 1940, formally, proclaimed the Muslim goal of Pakistan which through a plethora of guesses, estimates, comments and clarifications has finally taken shape in a demand for completely separate sovereign states in regions of Muslim majority, namely, in north-east and north-west India. Indeed the meaning is not quite clear in all its implications even after the Gandhi-Jinnah talks in September, 1944. Mr. Jinnah never gave a concrete scheme and Gandhiji's scheme did not commend itself to him.

Now it is obviously untrue to say that Congress is a Hindu organisation. Its decisions are all in general

terms. It claims to speak for all India. Its efforts are directed not against certain communities in India but against the British Imperialism. It has had for several years now Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as its President and few Indian Muslims rank as high in culture, scholarship and love of Islam. Its membership embraces all communities without restriction of race and religion. That it is not a Hindu organisation is as clearly evident from the growth in influence of the Hindu Mahasabha which in communal matters calls the Congress pro-Moslem.

But the cry was raised with ever growing insistence. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was contemptuously described by Mr. Jinnah as a "showboy president" of the Congress. The propaganda was directed mainly against the Congress ministries. All sorts of insinuations were made against them to show them as oppressors of the Muslims. The charges, however, were never concrete enough to be investigated. This was so by all agreement because in fact there were no charges to make. Pandit Nehru's challenge to Mr. Fazlul Haq for joint investigation remained unanswered. Dr. Rajendra Prasad's suggestion that an impartial outsider like Sir Maurice Gwyer should investigate was not accepted by Mr. Jinnah. That there could be no valid charges is clear from the fact that the Central Government was still beyond Congress reach; and in the narrow provincial field the governors were there fully equipped to protect the minorities as their special responsibility. The ministries were rigidly controlled by a Congress Parliamentary Board of three of which Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was a prominent member. The legislative and executive

measures sponsored by the Congress were economic and social. Witness the new tenancy laws in the U. P. and in Bihar; the rent reduction operations in the latter; the Agricultural Income-Tax Act; the Prohibition measures; the Mass-Literacy drives; the Electrification Scheme; the Sugar Industries control; the Rural Development scheme; the National Planning Committee; and so forth. But the protest against the Congress ministries was made on such childish grounds as that the Wardha Scheme of education named the schools 'Vidya Mandirs', a Hindu religious expression; that Agricultural Income-Tax should not be levied on Muslim Waqfs; that the Advocate-General in Bihar should have been a Muslim rather than a Hindu; that Hindustani fostered by the Congress as the national language was a conspiracy against Urdu. The charges of injustice were denied even by the governors who could never be supposed to be in league with the Congress ministries.

The composition of the ministries itself made argument of unalloyed Hindu communalism absolutely groundless. Thus if we consider the membership of the Provincial Assemblies we find that in Sind Muslims as such have 33 seats in a house of 60; in the N.W.F. Province they have 36 seats in a house of 50; in the Punjab they have 84 Muslim seats in a house of 175 but with 2 seats reserved for Mohammadan women and with seats for landholders and labour, etc., Muslims will count more than 88 seats which gives them a clear majority. In Bengal in a house of 250, Muslims have 117 communal seats, and 2 women seats, and are bound to get some seats of labour, landholders and the university, etc. They will thus easily get more than 125 seats. In these provinces,

therefore, Muslims have statutory majority and the governments will be predominantly Muslim in composition. In Assam Muslims have 34 communal seats and with seats reserved for planting, etc., which may be and often have been sympathetic to the Muslims, they form a compact minority and have often formed governments.

Correspondingly in the remaining provinces the governments are bound to be predominantly Hindu in composition. This is inherent in the Act. Wisdom lies in seeing that the Muslim majority in one case and the Hindu majority in the other do not become permanent and fanatical institutions. The only solution is to subordinate religion and develop political parties on non-religious, economic and social lines. Only so can we fight the tyranny of religion.

Even so the Muslim minorities were very much better off than the non-Muslim minorities. In one case Congress which is open to all communities formed governments with a definite economic and political programme. In the other Muslim League which is frankly communal had influence over governments which had no such economic programme. In one case religion was ignored and by-passed. In the other it was emphasised.

Even numerically out of 71 ministers in the 11 provinces 26 were Muslims, 10 of other communities and 35 Hindus. On population basis Hindus would have many more posts and Muslims many less. In the 6 Hindu majority provinces (if we ignore Assam) out of 35 ministers 6 were Muslims and 5 of other communities and only 24 Hindus. By population their percentages should have been much higher. Thus there were no purely Hindu governments. Nor were the Muslim

ministers in the Congress governments persons who had no representative capacity and who deserted their own parties from motives of self-aggrandisement as alleged. In fact 3 were elected on the Congress ticket and one in the U. P., Mr. Hafiz Md. Ibrahim, resigned his seat in the U. P. Assembly, stood on Congress ticket and was elected after defeating the Muslim League nominee. Two were independents and there was no question of desertion involved. It was Muslim League which was strengthened by wholesale desertions from their parties of members in the Punjab and Bengal in the autumn of 1937. Congress relied on its own strength.

These sober facts were drowned in a virulent campaign and the brief interval of Congress ministries, (barely 27 months) was made out to be so packed with atrocities that a feeling was created that the very survival of Muslims was at stake. It was expected that when Congress resigned in the autumn of 1939 the Muslim League propaganda would abate. The celebration of the deliverance day, however, dashed all such hopes to the ground. Muslim League was relieved that democracy died in the provinces and the British governors once more returned to the pre-1909 days in the provinces where section 93 of the Government of India Act came into force. The country was delivered from the Congress but on to the British governors. The events had to be celebrated with rejoicing.

The outbreak of the war provided a new factor in Indian politics. The Congress as a self-respecting nationalist party refused to support the war-efforts as India was declared a co-belligerent with Great Britain without even consulting Indian opinion. The Congress which

was ever a *persona non-grata* with the Britishers showed such a wonderful unity and independence on this issue by resigning office that Britishers were shocked at the "impudence." The Britishers tried to show an unconcern and contempt for the Congress by ignoring it. But the Congress case was so unanswerable, and there was such an out-cry in India that even the Muslim League formally announced non-cooperation in the war efforts. The League condition for co-operation was, however, quite attractive to the Britishers. The League from New Delhi in September, 1939, on the declaration of the war declared that they must have full satisfaction that no constitutional change would be allowed without the acceptance of the Muslims (Muslim League). Nothing could please the Britishers better than to delay transfer of power on any pretext whatever and on 23rd Dec., 1939, the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah very obligingly: "His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional development in India. You need, therefore, have no fear that the weight which your community's position in India necessarily gives their views will be underrated." This was a veiled encouragement to Mr. Jinnah to formulate extravagant demands and in March, 1940, the famous Pakistan resolution was passed.

Congress unable to secure a definition of the war-aims and to secure their application to India in that they would have freedom here and now to join the war and shape its policies, decided on 'Individual Civil Disobedience' which still further embittered the British.

autocrats and encouraged them to woo and nurse the Muslims as a counterpoise to the nationalist demand.

The vicarious success of the Muslims which must have pleased Mr. Jinnah very much although on surface he still appeared unreconciled is directly a British contribution. It served the British well and their policy gradually began to shape on the sinister line of making it impossible for Congress to have power in any future scheme. There started a systematic flight both from the conception of Indian Federation and from democracy and the Muslim League heartily collaborated with the British in this unholy race. We can trace this in the various declarations made.

Thus the Viceroy on October 18, 1939, in his declaration gave a clear assurance to the Muslims that full weight would be given to their views and their interests in any modification (of the constitution) that may be contemplated.

Lord Zetland, Secretary of State, declared on the same day before the Lords :

"There is on the part of the minorities an insistent demand for safeguards against consequences which, rightly or wrongly, it is feared may result from the unfettered domination of the majority,"

To the Indian demand for an interim National Government the Viceroy responded by offering an Indianisation of his Council with 'yes men' and said that fundamental changes could not be made. The reason is given in the famous declaration of the Viceroy on 18th August, 1940, when he said :

".....It goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in Indian national life. Nor could they be parties to coercion of such elements into submission to such a government."

Mr. Amery on 18th November, 1941, declared, "Rightly or wrongly, the experience of the Provincial self-government on British Parliamentary lines has convinced the Muslims and the States that they cannot submit to any central government for India in which the executive is directly dependent on a Parliamentary majority which, if provincial experience is any guide, would be an obedient mouthpiece of the Congress High Command."

Mark the words "Rightly or wrongly". Even the British authorities found it impossible to justify the Moslem League demand. That, however, did not prevent them from accepting the demand as it was conducive to maintenance of British paramountcy. "The admittedly just demands of the Congress would not be conceded as they undermined the imperial foundation. Thus the League reaped rich harvests out of the war. Indeed its opposition to the war-efforts was only so-called. It was itching for co-operation. Co-operation promised offices and positions in the present and favourable deal in the future. Thus starts the gradual unfoldment of an ill-concealed anxiety for co-operation. The Moslem League authorised Muslim Leaguers as individuals to co-operate in the war efforts. It never thought of ordering the ministers in the Punjab and in Bengal to

dissociate themselves from war efforts. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan was too conscious of the economic gains to the Punjab that came from enlistment in the forces to swallow such advice. It manouvred to get into ministries in the N.-W.F. Province, in Assam and in Sind when the Congress vacated office in the first two, and Mr. Allahbux was murdered in the third—acts of conscious co-operation in the war effort. Indeed in these provinces the Muslim League ministries were so artificially bolstered up that they could not expect to survive if the Assemblies were allowed to sit in full strength. Members were actually restrained in the N.-W.F. Province and in Sind from attending the Assemblies. The whole technique smacks of indecent and disgraceful job-hunting. It was 'jobbery' with a vengeance.

While the Muslim League was thus everywhere offering unconcealed co-operation to the British and the counterpoise policy appeared to be succeeding admirably, the Japanese declared war and with rapid strides established themselves over south-east Asia and in the Pacific. The presence of American troops and civilians in India gradually led to information leaking out to America. The Japanese and the German radios were making capital out of the British policy of negation. Internally the morale of the people was low both because there was doubt about British intentions and lack of confidence in British prospects of victory. Counterpoise badly needed reinforcement by 'concession'. It was against this background that Sir Stafford Cripps came with his dramatic offer in the spring of 1942. The offer when closely examined turned out to be a 'post-dated

cheque,' as Gandhiji called it, for the brief and somewhat nebulous proposals were concerned only with post-war constitutional arrangements and offered nothing substantial by way of an interim national government. Indian participation in the defence of the country was not allowed nor was the civil government to be set up in any way different from an Indianisation of the Council. Cabinet government was summarily discounted. The only attractive thing about it was that it conceded the principle that the new constitution would be framed by a constituent assembly. That was a sop to the Congress. The sop to the League was that it conceded the possibility of secession of certain areas from an all-India Union.

Yet the Cripps Mission for a time dominated the politics of the country. As usual communal intransigence rose sharply when the constitutional prospects were being debated. The Muslim League, already fortified by the encouraging utterances of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, now scored a further success when it got a conditional commitment in the Cripps' offer which came from the British Cabinet itself.

Everything seemed to prove to the Muslim League its own importance. In this expansive frame of mind the League demanded an immediate and unconditional declaration from the Britishers in favour of Pakistan. It made a grievance of the fact that no full clarification was made, and, on several other obscure grounds, rejected the Cripps' proposals. To the Congress also it made the same demand. The communal controversy during this period reduced itself to mere mutual recrimination. The League, however, emerged strengthened.

The period after the failure of the Cripps' proposals has been the stormiest in the recent history of India. While the Cripps Mission necessarily involved a discussion of the communal question, the events that followed had no such implication. These events can be summed up in the 'Quit India' campaign of Mahatma Gandhi, the August resolution of the All-India Congress Committee on direct action, the arrest of the Congress leaders, the disturbances that followed and the trail of repression which still overshadows the land. These events were directly a challenge to the British power. The Moslem League, however, had a reaction to it which baffles understanding. The 'Quit India' campaign and the August resolution and the direct action contemplated were declared to be aimed against the Muslims. No greater untruth was uttered in the name of religion than when the League declared that the Congress was at war against the Muslims. Its condemnation of the Congress was couched in phrases that might have been as well stolen from the lips of Mr. Amery.

How the Congress with a Moslem President waged a war against Moslems when no single Moslem was hurt and no Moslem property was affected was never explained at the time. Recently Mr. Jinnah in his correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi (Sept. 9 to Sept. 25, 1944) has sought to explain it. The laboured explanation cannot deceive anyone. He says the Congress was fighting to get power transferred to India without having made suitable arrangements as to how power would be shared. When the British withdrew the power would go to a government in India which is dependent on parliamentary majority of the legislature as at pre-

sent constituted. In the legislature Muslims are a minority and the power would, therefore, devolve upon Hindus. That blights the Muslim prospect. The reply is that power must necessarily pass to bodies as at present constituted but that it will be merely a provisional government which would set up a constituent assembly to frame the new constitution. The Congress has laid down what safeguards for minorities it will be prepared to support. But it does not prejudge. It has even conceded that there may be a partition even as the Muslim League wants if the electorate in the areas concerned is in favour of it. Mr. Jinnah knows that the Congress is the only party in India that has prospects and that commitments by the Congress would in fact be given effect to. The immediate transference of power, however, can only be to a provisional government as the final arrangements can be made only after power has been won. Mr. Jinnah, however, puts the cart before the horse and would want power to go to bodies that do not exist. He will have only the British to frame the constitution at their own sweet will and would not brook any party to compel the Britishers to abdicate. His logic, therefore, perpetuates British domination. He frankly pins his faith on British dispensation and non-British arrangement he would naturally regard as hostile to Islam. It thus comes about that Mr. Jinnah denies not only the great Muslim people but the whole of India to fight for its freedom. He thus directly and openly plays the British game. He proves a valuable ally to the British.

The reward came in several ways. The governors bolstered up the Muslim League ministries artifi-

cially and are in no hurry to let representatives of the people come into power. The repression that followed the disturbances which was a mass movement openly discriminated in favour of the Muslims. The collective fines did not bind the Muslims. The underlying support to Pakistan has been presumably deepened.

Revolution teaches both the leaders and the people with incredible rapidity and the revolutionary months of 1942 swept away many cobwebs from political thinking. On the eve of the mass upheaval of 1942 Mahatma Gandhi's writing gained in power and clarity as if with a new realisation. I am referring to the writings in which he invited Mr. Jinnah to join in the demand for British withdrawal from power; where he declared that the fight against imperialism will go on with Mr. Jinnah if he joined up, without him if he cared to stay out, and in spite of him if he allied himself with the British power; where he coldly visualised even the possibility of a short civil war, if the British withdrew, but a civil war that would make a solution of the communal problem urgent and inevitable; where for the first time he called off the Muslim League bluff that they would resort to force by declaring that the Hindus could equally fight and that clash of mights must decide unless they agreed by negotiations. These phrases were deliberately misconstrued by the Muslim League press which luridly portrayed the Congress as on the war-path. What Gandhiji clarified was that the alternative to peaceful settlement was a settlement by war. As for himself he indicated a strong, some say a morbid preference for the former alternative. All this put the communal problem in its proper perspective.

As the Muslim League has waded far into the communal current retreat has become impossible. The present role of the Muslim League is thus a result of its own history and an accident of its own peculiar leadership. With a morbid hallucination of Pakistan and racial arrogance; thwarted by Muslims as well as by Hindus, dubious of the Congress and jealous of its power, favoured by the present British policy and free to infect the Muslim mass with its propaganda of hatred,—the Muslim League has grown into a party ruled by contradictory impulses, subject to violent emotions and incapable of sober, calm and constructive thinking. Under its malignant guidance the Muslim mind is rising into a blind opposition to India's struggle for freedom.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS : THE BRITISH ARM OF THE TRIANGLE

WE closed the last chapter with the note that the Muslim League has evolved into a malignant opponent of Indian freedom. This leads us to the subtlest and the most powerful factor of the communal question. It is the third arm of the communal triangle, namely, British Imperialism.

We have already met this hidden third arm at several stages in the analysis of the role of political parties and leadership in India. Indeed, the political parties and leaders have been powerfully swayed by the presence of this factor which has never allowed them free-working.

British Imperialism has never been fully brought into the light of day and there is considerable misunderstanding about its true nature. As the literature on the subject is either too inadequate or too diffused an attempt is made in this chapter to elucidate it as briefly and succinctly as is possible.

To a proper appreciation of the British brand of imperialism in India, some general observations on the nature of 'imperialism' would be in order.

Imperialism as any other system is a product of human psychology and organisation. Man is by nature averse to effort. He would like his problems to be solved by others. He drafts animals to toil for him

and controls the forces of Nature to serve his ends. So much is called science. By a curious streak of cannibalism in him, however, and by his power of organising weapons of violence and fear, he makes his fellowmen victims of his avarice. Arms and the law and the God of judgment serve as fetters on humanity. Exploitation comes natural to man. When this exploitation is by one group of human beings on another, we have the phenomenon of "Imperialism". Most often this is crystallised in visible political control of one people by another. The Greeks and the Romans derived their tributes from the Empire and shared the benefits among themselves. It is true that the benefits were enjoyed by certain classes only, like the monarchy, the nobility, the army and the retainers; but, following the logic of the slogan "I am the State", the country and the nation till recently were identified with these classes only.

The ruling group often believes by a process of self-hypnotisation that political control is only for the good government of the ruled and pious sentiments are expressed about it. But there have been few instances of one people exercising political control on another without enjoying material benefits derived from this control.

This old conception of the Empire as a political over-lordship with right to get a visible tribute has undergone fundamental changes with the growth of capitalism. Expansion of capitalist industry demands both sources of raw materials and markets for the disposal of products. There is thus a natural quest of peoples and territories which may serve the ends of

the capitalist industry. Karl Marx with a rare insight into the nature and working of the state has shown how, amidst the camouflage of generality and universalism, the state is basically a class institution; and how in the era of capitalism it functions as a managing committee of the propertied classes. Those who own and control the industry will be found to be ultimately controlling the government. They would be in the key positions in the administration, in the army, the police and the financial institutions. The capitalist masters, therefore, use their state machinery for securing control of other peoples and territories. In this pursuit they carry the gullible mass with them by all the subtle devices of education and propaganda, feeding them on the vapid sentiments of nationalism and patriotism. The trick works and at the bidding of capitalist rulers peasants and workers of one country have marched in goose-step with rifles to shoot their compeers of another for ends they have never been able to fathom.

It is this necessity of capitalist development that has resulted in the partitioning of the world among different powers and has thrown humanity from one world conflagration to another.

One other feature of capitalism, which may prove its doom, is that it distributes in income more value than what can be habitually spent on consumption. On the face of it this looks like a paradox of plenty but the mischief arises from the fact that certain classes barely get their living while other classes get more than they consume. There is thus necessarily saving which can be kept only in the form of durable goods, i.e., capital goods. Capital goods are only an aid to further

the production of consumption goods, and, when all the necessary investments have been made, further laying up of capital goods will be wasteful and uneconomic. Resort is, therefore, had to export of capital helping industrialisation of other regions. Capital often carries control of industry with it but even when this is not so there is a demand for safety of the investment and for the sake of safety control over the people and territory concerned is demanded.

This was, however, the early phase of capitalism. During this phase capitalism was a liberalising force and the empire, whatever political subjection it meant, was not felt to be a crushing burden. The export of goods and of capital both tended to spread industrialisation in the colonial lands and there was a tendency to equalise conditions in the dominant lands and the colonies.

Empire, however, became an exceedingly mischievous force with the emergence of the recent phase of capitalism—the monopoly capitalism of cartels, combines and trusts. This phase was inevitable for it could not be long before people realised that profit and dividend could be maximised even without expanding production, if supplies could be suitably controlled. Organising scarcity became a method of getting monopoly revenues. The economy of monopoly production and the certainty of returns from it were so compelling a force that those who owned industries were naturally led to seek monopoly of the sources of raw materials and of markets. Very often the industries realised monopolies independently of the state, but as owners of capital were necessarily in the administration it was

not uncommon for the state to become a party to furthering the growth of monopolies.

The control of the sources of raw materials and markets in this second phase of capitalism became, therefore, a more ruthless and more restrictive force. One factor which has helped the concentration of control over industries is the emergence of the banks as the greatest providers of capital. The individual shareholder who was the pillar of capitalist industry at one time has been now completely thrown into the shade and the great banks have taken away almost all the functions of the issuing houses. The banks controlling the day-to-day provision of circulating capital as well as the issuance of bonds have become the final authority in determining the level of productive activity the world over. This is the third phase of capitalism, popularly called the era of "finance capital."

As capitalism passed from one phase to another, the meaning of imperialism became deepened. Each succeeding phase of capitalism became more and more profitable to the owners of capital. The rentier class, the owners of capital, became progressively smaller as capital tended to concentrate in fewer hands. Correspondingly the burden on the colonies became more and more crushing and the non-rentier class faced greater and greater exploitation.*

Imperialism has many shades and expresses itself in many forms. It may be as pale as a commercial deal between England and Canada on terms only slightly favourable to England, and as bloody as the exploitation of the natives in Belgian Congo. It may express itself through open political control as well as through sheer

unequal treaties. It may flourish under an actual army of occupation as well as through the mere frown of a superior power. At its best it involves a compulsory exchange of equivalents. At its worst it means sheer robbery and deprivation. This is the commercial side of capitalist imperialism. The financial side is still more attractive. The export of capital yields a large margin of profit. The method of issuance of bonds has been utterly changed. The issuing houses and banks take up all the bonds when issued and only gradually unfold them on the markets of the colonies. This cornering of shares and bonds enables them to sell them at monopoly prices. The issuing houses can also buy back all the bonds by organising panic and sell them over again to unsuspecting colonial buyers. On each turnover they gain at the cost of the colonies. Even the original issue of the bonds is subject to high underwriting costs and few colonial borrowers get more than 80 per cent of the nominal value of the loans advanced to them. Lenin has calculated that issuance of bonds is the most paying occupation on the earth.

The gain on sale of products at monopoly prices; on purchase of raw materials at dictated prices; on exploitation of colonial industries; on issuance, sale and purchase of bonds—in themselves stupendous are reinforced by the subsidiary developments* of shipping, banking, insurance and other monopolies which yield their own returns.

All told the gains to the imperial power are great and correspondingly economic cost to the people in subordination is heavy. As economics is the bedrock on which the fine superstructure of morals and culture

is reared, Imperialism affects the morals and cultures of both the peoples. Whereas it corrupts the superior power and makes it narrow-minded and vain-glorious its effect on the subordinate people is more sinister. When it is at all deeply entrenched, it undermines the morals and cultures of the subordinate people and robs it of its manhood.

Thanks to the qualms of the moral man in immoral society, imperialism rarely shows itself in its naked and ugly form. To the subordinate people it seeks to ingratiate itself by appeal to attractive and high-sounding principles. It claims to be on a mission of protecting the subordinate people, giving it good government, curing it of anarchy, developing its economic potentialities, and so on and so forth. At home and abroad it resorts to the same propaganda but a more successful method is to keep discreetly silent and to let no information out. The well-known saying 'out of sight out of mind' is pressed into fruitful service. What people outside would not know they would not criticise. This maxim is also applied within the country itself. Vital operations are rarely brought into the light of day and the critical faculty of the vast mass is blunted out by a hard crust of ignorance and illiteracy systematically achieved. This is the well-known method which Indian wisdom knows as *sama*.

While these are the moral weapons of imperialism it also seduces to its fold men of ability and intelligence who would otherwise be its potential opponents. The classic case is that of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald who was seduced by the West End of London and was lost to the Labour Party and to Socialism. 'Quisling' has

already passed into current vocabulary as descriptive of a type. Seduction proceeds in manifold forms. There are the glittering prizes of employment and position under the government, and, although it may be shocking to the prudes, our loyalties can be often purchased for a suitable price. The native element absorbed in the governing classes is distinguished by other favours from the common people and there arises the familiar phenomenon of the "official caste".

Then there are other hierarchical gradations, creatures of the Imperial regime, whose fortune is tied up with the Empire. And lastly there is no dearth of men of average attainment who rush to titles and sanads and other honours to lend them illusory distinction.

Through all these baits a fair number of men is attracted to function as pillars of the Empire—*dama* principle of Indian wisdom.

In the final analysis, however, force alone can settle the great problems of imperial politics and even as eternal vigilance is said to be the price of liberty, the Empire must be eternally vigilant and ready for offensive and defensive actions against its enemies—the "rebels" and the "agitators". To this end it disarms and castrates the people and maintains an army of sufficient strength and of proved loyalty which it jealously guards against native influence. This is indeed the brute fact of the empire—the solid kernel that sustains it; the mailed fist under the velvet gloves. This is what India knows as the principle of *Danda*. In each crisis the thin veil of democratic decencies is flung away and this principle begins to operate freely and ruthlessly.

The great concern of the Empire, however, is to see that the potential opposition remains unorganised. It is said one can fool some people for some time; one can also fool all people for some time; and even some people for all time but one cannot fool all people for all time. This applies also to imperial subjugation. It is very difficult to keep all people from rebellion all the time. For this reason if the rebellion must remain an ultimate possibility it is ordinary prudence to see that it is not universal and complete.

Now men will fight only for ideals and aspirations that appeal to their reason and grip their supra-rational consciousness. We know how the burning faith of one leaves another cold. The opposition to imperialism to be universal and complete must, therefore, be based on common ideals and aspirations—which shape only slowly by association and communication and by equal sharing in the same efforts and the same struggle. The conditions of its growth are very exacting and it is exceedingly easy to deflect, distort and retard this growth. Imperialism stands against emergence of a common and virile idealism and it does this by breaking the population into groups and subgroups which it must make as water-tight as possible. This is done with scientific detachment and even while one group may appear to be flattered and favoured at any time as compared to another group, the Empire in fact has no such preferences. It is only tipping the scale to preserve the balance of forces. Positively it grants recognition statutory and otherwise, to existing groups. What is more it creates groups where none existed before. It concretises this recognition by ostensibly acting for the

groups. Negatively while it may have on the statute books laws penalising dissemination of class and communal hatred, it refrains from acting when individuals of one group actually wound the feeling of another group and thus confirm the groups in their hostility to one another. What is more it denies by executive act opportunities to the groups to meet in solidarity even though the written laws proclaim the freedom of speech and association. This last method is the well-known method of divide and rule—the *Bheda* of Indian wisdom—the trump card of the empire and the great prophylactic against revolution. It is this last method which is specially relevant to the discussion at hand.

This is how imperialism works. The fourfold measures outlined above will be pushed forward the more energetically and thoroughly the more deeply entrenched the empire and the more vital its stakes. They will be the more successful the greater the rigidity of the political control.

Imperialism in India is governed by the same principles and broadly employs the same methods. What is more the political control is fully and blatantly in the hands of England and England is in a position to pursue all the measures successfully and vigorously. There are, however, certain peculiarities in the Indian situation that give imperialism in India a special stamp. Thus unlike Africa where the Imperial power met a sparse population at a very low level of civilization and where it was easy enough to view the indigenous population as no more than beasts of burden, the Imperial power in India met a civilization older than and culturally superior to what it could boast of in the home

country. India in the middle of the eighteenth century, though politically divided and distracted was in culture and civilization, and in arts and industries by all accounts superior to England. It was thus not easy for the Imperial power to rely solely on naked force as in Belgian Congo. It had to cloak its operations under a thick smoke screen of high and pious principles. Indeed the screen was so thick that even distinguished members of the ruling race were sometimes led into the error of believing in their truth. So Hume; so Wedderburn; so Annie Besant—they believed that England was interested in setting India's house in order and retiring after a temporary sojourn in this country. Again because India was already a vast and populous country there were fewer opportunities to colonise this land as was done in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Here direct exploitation was not possible and economic advantages had to be derived in a very roundabout manner. Thirdly, the "Great Refusal" by Englishmen to settle in India permanently gave the Imperial race the character of an army of occupation. As this army of occupation was a handful compared to the vast mass of the people in India there was always a fear lurking among the Britishers that they might be swamped and the Englishman developed his characteristic stiffnecked aloofness which cut him off from contact with the Indians even of his own status. The net result was that he never found an urge to consider the long range problems of the Indian people with a view to settle them and even ordinary reforms that did not affect the position of the Britisher or the Empire were not taken in hand. The positive British achievement, therefore, was confined to creating the structure of a police state

which ever remained a stranger to what is called nation-building activities.

The fourth feature is the nature of the political arrangements. The control of India passed into the hands of Englishmen. In itself it was not different from the manner of the older Empires which visibly took tribute from the subordinate countries. But in the case of India during the Company days the considerable surpluses out of Indian revenues were not remitted to England in this form but were used to finance a more or less monopolistic and compulsive trade and the profits which by all standards were excessive were remitted to England. This arrangement did not fully conceal the fact of direct tribute paid by India to England. After 1857, however, this remittance out of revenues dropped out and formally what was raised in India by way of revenue came to be spent in India itself. The disappearance of the visible tribute has considerably mystified the nature and the intentions of the Empire. If England takes only wages for services rendered in India and makes no profit out of Indian revenues its control of India must be for philanthropic and altruistic reasons. So runs the naive argument. This plausibility has also encouraged the pathetic belief in some quarters that England must be anxious to abdicate and to wind up this unprofitable business as soon as Indians are found fit to take over. According to this view what Indians require to do is merely to argue and to convince England that they are now fit for self-government. Nothing could be a greater delusion.

This will be clear from how deeply the Empire is entrenched in India and how vital are its stakes.

Consider the economic resources of Great Britain. Except for coal and dwindling resources in iron and relatively unimportant resources for farming—British economy is very precariously dependent on factors outside its own borders. England's industries are very largely dependent on raw materials imported from outside and English labour and capital appropriate the difference between the cost of importing the materials and the realised price from sale of the manufactured goods. These goods also have to be sold to people outside. Necessarily, therefore, foreign trade figures very dominantly in British economy.

The large volume of foreign trade gave rise to the British shipping and England became the world's carrier. In handling this large foreign trade England became a major trader in bills of exchange and thus became the world's banker. The gains from these avenues must seek outlet in export of capital and England became the world's financier. For all this England is naturally interested in other countries for regular supply of raw materials and for regular market for its wares. It must also see that its investments are safe.

The hey-day of British prosperity is, however, over. Both in industry, in banking, in finance and in the carrying trade serious rivals have arisen in America, Germany, Japan and now in the Soviet Union. The accidental supremacy of England is thus seriously shaken. From a population of 12 millions or so in 1750 British population has jumped to 48 millions, and, although by all estimates this population is likely to decline if the present birthrate does not increase, it

remains nevertheless too large to be sustained by the shrinking economy of Britain. With countries and states becoming more and more autarchic, with prospects of migration growing remote in view of the anti-immigration laws in all countries, the British people are rapidly becoming a beleaguered garrison with economic war enveloping them from all sides. Thrown on itself, Britain has a gloomy future. Dr. Inge in an article in the *Evening Standard* (quoted in the *Modern Review*, August, 1944) makes this gloomy forecast:

"In my opinion our episode of prosperous industrialism is coming to an end and will be followed by the kind of civilization which Plato and Ruskin liked best, a nation of farmers and small traders.

"A nation which depends for its existence on foreign trade can never be a working man's paradise. I believe, therefore, that our foreign trade is lost.

"Does it mean that we shall cease to be one of the Great Powers? In a sense, yes. We must give up trying to police the world and giving moral lectures to our neighbours."

According to Dr. Inge British Empire will have a future like that of the Spanish Empire. Inherently Britain has no better prospects than, say, Norway or Sweden or Spain.

The present war has had a terrible effect on Britain's economic position. Apart from the damage to plants and buildings, the war has violently changed England from a creditor nation to a debtor nation. A very considerable portion of British income was derived from investments and loans abroad. These, before the war

have been calculated at £2,200 millions. They have been all wiped out. What is worse England is heavily in debt to Canada to the tune of 1,000 million dollars and to India to the colossal sum of Rs. 10,02,07 crores, the value of the sterling balance held by the Reserve Bank of India on June 30, 1944. The balance is still growing and is at present in the neighbourhood of Rs. 1,400 crores. No correct estimate is available of the lend-lease debt to the U.S.A. but the sum was generally believed to be 6,000 million dollars in the middle of 1942 and must be considerably larger today. To Australia, to New Zealand and to South Africa also England has come to be a debtor.

British economists are fully alive to the terrible strain on England and have been stressing the enormous efforts required of England to keep itself up.

Thus Lord Catto, Governor of the Bank of England, speaking at Lord Mayor's Luncheon in the Mansion House on October 4, 1944 (quoted in the *Searchlight* of 6th October, 1944) even while cheering up the English people said: "It is true that our national debt is likely to be three times as much as at the end of the last war. Recovery will not be easy..Our external debts do not fill me with dismay although I would not like to contemplate what they might have been but for that financial 'miracle' Lend-Lease and the most generous war contributions of Canada.

"..Our problem, therefore, will be to export in sufficient volume to enable us to pay for our current essential imports—raw materials and food—to maintain the standard of living for our people and have some

surplus towards a gradual and orderly liquidation of our external obligations. It is indeed a serious problem."

Similarly Lord Keynes has been systematically reminding the English people that it would be not enough to go back to the pre-war production. The pre-war production will have to be trebled if England wants to avoid utter bankruptcy.

With British resources as they are this trebling of pre-war production will involve much greater purchases of raw materials from outside and the effort to pay up the debts must involve a tremendous expansion in the export trade. We do not know what would be the post-war economic relations between countries, but if autarchic tendencies persist, and there appears to be no chance of these disappearing, the dilemma before England looks insoluble.

Hence the desperate clinging to the Empire which would be the sole preserve, whose resources Britain would be able to draw upon and on whom she would be able to force her wares at monopoly prices. All indications point unmistakably to these intentions. Witness how jealously Britain withdraws questions relating to India from international discussion. The political problem of India is a domestic issue of Great Britain. The problem of the sterling balances was also excluded from the International Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods.

The controversy over the sterling balances of India is the most revealing of the Empire's attitude. If India has a right to the sterling balances to her credit she should be free to spend it where she would, convert it into whatever currency she would like, purchase with

It whatever she deems necessary and in whatever time. These are the only guarantees of the use of the sterling balances being profitable to India. Any restriction on their use imposed by England must mean that England will gain economically from such restriction. The considered view of Indians is that we should have the freedom to purchase capital goods from the cheapest market in the shortest possible time so that India may rapidly industrialise. For the only other choice before her is to perish. So desperate is her economic position.

By equivocal and contradictory utterances Englishmen have made Indians very suspicious of their intentions on this issue. There is one voice which says it is very unreasonable of India to demand payment of the sterling balances because the balances have arisen during the course of war and represent the contribution of India to the war efforts. She is a party to the war and as a free partner must take her share in the war efforts. It is only by a political fiction that India is a dependent country and that England should be meeting her war expenditure. This argument would wipe out our sterling balances outright—such is the luxury of Imperial Power. What greater proof is required to demonstrate that Empire is a very profitable business to the ruling power? This view is not that of some irresponsible Britisher who has no voice in British affairs. Even Lord Keynes who is certainly authorised to speak for England has pressed this argument.

The other point of view is that the balances should be paid for gradually over an indefinite number of years in shape of British goods. And the most consi-

derate of all the views is that part of the balances should be released in dollar at once but the major part should be paid for in goods over years.

But these are still non-official views and the British Government's attitude does not seem to have crystallised on this point. The British Government is evading the issue and leaving it for determination afterwards. An index to its attitude is the following extract from the Annual Report of the Reserve Bank of India which has the tacit authority of the Government of India for the year ended 30th June, 1944:

"The problem is to a large extent that of diverting productive capacity in the United Kingdom towards satisfaction of the demands represented by these balances and it is expected that it will be possible to secure a satisfactory arrangement with the United Kingdom for the orderly liquidation over a period of these resources."

The point to note is that 'productive capacity in the United Kingdom needs to be diverted'. In plain English it means the payment will be made in the shape of new industrial products of the United Kingdom whenever United Kingdom is able to produce in sufficiency, i.e., in indefinite future. It excludes our possibility of purchasing outside the United Kingdom—a monopolist that must charge its own exorbitant price.

More mischievous is the expression "satisfaction of demands represented by these balances". The expression seems to be meaningless. There will be in deed future demands of India to the satisfaction of which the balances would be used." These demands according to India would be for capital goods. But if the expression means the demands on the sacrifice of which these

balances have arisen, i.e., consumers' goods, India takes strong exception to dissipating the balances. India fears that against her will and by manipulations of tariffs, trade agreements and exchanges England would force flimsy consumer goods on India and make industrialisation in India in competition with her own impossible.

There will be besides 'orderly liquidation', i.e., not a sudden and immediate liquidation but "over a period" whose length we would never be allowed to determine.

The intentions are also indicated by the British attitude to establishment of certain industries in India. Ship-building, automobile, locomotive-making and other key industries have been systematically discouraged on unconvincing grounds of unsuitability of India for such production even when the *Statesman* at the time of the German bombings of the British Isles came forward with the suggestion that industries should be bodily transferred to India. The obvious reason for such discouragement is the possibility of England facing Indian competition and consequent unemployment. Equal development means disappearance of privilege. Empire generating prosperity in the dominant country and degradation in the colony is the very condition of British survival. It is in this light that we have to examine Britain's relations with India.

As the self-governing Dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand have a population of the same extraction as the mother country enjoying almost equality of status with Englishmen, these areas are not handy for exploitation. The undeveloped regions of Africa are not immediately attractive both on account of climatic conditions and of the efforts involved in deve-

loping them. India is already a developed country—ideal as a source of raw materials, and, with its enormous population, a great and expanding market. The population is also different in race, religion and colour and there are few sentimental inhibitions in the way of their exploitation unlike those in case of Canada or Australia.

While these general considerations prove the importance of India to the Empire, let us see concretely what India has meant to Great Britain.

In the first place we should not be misled by the formal accounting of Indian revenues as being spent in India itself. If we examine for what object the Indian revenues have been used we would not get an edifying answer. For out of Indian revenues Britain has met the cost of her imperial wars like the Sikh wars, the Burmese wars, the Nepal wars, the Afghan wars, even Abyssinian and Chinese wars. The wars were not for the benefit of India but for the benefit of England. But they have swelled our national debt and there is considerable agitation in the country against these costs being saddled on India.

The major item in the Indian budget is defence which uses up about half the revenues of the Government of India. Now it is clear that the Indian army is for the occupation of India and for defending this imperial possession from possible rivals of the British. In case of the colonies the cost of defence was borne entirely by the Imperial Government so far as Imperial forces were required for the purpose. Thus in 1858 (vide Keith's 'Responsible Government in the Dominion,' second edition, page 966) the total cost of Defence of the colonies was £4,000,000 of which only £380,000,

i.e., less than one-tenth was contributed by the colonies themselves. Even after the colonies obtained self-government, for some years, Imperial troops were maintained for helping to keep internal peace at no cost to the colonies and the troops were withdrawn only after adequate notice. This was only fair, if in deed there can be fairness in imperialism. The position of India as regards military defence has been entirely different from that of the colonies. From the commencement of the British connection India has raised and maintained her own army and found men and money for the purpose. The Imperial Government does not pay an iota of the cost of the Indian army but steps in to control it and use it for its own purposes. As we pay every pie of the cost of the British forces in India legally their position is that of hired troops. But these hired troops of ours are in fact our masters and are used to maintain British supremacy over us and generally in the east. This was clearly admitted in his evidence before the Welby Commission by the late Marquis of Lansdowne who was then Secretary of State for India and had been its one-time Viceroy.

This is hardly the place to dwell on the British policy in respect of the army in India which is well-known—how the civil population has been disarmed and emasculated; how by confining recruitment to certain classes martial tradition has been sought to be killed; how the Indian soldier can never rise beyond a Havildar or Risaldar: how he is kept apart from technical branches and given only inferior weapons to handle; how there is always the British troop to keep him in his position; how no Indian officer class has been allow-

ed to arise; how organisation and control has been kept a secret from Indians: and yet how shamelessly it is argued that Indians are ignorant of military art and are unable to defend themselves and unfit for self-government. The tragedy of India is that she has to forge and pay for her own fetters. This is true of the Indian section of the Army in India which is officered and led entirely by Britishers. But the 62,000 British troops out of a total of 209,000 (Army Estimates 1924-25) of the whole empire, i.e., about one-third, that are maintained out of the Indian Revenue, are unconcealed engines of white domination over India. Their cost can be saddled on India only because the Empire has the brute force to extort the cost from us.

Thus our innocent-looking budgets that show no visible tribute being paid to England are in fact dominantly for British advantage and profit.

Apart from the defence-budget and the national debt, the large British official class in the civil and military employ of the Government in India gets emoluments that are practically the highest in the world. Their pays and pensions are the major items of the 'Home' charges that forms a considerable proportion of the Indian revenues.

And then there is the more important, although the less obtrusive wing of the Empire, the non-official British hegemony in Indian trade and industry.

The non-official Britisher is engaged in trade and commerce, in banking, shipping and in industries and to some extent in the professions. They form a powerful group and in Bengal, Assam and Bombay they have been

assured representation in the legislatures out of all proportion to their numbers.

The British rule started with an aggressive commercialism and the first phase of the regime was marked by progressive decline of Indian industries and growing ruralisation of the country. But even when the state ceased to trade, the non-official European got all the privileges that could be given by their official brethren. For after all 'blood is thicker than water'.

The result has been British monopoly in industry and trade in India. Thus the entire foreign trade of India is practically in British hands. British ships carry all our exports and imports. Even in the coastal shipping Indians have no place for when the Scindia Steam Navigation Company came into being it found itself an unwelcome intruder in a closed preserve and its share in the coastal shipping remains absolutely insignificant. Our entire railway system is built out of British money. The irrigation system of the north-west, including the Sukkur Barrage, is mortgaged to British capital. Almost the entire plantation industry, namely, tea, coffee and indigo is British. Among mining industries, coal-mining is overwhelmingly British and copper-mining completely so. Oil of Assam and the Punjab is also under British exploitation. In iron and steel indeed the Tatas lead but the Steel Corporation of Bengal is not unimportant. Major portion of internal banking and insurance work is under British control and exchange banking is entirely British. In heavy chemicals the Imperial Chemicals hold the monopoly. Almost all the engineering works are British. Jute industry is

overwhelmingly Scottish. All told 70 per cent of the organised industry in India is British.

Only in the relatively unimportant industries producing consumers' goods like cotton textiles and sugar—Indians have been allowed a field. Otherwise India's gain out of industrial development has been only the paltry sums earned in wages by unskilled workers whose perforce had to be Indians. The industrial and commercial control of India by a foreign power prevented the training of Indians in industrial management, organisation and leadership and kept them out of all the benefit of industrialisation. The Imperial power always took care to see that the Indian industries did not compete with English industries and that no key industries be allowed to grow in India. Indians were thus driven to uneconomic holdings of land in a progressive pauperisation.

The British gains from trade and industry in India are thus summed up by H. N. Brailsford in his brilliant book 'Property or Peace?' at page 221:

"It is usually estimated that £600 to £700 millions of British capital are invested in India. Part of this capital is sunk in industries which in favourable years yield fabulous profits. Coal mines have been known to pay 100 to 120 per cent on a daily wage of 8d. Out of 51 jute mills, 32 paid as much as 100 per cent in one or more years between 1918 and 1927; 29 never paid less than 20 per cent, and 10 never paid less than 40 per cent. During the early post-war years the profits of the jute mills ranged from six to eight times their total wages bill. For every £12 they paid in wages to

their Indian workers, they remitted £100 in profits to their shareholders in Scotland..”

This is the gain from industry. Monopolist trade carried on by a highly organised industrial country like England with an agricultural and raw material producing country like India must yield a large revenue. The terms of trade are inevitably against the raw material producing country and India must be always the loser in the bargain.

As for export of capital Lenin has calculated that the colonial borrower rarely gets more than 80 per cent of the nominal loan advanced to him. Often capital generates capital by simply watering and it is not certain that all the nominal balance of liabilities does in fact represent material goods received by India.

This is what India meant to England even in the days of peace and relative free trade. During this war India has meant all the difference between England's life and death. Her hungry peasantry gave England an army of 2½ million soldiers—the volunteer army of Mr. Amery and Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan and the mercenary army of Mahatma Gandhi. During the five years of war India supplied materials for war to the tune of Rs. 1,700 crores and acted as the base of operations for Japan and the Middle East. The contribution, altogether extorted—has been invaluable to the Empire. With autarchy gaining in popularity and with this devastating war which has revolutionised England's economic position and made it a debtor on the verge of bankruptcy, England will cling to India even as the drowning man catches at straw. It is a splendid opportunity if the creditor is also the victim of the debtor as

India is. India has been called the brightest jewel in the British Crown—certainly it is the most precious. The admissions by the late Lord Curzon in his book "The place of India in the Empire" are echoed more loudly by Mr. Winston Churchill who understands the advantages of holding India much better after the economic upheavals caused by this war when he says: "I have not become the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the Empire." It is this determination of England to cling to India that explains the arming of the Viceroy and the governors with their special responsibilities, particularly in respect of what is called commercial discrimination and financial stability of India. In plain words this means English participation in Indian trade and industry must not be interfered with; that Indians and Englishmen should have equal opportunity in the Empire—the equality of the giant and the dwarf as Gandhiji has put it. India must be safe for the Britisher to realise his returns.

This attitude is not confined to the British Tories who have been the rulers of England. Even labour shares in the tainted profits from the empire, although only as crumbs from the bursting tables of their capitalist masters. Thus Attlee and Churchill are equally convinced of the desperate necessity of holding India. They have the will to hold and think that they have the capacity to hold India for all time.

Against these tremendous economic facts we have the fancies on which England feeds us—the fine phrases in which self-government and even complete independence is promised; the effusive concern betrayed for the minorities; the kindly reproof with which she meets

our 'childish' ambition to swim in the stormy seas of international anarchy.

These are cobwebs which would confuse only the dull and the credulous. It is clear that principles of justice cannot operate in the context of imperialism. England is determined to dig herself in and will do all that would ensure her permanency. Empire can be liquidated only by snatching power. The "Faith Cure" of Lord Wavell is an opiate to drug us.

It is in this light that we must study her contribution to the communal problem. She is experimenting with scientific detachment on materials which are exceptionally promising. There happen to be such things as differences in religion, language and caste along with the inevitable social and economic inequalities. These differences have been exploited to their full capacity. The communal question is only part of the great method of counterpoise.

We must be in no doubt about this policy of 'counterpoise'. 'Counterpoise' neutralises and weakens agitation. Even before there were organised political parties and when there existed no politics to challenge the British rule, the policy of counterpoise was professedly followed in respect of the organisation of the Indian Army. In the beginning the regiments were promiscuous assortments of people from different religions and areas. The vicissitudes of service in isolated regions were necessarily ironing out differences and forging unity of outlook in the army. This was realised early and the regiments were made homogeneous units. The counterpoise was illustrated in the communal composition of the army at various stages. After the mutiny Muslim

percentage in the army was lowered as Muslims had proved particularly unfriendly to the British. The Sikhs and the Hindus were favoured at the cost of the Muslims. Later when Hindus became dominantly nationalist in outlook the policy was reversed and the Muslim element was strengthened. Thus while the Sikhs were at the top in the Indian army in 1914 with a percentage of 19.2 and the Punjab Muslims came third with their 11.1 per cent and the Rajputs fourth with their 6.4 per cent; in 1930, the position was altered in favour of the Muslims, the respective percentages being 13.88, 22.6 and 2.55.

This idea of counterpoise which arose first in the army was applied in other spheres also. The present configuration of India with 600 native states in unequal alliance with British India is no accident. A uniform political system, while it may help the principle of paramountcy, was bound to strengthen unity of political outlook in the country. After the phase of conquest and consolidation that terminated with Dalhousie, it was thought wise to leave India honeycombed with native states as a measure of counterpoise. Let Lord Canning bear witness. After the mutiny he said: "These patches of native government served as a break-water to the storm which would otherwise have swept over in one great wave." The conservative role of the princes was realised very early. Karl Marx considered them to be the most "servile tools of English despotism" and the greatest obstacles to Indian progress. While the paramount power considers the greatest of the princes as nothing better than domestic servants; while it deposed the reigning Prince of Sikkim, and exiled

large numbers of rulers in Rajputana, the Punjab and Central India and the South; while it can interfere with the princes' right of adoption and marriage and so forth; when it comes to speak of the position of their people, it calls these museum monuments sovereign-states in alliance with the paramount power by solemn treaties. By these means it uses the Indian princes as a great check against the anti-imperialist front in India.

The classic example of this use of the princes is provided by the Government of India Act, 1935. The princes have been given the sole choice of packing the Federal Legislature with their nominees to checkmate the British Indian nationalists. With a population of 93,198,233 out of the total Indian population of 388,997,955 (1941 census), i.e., with a population percentage of 23.96, the Indian states in the proposed Indian Federation have been given 40 per cent representation in the Council of State, and 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent in the Federal Assembly.

Thus the policy of counterpoise has been steadily working throughout the period since 1857. In the communal sphere this policy took conscious form with the rise of an Indian nationalist movement. There is an almost complete parallelism between the development of the policy and the development of the Congress programme.

Thus since 1885 when the Congress began to voice the nationalist sentiment the quest for an alternative organism as counterpoise started. The Aligarh Principals busied themselves to found such an organisation. By 1892 Congress was already a power and by 1909 it had gone through the dress-rehearsal of its first mass

movement over the swadeshi question and the partition of Bengal. This period is rich in correspondence, despatches and memorandums in which the idea of "counterpoise" is frankly advocated. Thus it finds prominent mention in the private correspondences of Lytton, Curzon, Minto and Morley; in Minto's official despatches to Morley; in Morley's despatch to Minto; in Government of India's memorandum in 1907 on the question of minority representation and the replies of the local Governments to that memorandum. Lord Curzon scouted the idea of a Council of Princes as a device for countering the Congress. Lord Minto was equally anxious to find another programme and another set of ideas to set up against the Congress so that the younger generation might be kept away from it.

We have seen how the Simon Commission was directly inspired by Lord Birkenhead to angle for support against the Congress and other nationalist organisations concerned with the boycott. Through the various stages of the Government of India Bill this idea was prominent; and now, since 1939, when Congress has declared unflinching determination to liquidate British power; the various declarations of the Viceroy's and the Secretary of State and the Cripps proposals have all been consciously aiming at liquidating the Congress by favouring and encouraging the Muslims and Mr. Jinnah. Counterpoise is thus an established fact.

In pursuit of this method the Empire has followed two main trends. In the first place it started dismembering the electorate, breaking up the people into watertight groups so as to make common aspiration impossible. The shady tactics of Lord Minto in starting this

THE BRITISH ARM OF THE TRIANGLE

dismemberment by first conceding separate electorate to the Muslims is well known. This injection of the separatist virus proved so effective that barely a decade after the Minto-Morley Reforms even nationalist India had succumbed to it. In the All-Parties Conference of 1916 separate electorate for Muslims was formally approved. Certain proportions of seats in the legislatures were allotted to the Muslims and it appeared as though the communal problem had been solved and would no more remain a handy tool of imperialism. But unity of the Indian people was anathema to the Empire and in the Montford Reforms this agreement was departed from in favour of the Muslims and separate electorate was awarded to other groups as well. The Constitution of 1935 carried this tendency to extremes. The electorate has been now broken into 17 fragments. The Communal Award of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald not only treated the Muslims most generously by giving them undue weightage in what are called Muslim minority provinces like Bihar, Orissa, the U. P. and so on but in Bengal and the Punjab the allotment of seats was such that Muslims came to have a statutory majority and the principle of weightage to minorities was not applied to these provinces. Everywhere Muslim representation was artificially inflated at the cost of the other communities, mainly the Hindus.

The 'Communal Award' was more evil in its intentions. The Hindu community—of which only the Marathas of Bombay and the non-Brahmins of Madras had so far been granted reservation of seats—was sought to be broken up by giving separate electorate to what are called the "scheduled castes". The attempt was not a complete success on account of the Poona Pact follow-

ing Gandhiji's fast unto death to annul this measure. But the reservation of seats for the scheduled castes in the general constituencies is proving the thin end of the wedge that may one day rift the Hindu solidarity. It has already given encouragement to men like Dr. Ambedkar to fish in the troubled waters of India.

The glaring discrimination in favour of the Muslims and the solicitous interest in the scheduled castes are not a measure of inter-communal justice. To such things the Imperial power is entirely indifferent. They are parts of a concerted plan to undermine the dominance of any party to speak on behalf of India. The one party that claims to speak on behalf of the people of India is the Congress and the Congress has ever been a thorn in the side of the Empire. Through open rebellions of 1921, 1930 and 1942 the Congress has been performing the dress-rehearsal of the final revolution that will sweep away the Empire and all that it means. Through sufferings Congressmen have paid the price of their patriotism. The Empire knows its opponents better than its muddled-headed apologists do and it crushes them with iron heels. It is not for nothing that Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru, Maulana Azad, Sardar Patel and Dr. Rajendra Prasad, to name only a few of the noble band—have drawn the ire of the Empire on them.

The other parties have never been inconvenient to the Empire. I know of no resolution of the Muslim League that has ever contemplated the disappearance of the Empire. No one ever saw Muslim League party in direct action except against its Hindu brethren. Mr. Jinnah's protestations of patriotism have been entirely

hollow. His party has been frankly communal and nothing else. Mr. Jinnah has never been a lover of suffering. It must be a wonderful faith that can burn without the fuel of one's own life. It is doubly wonderful that his opposition to British imperialism is so soothing to the rulers that they treat him with the greatest solicitude and consideration.

Dr. Ambedkar whom the Britishers have appointed leader of the scheduled castes—for this leadership has not been earned by struggle and sacrifice—is yet new in the field. But his utterances are entirely similar to those of Mr. Jinnah.

The alignment of forces in Indian politics is clear. The Congress has placed freedom of India in the forefront of its programme. By this very fact Congress has proclaimed itself the arch-enemy of the Government of India. To the Congress demand for independence its response is not by a flat denial for that is not in keeping with the present-day political standards, but by pointing out that Congress is not the sole spokesman of India and that all the main elements among the Indian people should present a united demand. Exactly in similar language the Muslim League declares that Congress is not the sole spokesman of India and that no changes in the constitution should be allowed unless the Muslims agree to those changes. Dr. Ambedkar says the same from the point of view of the scheduled castes.

The Britishers say that there is no body to whom they may transfer power. Mr. Jinnah and Dr. Ambedkar say that there is no body to whom power can be transferred.

Thus against the Congress demand for immediate independence Mr. Jinnah and Dr. Ambedkar ally themselves with Britain to delay the coming of freedom indefinitely. Whatever the motives of their opposition the three sail together and strengthen and encourage each other against the Congress—or for that matter against nationalist India. That is why in 1940 Lord Linlithgow gave Mr. Jinnah a veto on all constitutional progress when he emphatically stated that no changes would be made in the future constitution of India unless beforehand the Moslem community had been consulted and that community had also agreed to those changes. That is why Lord Wavell in rejecting Mahatma Gandhi's "concrete proposals" made in July, 1944, made the irritating repetition of the sanctity of his responsibilities to the minorities; the princes and other elements. That is why the Simla Conference of June-July, 1945, was condemned to futility even when all parties except the League showed themselves keen on joining an "interim national government".

The phrases employed by the British spokesmen are soothing to the shortsighted communal leadership and convenient to the British. Mahatma Gandhi who has learnt the lesson in course of his struggles which teach rapidly and correctly thus observed in an interview by the Associated Press on August 18, 1944:

"Boiled down, the Viceroy's proposition means that unless all the main parties agree as to the constitution of the future and there is agreement between the British Government and the main parties there is to be no change in the constitutional position, and the Government of India as at present is to be carried on.

The names of the parties given in the Government reply are illustrative only. I have no doubt that on due occasions more will be exhibited as from a conjurer's bag and who knows how and when the British Government will agree to surrender control. It is as clear as crystal that the British Government do not propose to give up the power they possess over 400 millions unless the latter develop strength enough to wrest it from them."

In a statement from Panchgani on July 14, 1944, Mahatma Gandhi said :

"... I myself feel firmly that Mr. Jinnah does not block the way but the British Government do not want a just settlement of the Indian claim for independence, which is overdue and they are using Mr. Jinnah as a cloak for denying freedom to India .."

The same applies to other communal leaders.

Thus the British Government went on dismembering the electorate, creating groups and sub-groups; emphasising them by executive recognition in respect of education and services; and inflating minority opinion—all with the sole intention of preventing the emergence of a dominant nationalist party so as to be able to say that there was no united body of people in India to whom power could be transferred. Having thus broken the unity they ask Indians to present a united constitution and taking Britain at her word we set about complying with this strange demand. •

The second trend is exhibited in how Britain hinders settlement.

Settlement of a political question can never be on purely academic considerations. There must be in the first place an immediate and urgent need for a settle-

ment. In India this dynamic urge is provided by the possibility of transference of power to India. It is well known how the communal problem comes into prominence on the eve of contemplated changes in the constitution. It is also clear that in normal times we do avoid flying at each other's throat and the urgency of settlement is not felt. The problem simply does not arise. Now Britain is the sole judge as to when and how far power would be transferred to India. She, therefore, controls the conditions that would urge the communities to settlement. There have been occasions in India when whole peoples were in a mood for settlement. An instance in point is the recent mood of our people. The political deadlock since 1939 coupled with the bunglings of the British authorities during the course of the war resulting in abnormal inflation and general food scarcity and distress made people anxious for a return of popular government and the release of Mahatma Gandhi provided an added incentive for a settlement. Even when Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah were about to meet on August 19, 1944, Lord Wavell rejected the idea of an immediate national government in the civil sphere, the concrete proposals of Mahatma Gandhi.

With one blow the entire basis was knocked out of the impending conversations. The mood for settlement was chilled.* This was inevitable for even about the middle of July, the *Spectator* hinted at this possibility and remarked: "... His (Gandhi's) present proposal is in effect for independence not after the war (as in the Cripps' offer) but during it, and he knows perfectly well that the British Government would not accept. That being so

the whole of his offer to the Muslim League conveyed to Mr. Jinnah indirectly through Mr. Rajagopalachari rests on thin air and that is probably one of the reasons why Mr. Jinnah has not jumped at it with any eagerness. Mr. Gandhi has certainly made a gesture in the direction of consultations with Muslims about the future of India—but on what basis? Scarcely one which has any reality.” The remark is brutally frank and should open our eyes. There is no settlement in prospect even when we are most anxious for a settlement so long as Great Britain can say ‘no’ to our demand for immediate independence.

The second condition of a genuine inter-party settlement is that parties concerned must have a realistic appreciation of each other's importance and must not look to outsiders for help. The British Government makes this impossible. We have seen how Muslim League under Mr. Jinnah's leadership and now the scheduled castes under Dr. Ambedkar have become strange bedfellows of the Empire and how the Empire has marked its sympathy and alliance with them by granting favours to them. The Muslim League relying on publicity through British journals like the *Statesman*; through British journalists like the editor of the *Star of India*; and British educationists like the notorious Principals of the Aligarh College and getting the approval of the British Government through Lord Linlithgow, Mr. Amery and Lord Wavell is filled with an exaggerated notion about itself. Its utterances are hardly conciliatory. Of Rajagopalachari's recent formula (1944), which was to be the basis of the conversations, Mr. Jinnah in the Muslim League meeting

said that it was a trap for the Muslim League and even "dishonest". One wonders how Mr. Jinnah's intolerance would be conducive to a settlement. The same remark applies to the intransigence of Dr. Ambedkar. Both of them are equally contemptuous of the Congress. Their sense of appreciation is entirely warped. The parties to the settlement, therefore, are not entirely relying on themselves but looking over each other's heads to a third party either hindering or helping them in their task.

What is more this third party officially and non-officially keys the pitch and tips the scale on every occasion when a settlement is attempted. We need not go very far into history for instances. We can watch the interesting game even on the eve of the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting scheduled for August 19, 1944. Officially Lord Wavell in rejecting Mahatma Gandhi's concrete proposals repeats the sanctity of his responsibilities to the minorities. The non-official sample is the editorial of July 14, 1944, of *The Times* of England. The relevant passage runs thus:

"(The formula does not remove) incompatibility of terms on which the Hindus and the Muslims are ready to cooperate in the formation of a Provisional National Government and leaves unsolved the more important League doubts and fears .."

The more important doubts and fears are known to *The Times* better than to the Muslim League. The larger comprehension of the Muslim point of view is displayed by *The Times* than by Mahatma Gandhi. How Wavell and *The Times* must have swelled Mr. Jinnah! He must be verily dizzy with success. Could

he meet the humiliated Mahatma with anything but arrogance?

The tipping is not confined to words. The British authorities have often countered the proposal to the minorities by their own proposals and these latter have been ever more liberal to them. The All-Parties agreement of 1916 was departed from in favour of the Muslims.

The grounds for such departure were explained by the Government of India who on the Lucknow Pact observed:

"The Mohammadan representation which the Pact (Congress-League Pact) of 1916 proposes for Bengal is manifestly insufficient. It is questionable whether the claims of the Mohammadan population of Eastern Bengal were sufficiently pressed when the Congress-League compact was in the making. They are a conspicuously backward and impoverished community. The rendition of partition of the Presidency in 1912 came as a severe disappointment to them and we should be very loath to fail in seeing that their interests are generously secured. In order to give the Bengal Muslims a representation proportionate to their numbers and no more, we should allot them 44 instead of 34 seats (due to them under the Pact)". What a champion of the poor and backward Muslims! The Government of India posed itself as more Muslim than the Muslims themselves for Muslims as such could not see what was due to them.

Another instance of British counter-proposal came in 1933. British spokesmen had repeatedly asserted that the communal award would be replaced if Indians

could come to an agreed solution. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya accordingly convened a representative unity conference at Allahabad and such good progress did it make that there was widespread satisfaction in the country. The conference had agreed on everything except on the question of Bengal. It was agreed that Muslims would get 32 per cent of the British India representation in the central legislatures and that Sind should be separated without any right to central subvention. The conference was proceeding to Calcutta to study the problem at the spot. At this stage Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State, declared at the third Round Table Conference that H. M.'s Government had decided to allot 33 1/3 per cent of British India seats in the central legislature to Moslems and would give adequate financial aid from centre to Sind. Nothing was said about Hindu minority in Sind. The conference found its labours futile and broke down.

The communal award itself offered more than Mr. Jinnah could have dreamt of at the time and this was conveyed to the Muslims by Sir Fazli Hussain in his famous circular. There has been considerable speculation that the hasty despatch of Sir Feroze Khan Noon to India on the eve of the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting is not without meaning. It was freely mentioned that Sir Feroze enjoying the confidence of Mr. Amery as well as of the Muslim League had brought a counter offer from the British Government to the Muslim League to torpedo the Gandhi-Jinnah talks. Mr. Jinnah is obviously asked to be stiff for if Gandhiji does not concede to his extreme demands the British Government will be there to oblige him.

In fact the British are anxious that there be no settlement for has not Sir F. Noon who is obviously in the know of things said that settlement or no settlement the British would grant Dominion Status to India or something short of it at the end of the war? So have other British spokesmen. Now if settlement is irrelevant, parties need not agree. The British Government may thus freely blow hot and cold. Let India guess their intentions.

Organically connected with the declaration that settlement is irrelevant is the British capacity to rob any settlement of finality. They can always bring out a new party from their "conjurer's bag" and insist on revision of the old settlement and the game may be carried on indefinitely. To run for a settlement that is not stable and in some sense final is to pursue a mirage.

To have deliberately broken the unity and to stand in the way of settlement means unmistakably that the weapon of divide and rule will not be allowed to tarnish and the communal controversy will continue to flourish in the congenial air of British Imperialism to the last syllable of recorded time.

CHAPTER VIII.

RETROSPECT

THE first impact of the world on our senses presents a chaos of apparently irreducible facts. If we are impatient or dull we would never be able to find any general principles in this bewildering diversity. Strangely, however, we discount the evidence of our senses heavily. In search of explanation which is a ruling passion in man we inevitably generalise. As there is no objective test of truth in social studies and as mistaken and false theories would rarely produce their effect except in the very long run, there is a premium on human indolence and our generalisations are often hasty and incorrect. Our social studies to be fruitful must avoid both the chaotic individuality of facts and the rush of hasty generalisations. We must trace trends and tendencies after examining the hang of facts, their preponderance.

The thicket of facts through which we have hewn our way can be now surveyed from the vantage ground of where we stand. From these heights, it is easy to mark the dominant features of the landscape, the hang of facts and their preponderance.

What does the retrospect reveal?

The multitudinous details arrange themselves in three prominent features.

In the distant background is the vast mass of Indian humanity restless in their poverty and helplessness.

ignorant and groping. This submerged population is greatly handicapped in having a clear and vigorous politics. The majority is too much pre-occupied with its problems of brute subsistence, and too uninformed to be able to evaluate political slogans correctly. As they are themselves undecided, they readily accept any quack who comes with a tone of confidence and insistence. As their sorrows are great and their problems gigantic, few have the heart even to think of an alternative. Yet lust of power sways many and as power does not seem possible unless with the consent of the demos the power-seeking men become the centres of pale politics which has no root in the grim reality of Indian life. Much of Indian politics ostensibly doing homage to the people is really class or group politics that fulfils a few self-seeking men.

Very few, far too few if we rule out the hysterical mass agitations which make heroes even out of ordinary clay, have the sustained courage of comprehending the Indian problem in its gigantic stature and of seeking to solve it in any adequate manner. These few are the real mass force although their voice is often drowned in the shrill hysterics of the other parties. In India this organised mass force is centred almost exclusively in the Indian National Congress. The will-less and ignorant mass clustering amorphously round the Congress at one end and listening with equal attention to the lulling assurances of the class-politicians on the other provide the anatomy of the distant background.

In the immediate foreground are patches of white absolutism inter-laced elaborately by a supporting cluster of brown bureaucracy—together comprising the

official caste in India that holds the swarming mass in leash. This official caste sharply demarcated from the Indian mass is the far end of an imperial administration with its core in London. These patches of white absolutism are both the cause and the effect of the degradation of the Indian mass and their disappearance is the very condition of Indian progress. For they are bailiffs of an impoverished imperial power which must cling desperately to its possessions. Charity and self-denial on the part of this power means to it certain political suicide.

As self-seeking men can flourish in India only at the bidding of the imperial power, the intervening space between the background of Indian mass and the foreground of white absolutism is occupied by an invisible army of the Empire, the titled commoners, the nobility, the privileged classes and the retainers of the Indian official class. This invisible army is a thin treacle that connects the two poles of submerged India and of dominant imperialism. This variegated group, however, is identical only in its externals. Internally it is ridden by jealousies like the harems of the old Moguls. The politics of this group is a politics of jealousy, of rights, divisions, shares and jobs. The other aspect of obligation and mutual aid does not figure in their politics.

This in fact is the core of the communal politics. This small group of go-betweens is two-faced. It is correct to a fault in relation to the empire. It is clamorous and wild at the other end. It passes incessantly from one pole to the other assuring the imperial end that all is well, at least shall be well, thank

God, at the other pole. At the pole of the Indian mass it speaks in confident terms that the imperial end is a boon and that the mass is in the best of all imaginable worlds—for short-comings only the fates are to be blamed.

While these incessant preachings stupefy the mass, the petty conflicts are carried to a higher pitch and the hysterical mass which has nothing to gain and lose takes sides. The unreal politics of communalism arises and threatens to drown all sober voices in a babel of tongues.

This intermediate group serves the empire well and itself not badly. Its role is, therefore, justified by the powerful voice of the empire and its own self-interest. The phantoms that flit about in this group are energised by this combination. The combination would have brought into being such phantoms in any case. The extra vitality, however, comes from the accident that there are in this group certain personalities who were obviously meant for a nobler role of liberators. They had the energy and the imagination for creating a new world. By a perversion they are using both these gifts for creating a fragmented world—a mosaic of petrified but picturesque communities in the eternal sunshine of British imperialism.

It is thus that we get both the passion and the knavery of communalism; both its disintegrating ethics and its petty constructions; its clinging to the familiar British dispensation as well as its wistful longing to revive a dead world. By its inherent contradictions communalism is a futile force—barren of positive results. But even a painted devil can alarm the unwary

and communalism does keep the unwary Indian mass in alarm—numbing their energies which might have otherwise swept off the white domination and lifted India out of the morass. It is to this end that communalism has to be liquidated.

PART II

THE WAY OUT

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST PRINCIPLES.

THEORY is a guide to action. Our analysis of the origins of the communal problem indicates the correctives that must be applied to solve it. We noticed a number of factors that provide the condition of the communal politics. We noticed how mass psychology is shaped by the activities of parties and leadership. We noticed how the economic core of the problem is the real genesis of all subsidiary manifestations. We met the disturbing influence of British imperialism at every turn in our analysis. And so on.

All these complex phenomena must be considered and provided for in any scheme of solving the communal problem. The attack must be simultaneous and on many fronts. Social facts have a multiplicity of causes and no solution would be adequate unless the plurality of causes is attacked *en masse*. This may sound impracticable to the sober genteel on whom inertia of the past weighs too much. They would smile and say: be practical, boys—one thing at a time. But the one thing, in fact, is no isolated thing. It is hopelessly intermixed with many. Whether we just want “the left arm to go with the roots and the sea-salt”, or “just simply a loin chop” or even only the “chitterlings” we will get none of these things from the pig on the Provinder Island unless we agree with the Cabin-boy and kill the whole pig. Partial enterprise is not

always wiser or more hopeful than a comprehensive one. In solving the communal problem we must go the whole hog.

The need for comprehensiveness, for large range of efforts, for patience must be clearly grasped. At the moment we are like children incapable of forethought and patience. We want a miracle to happen that would change the face of things at once. We expect the millenium to come by an agreement between Mahatma Gandhi and Qaide-Azam. By a desperate yielding to Pakistan. By anything short and swift. We are afraid of slow and patient building. But our analysis has shown that there is no short cut.

Granted that the need for comprehensiveness, slow building and patience is realised we would be still unable to take a step unless we are clear about our long-range goal and our concrete short-range context.

To comprehend the long-range goal we must inevitably skirt the borderland of philosophy and metaphysics. For, if we care to see, the ruthless dictum of a dictator can be traced to the ravings of a dead philosopher that has stole into the recesses of the dictator's consciousness. "As we think, so we do" says the author of the Dhammapada. Action without thought is unthinkable on human plane. Let us think rationally to act well.

It is necessary to emphasise the need for a long-range goal for if we study the successions of ideals that have ruled humanity for brief intervals we would find that what is immediately authoritative and compelling may be ultimately mischievous. We may have

laboured in vain if by our efforts we have given humanity only partial and false gods whom it must shortly discard to undergo the painful search for ideals afresh.

It is impossible not to appear to be in conflict with many ideals that are passionately held by large masses of people at present. There is the king and country for some; the nation and state for others; the Nordic race for the third; mere profit for the fourth and so on. In India we are familiar with ideals of Islamic life and of patriotism. Evidently none of these ideals is ultimately satisfactory. None of them can be rationally held by the whole mass of mankind. These partial ideals belong to a society organised for war, for regression and for futility. Aldous Huxley in his book 'Ends and Means' has examined the diverse ideals and concludes that the only ideal urged by all who are acclaimed the greatest men of wisdom is the ideal of freedom, justice and peaceful cooperation between non-attached yet active and responsible individuals.

The epithet to note is "non-attached". Any particular belief and duty that must be upheld even at the cost of one's life and of the life of the world is a belief and duty that divides. For precisely because it is particular it cannot be held by all equally, and, divergence, if material, must tend to war. Weakly and haltingly we are trying to realise this ideal in what is called liberal education. The fact is that so little is known of this vast universe that all our beliefs must be at best provisional. To have a closed mind is to run away from reason.

The eastern philosophies have repeatedly insisted on the transience of everything of this earth. This is true of Islam as well as of Hinduism and Buddhism. In India the adoption of the ideal of non-attachment should be in keeping with our best traditions. Non-attachment means that we shall be addicted to nothing; neither to reading; nor to praying; nor to eating; nor to drinking; neither to religious rituals nor to secular profanity. The non-attached shall build on nothing particular.

As soon as we realise the provisional nature of everything the animus of intolerance has nothing left to sustain it. We shall be extremely tolerant. Non-attachment is nothing negative. Thus a man who fears is not non-attached for what is fear except the contemplation that what one holds dearest will be taken away—life, leisure, dear ones? The non-attached cannot be a coward. He will not be sick for sickness ties the self to a doleful thought about the body. He will not be starving for starvation puts the body in the forefront. He will not be ignorant for ignorance will necessarily tie him to the immediate and particular. He cannot be a slave for slavery is nothing but fear or ignorance which are both inconsistent with non-attachment. Non-attachment is, therefore, positive, strong and active.

Again the men who have been pronounced to be non-attached have generally been found to be sustained by a mystical general awareness. They do not appear to be aimless and dissatisfied. This is also positive.

The other attributes flow from this virtue for it will be found that non-attachment cannot be complete with-

out them. If there is a jarring disharmony, attachment to particular arises. If there is any one starving, the non-attached will find it hard not to be moved. He seems to develop a universal personality.

Realising that our knowledge of the world is provisional, the non-attached society will not be prepared to do homage to dogmas, to authorities and to anything that prevents free inquiry, research and science. Such a society must be vigorous intellectually. Its prevailing attitude towards the existing body of knowledge will be ever agnostic—not final; it would be ignorant to make the attitude atheistic—that it does not exist.

This view of a society of cooperating, alert, non-attached individuals, progressing with mutual aid appears to be realistic and helpful by other considerations also.

It is realistic because the subject-man who is the end of all the adjustments we are discussing is no isolated 'human' atom but a socialised man. 'We' is already contained in the pores of the philosophical 'I'. The separate 'I' is undoubtedly a reality and often longs to bend the world to its wills. But it is being rapidly narrowed by constant invasion of 'we'. The subject does not and cannot close up after admitting the 'we' of a particular group or community. It is still open to admit the 'we' of all possible communities. We are in fact potentially universal in make-up. We enjoy the Scottish ballads of Robert Burns as much as the twilight Irish romances of W. B. Yeats; the poems of Tagore as well as those of Iqbal; and can even go back to the past to find ourselves mirrored in the Greek dramas

just as much as in the desert poems of Omar Khayyam. "Very old are we men" and great has been our assimilation.

The process is going to be still further accelerated as history develops. The world war has evoked similar responses all the world over. The radio, the telegraph, the steam engine and the aeroplane have annihilated distances and there is no frontier which is proof enough against the invasion of ideas. Man is not only social but also a social-historical subject. The possibility of comprehension and the march of history have combined to make men as like as two peas. We are on the verge of bursting into a world community for which only a political framework is lacking. Parochialism and love for the picturesque mosaic of small communities are now a false sentiment and the more irrationally intense the sentiment the greater the disharmony and mischief that will arise. To put a Chinese wall round any group will cost us much negative and harmful effort.

This attitude is also helpful because the greater the socialisation of man the more widespread will be the sympathy between the individual and the greater the development of the principle of mutual aid. By this means we avoid the uncertain struggle for survival which makes life "nasty, brutish and short". The development of mutual aid is at no sacrifice of individual happiness but becomes the very condition of such happiness.

These considerations lead us to the conclusion that even while economic conditions and political and social

development have been unequal in different territories and peoples a substratum of basic identity has been already laid. The exclusiveness of cultures, religions and traditions has considerably abated and become largely irrelevant in the new context. Humanity is able to live in larger and larger communities and verily draw upon the 'world-heritage'. They also establish that the basic identity of man would lead to a more or less equalitarian system consistent with harmonious life of the group.

The other view is typified by the Czarist minister Plevé who could think of no other way of solving the Jewish question than to compel one-third of the Jews to be converted, one-third to emigrate and one-third to die. This is also Hitler's way. We in India are not quite immune from such views. Did not Mr. Fazlul Haq assert that "Thaneshwar and Panipat must repeat themselves?" Did he not visualise the conquest of the whole of India by nine crores of Muslims? We are free to adopt this attitude but that way lies war, disintegration, political suicide and a hazardous gamble in force. Such hatred and boasting pays rich dividends in the overflow of base emotion but this is not the way of sane human beings. It is the writer's hope that India will consciously choose the former alternative tested by ages and recommended by thoughtful men of all times. The poisonous fungus of exclusiveness and hatred must be rooted out deliberately and with care.

So much for the long-range goal. The short-range context imposes its own demands on the persons who would solve the communal problem. The short-range context precisely because of its immediacy and nearness,

has the more direct appeal for men. Even the permanent is implicit in the transitory and has no absolute existence outside it. It is only natural, therefore, that we must give due prominence to the immediate issues. 'There is no easier method of drawing men to action than showing them concretely how the immediate present will be affected thereby.

Now the immediate context that is significant in India is the foreign domination which with the development of monopoly capitalism inhibits the economic growth of the country and with it the cultural growth. Probably for the next fifty years India will find its absorbing problem in winning freedom, in consolidating freedom, in relating it to world-order and in enriching and expanding it. This is manifest from the study of the great unbalances we made in a previous chapter. That is why the Congress has become the focus of Indian political consciousness.

The winning of freedom and the economic development of India are then the immediate problems. Luckily for us they happen also to be problems whose solution would conduce to the society of free, non-attached, alert men and women. For our political subjection is a great obsession that militates against non-attachment and our economic poverty ties our thoughts to brute struggle for living—one of the worst attachments.

Both freedom and prosperity have to be thought of in terms of the mass of the people. We have already seen how the mass has marched into the centre of politics. The new ideology which has had powerful

support from the premises of science and from the reconstruction of society in the Soviet Union is now firmly established in India. The forces standing against the welfare of the common man have become untenable and shaken. There can be no reversion. There are powerful philosophical reasons why the more inclusive ideology has the higher survival value. To defend it there would be many more people than to defend the exclusive and the cramped ideologies of the select few.

These considerations furnish us with the true tests of judging whether a solution of the communal problem is correct or otherwise. About any solution of the communal problem we shall ask: Is it adequate and comprehensive? Does it conduce to the ideal society of freedom, justice and cooperation of non-attached individuals responsible and alert? Does it strengthen us in our struggle for freedom, for organising good life and economic and cultural prosperity? Does it centre round the needs of the common man? If we can answer these questions in the affirmative, the solution is good. The greater the frequency of the negative reply, the less acceptable and valid the solution.

The solution, we repeat, must be multiple. Let us go into details.

Why does the individual think on communal lines? For as we think, so we act. Community, religion and caste happen to be the temporary idols that Indians worship at the moment. Europe has thrown away these idols but has adopted their substitutes—nation, state, race and so forth. All these partial loyalties have a common origin. They arise from the individual not

having a complete awareness of a transcendental principle of integration. For integration alone gives meaning to life. The isolated self is too petty to satisfy a vigorous nature. Extra-personal causes are, therefore, sought. Such islands of integration, however, cannot satisfy the whole soul. There must be a continuum. The continuum must embrace not only the entire humanity but the whole universe. We must supply such a continuum. Else we can never be sure that even when religion, community and caste cease to be the presiding deities, other base gods will not take their place.

• The basic solution, therefore, will be the re-education of the individual into such a comprehensive principle of integration. Those who speak of change of heart, of faith, of God, of the first principle, etc., are vaguely hinting at this fundamental re-education of man.

Unfortunately those who claim to be radical are often too impatient of attempting a solution on this line. The main reason is the extraordinary effort required in what may be called reclaiming lost souls. There is also the fact that the method of re-education has not been worked out at all well and there is a suspicion that when tried such methods may produce little result.

Most of the solutions offered are, therefore, for changing the external environment of man so that whatever may be his inner make-up he would not be able to go wrong. The cooperative order of non-attached men will be produced because man will be able to work in no other way. Social channels and behaviour-patterns will be so devised as to ensure his activity being cooperative and helpful for all.

The external approach has immense appeal. The large-scale activity involved has its exhilaration. The result is noticeable immediately. Even the individual re-education is attempted incidentally by indirect external organisation.

The external approach takes the form of changing and liquidating the condition of the communal problem—large-scale social, political and economic changes. In the social change is included changes in the substance and method of education.

We notice then that a complete eradication of particularism must be attempted both from the individual and the environmental end. As apart from the appeal to the individual to improve, the constructive worker can only work from the externals, the second approach monopolises the field. In the coming chapters we shall also follow the usual method adopted by the constructive worker. We will consider the changes in environment that must be attempted. The individual's own effort at improvement will be considered incidentally in the chapter on social encouragement, particularly in the context of education.

In all the changes suggested our canons of validity must be applied. Other solutions that have been suggested by bodies and associations will be considered and tested by the same canons. In appraising them our own scheme of solution will be elucidated.

CHAPTER X.

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND ARRANGEMENT

BY far the most important large-scale reform must be in the constitutional sphere. The state is the most pervasive and the most potent of social institutions. Its role in determining the tone of society is unquestioned. Its directives are categorical and sanctioned by the power of compulsion. They are likely, therefore, to be enforced with effectiveness and certainty. Whatever its nature in the past, the state is bringing larger and larger areas of individual and social life under its direction. Necessarily, therefore, the modification of the political environment would produce the most striking effect in eradicating exclusive thought and behaviour among the citizens.

Whoever has seriously attempted to solve the minorities problem has felt the need for such reform. Generally the suggestion exhausts itself in enumerating constitutional guarantees. Thus in India the Congress at the Round Table Conference proposed a Bill of Fundamental Rights guaranteeing to the minorities protection of their cultures, languages, scripts, education, profession and practice of religion, religious endowments and of personal laws and guaranteeing appointment by an impartial public service commission.

Even earlier, in 1931, at the Karachi session the Congress had declared itself in favour of constitutional provisions guaranteeing the free-exercise of religion;

freedom of conscience; protection of culture, language and scripts of the minorities; equality before law and in regard to public employment, office, trade or calling. This still remains the Congress programme.

In the Round Table Conference there was almost unanimous agreement on such constitutional guarantees.

Similarly in 1931 at the Nationalist Muslim Party Conference at Lucknow presided over by Sir Ali Imam, guarantee of Fundamental Rights was demanded.

Thus there seems to be considerable justification for embodying guarantees in the constitution. We are not sure, however, what the guarantees should be. Thus we have not got the assurance whether there can be positive guarantees protecting practice of religion or of personal laws. Rigid guarantees of such things may become a strait-jacket on the developing life of humanity. They may tend to perpetuate fossilised remnants of what might have been at one time living impulses. There seems to be a general agreement on such guarantees while we deal in such beautifully vague generalities or high-sounding platitudes. In practice there would be considerable difficulties in enforcing them.

Thus shall we allow followers of the Holy Quran to fight non-believers merely because the Quran in chapter II, verse 215, says: "Warfare is ordained for you though it is hateful unto you." Shall we guarantee the realisation of the Christian demand:

'For I am come to set a man at variance against his father and the daughter against her mother and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law' (Mathew X. 35)?

Shall we allow the Quranic injunction "it is prescribed for you, when one of you approacheth death, that he bequeath unto parents and near relatives in kindness" to preclude direct taxation of wealth, the levy of death duties, or any other form of capital levy—and make a Quranic state a paradise for capitalists and proprietors? Again continuity of the family, with the bond of private property and inheritance which necessitates such concepts as adoption and joint undivided Hindu Family, seems to be the essence of the Hindu social-religious system.

Shall we for such reasons exclude Hindu properties from taxation and estate duties? Shall we again leave properties to accumulate in the garb of religious endowments to which the state can have no access as that would be attacking the system of waqf under Muslim law?

Shall we in order to protect the Muslim law of marriage compel a non-Muslim wife to change her faith compulsorily to keep in tune with the Quranic injunction "Marry not an idolatress?"

Evidently these things cannot be guaranteed. Such guarantees would defeat the principle of non-attachment by perpetuating the partial and the particular. This is evidently attachment. It is also against the spirit of healthy agnosticism of particulars, of the alertness of intellect, of the freedom of inquiry that we have posed as the necessary qualities of the ideal society.

As to protection of existing languages and scripts there seems to be less doubt. These are relatively stable for centuries but protection of language and script should not mean that the state should oppose

natural and healthy changes in them. *Thus making scripts scientific, making language more expressive by adoption of words even from foreign sources are desirable activities that would conduce to the free, intelligent and alert society of the non-attached. The state must not fight all innovations.

Guarantee as to education is a more controversial question. We know in India that there is a body called the Muslim Educational Conference which owes its origin to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. So far as the conference fights for better facilities for education of the Muslims, it is a purely political body and its role is not different from the role of the Muslim political parties. The question is whether the content of education can be different for different communities? Can there be a geography for Muslim boys different from a geography for Hindu boys? Can there be Hindu or Moslem mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, engineering? Not to talk of the exact sciences, can there be even such things as Hindu and Moslem philosophy and metaphysics except in a very restricted sense? The fact of the matter is that there is only one knowledge, the effort of human mind to understand and to explore the mental, moral and physical phenomena of his universe. To label it and to bottle it up is to reduce it to magic and witchcraft. Similarly the content of education remains unaffected whatever the religion of the teacher and the taught. We must have the widest choice of teachers, savants and educationists as they are not made to order. To limit the choice to any single community is to run away from the everfull gushing stream to stagnant pools.

Thus we conclude that there can be no communalism in education. Education both as to its content and the personnel of teachers, and their qualification must be left in the hands of a quasijudicial body above parties. Every political unit must have an impartial Education Board which should be fully autonomous on the analogy of say the Federal Railway Board.

Is there any sense then in phrases like "protection of education"? Probably those who demand such safeguards are thinking of things like Bible classes, Theological schools and so forth. These things if desired should be left in private hands and the state would be neutral in such matters. Such parochial institutions cannot claim state-aid and encouragement.

There is another sense in which such phrases may have some meaning. For example what may be intended is equality of opportunity for education, and, in the case of specially backward classes, extra encouragement of education. This is a perfectly legitimate demand. The Education Board is not likely to ignore such considerations.

We shall deal at greater length with education and its organisation in the chapter on 'Social Encouragement'. It would then be clear why an impartial quasi-judicial Education Board should be provided for in the constitution to be completely autonomous of the governments in power. Suffice it to say at this point that except for this concrete proposal, the demand for guarantees on other points cannot be possibly met. At present groups seem to pin their faith in these manifestations of their life to lend them distinction. These

are, however, not stable phenomena and other characteristics may be emphasised later on. We already notice emphasis on sanctity of party flags, of party songs and so forth. Exclusiveness may also express itself in these latter ways. Whether Vandemataram should go, whether tri-colour flag discriminates against the flag of the Muslim League--of the Muslim minorities, cannot be pronounced beforehand in a constitution. If we remember our canons of validity, we should reject guarantees to perpetuate anything that is particular, that has changed in the past and may change in the future.

But do we not rouse the distrust of the communities by guaranteeing nothing? What is absolutely speaking particular may nonetheless be significant today. Our constitution, therefore, must contain certain minimum assurances.

The minimum assurance that we must give the people can be only in negative terms. No one can foresee all future complications. The negative principle should be that no citizen shall be privileged and none subjected to disability for the mere accident of his affiliation to particular groups. No group shall be in disfavour unless law expressly imposes disability. We must guarantee this in our constitution on the lines of the new Soviet Constitution which had to grapple with problems of nationalities more complex and more refractory than we have in India. Article 123 of the Constitution runs thus:

“Restriction of any kind whatever, whether direct or indirect, of the rights of citizens, or conversely any definition of direct or indirect privilege of citizens on

the ground of their race or nationality as also any dissemination of racial or national hatred is punishable by law."

In India to race and nationality we will add religion and community.

This non-discrimination clause would be found on examination to be a positive and complete safeguard of the principles of justice and fairplay between individuals and communities. It perpetuates nothing particular but preserves the general principle of the ideal social order.

Let us see how this works out. Consider such a thing as levy of death duties. If we had said that the personal law of the Muslims must be guaranteed we would be sure to denounce the levy of death duties on Muslims. The books cited in support of the personal laws would be books compiled ages ago. They would contain unmutilated and complete the prescription "... bequeath unto parents and near relatives in kindness".

It may be, however, that ten years hence while the books still maintain the old injunction, the social conscience by education, experience and otherwise may have so changed that no sensible Muslim would consider the levy of death duties as anything extraordinary and as militating against his faith. Such changes have happened in human psychology. "Sateeism" was sanctioned in the past and scriptures were quoted to support it. It abhors thoughtful Hindus today even though none of the old scriptures have been changed. Similarly the growth of English common law has been in gradual

disregard of the texts. Now if instead of the books the guide was to be contemporary opinion death duties become possible. The judge in tune with the developing life and thought of the people would be given the task of considering specific issues. He will regard it a question of fact whether a particular measure is held by the contemporary Muslim opinion as discriminatory and whether it is in fact discriminatory. Only so can we free ourselves from the dead hand.

So much for the constitutional guarantees. The general non-discrimination clause and the impartial quasi-judicial Education Board must be embodied in the constitution. As we proceed other guarantees may be found to be necessary but these latter would be considered in the context in which they will arise.

Generally the enunciation of principles is considered enough by the constitutional reformers. But enunciation of principles is nothing unless the principles operate in day-to-day life. The substantive law of the constitution will have to be implemented by guaranteeing 'procedural effectiveness' which should be comprehensive enough to prevent intended or attempted discrimination against groups and dissemination of group exclusiveness or hatred, as well as to correct such events whenever they have occurred.

Briefly, and by way of illustration, we suggest that measures, legislative or executive, which are felt to be discriminatory may be prevented or corrected by any member of the group making a reference to a permanent judicial commission of a collegium of judges specially appointed for the purpose. Such a tribunal must be part of the highest judiciary of the unit whether pro-

vincial or federal. The tribunal should have all the powers to see that its decisions are enforced by the government or the official as the case may be. The tribunal may also be required to make a periodical review of government measures and the report laid before the legislatures.

To reduce such discrimination as much as possible there should be a ministry of justice which may afford quick relief and corrective departmentally. Such a ministry would form a convenient centre for coordinating, encouraging and inspiring all efforts to promote communal harmony and justice.

Against acts which may wound feelings of particular communities any individual should have free access to the criminal court and should be able to set the law in motion without reference to the state. The usefulness of section 153A of the Indian Penal Code has been nullified by making initiation of proceedings under that section conditional upon government sanction. Such sanctions have been granted most sparingly. Many of the communal fire-brands ply their trade as though section 153A, Indian Penal Code, did not exist on the statute book—a glaring defect of procedure.

Against dissemination of group exclusiveness and hatred by words, signs, representation or otherwise the central tribunal could be moved to correct the mischief by such measures as forfeiture of copies of publications and films. The government would be bound to carry out these decisions.

Lest it be thought that the law courts and the ministry will be full of such communal references, certain considerations must be emphasised. False, frivolous.

and vexatious references could be reduced to the minimum by penalising persons on the lines indicated by section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in India. The mere fact that the constitution disfavors discrimination and that the law courts are there as watchdogs will prevent authorities acting without care and caution. By arming the citizens with such powers and by providing a ready and effective machinery of redress we ensure communal harmony and mutual respect to the full measure desired. No government or official would then flourish by fomenting communal strife. A new healthy tone would have been given to society.

Little attempt has been made in India to devise political forms suited to conditions in India. One-third of India knows the rudimentary form of authoritarian government and two-thirds seem to have accepted parliamentary democracy of England as the ideal type to which they must conform. Both these types are, however, the product of history and arose to fulfil certain needs. The parliamentary democracy of England was devised to keep as large a part of social life out of the control of government as possible. The authoritarian form kept peace and order when no other machinery was possible. The constitutional guarantees outlined above must be supplemented by devising suitable forms of control and government. This is necessary when we remember that much of communal politics centres round seats and jobs under government or round what is called "share in power." The main incentive for seeking jobs and seats is the need for employment felt by a class of people who have become unfitted for the usual employments in India. But mingled with this economic

motive is the motive to participate in the adventure of government which is latent in almost every one. That is why seats in the local bodies and legislatures which apparently yield no return in the shape of money are eagerly sought. That is why men volunteer for unpaid jobs as jurors and honorary magistrates and so forth.

[It would appear then that to the extent that the government is run by a small group, frustration, secret and therefore more intractable, will be felt by large numbers of men. To that extent business of government will gain in scarcity value and people will fight for a share in it. Mr. Jinnah's demand for 50 per cent share in the governance of the country is symptomatic of this scarcity value. Communalism and exclusiveness will remain alive.

The remedy lies in encouraging widespread participation of the people in government. It matters little whether responsibility granted is for small things or big. So long as the people are trusted, so long as responsibility for governance in howsoever small a sphere is given to them, they will feel actively participating in political life. The disease of leaderitis, and dominance will be cured by injecting small doses of the same. Practice in self-government is almost an indispensable element in the curriculum of man's moral and psychological education.

Decentralisation and responsible self-government must be the guiding principles in deciding on the form.

As to the actual form we know that where social energy has been roused to efflorescence as admittedly in the Soviet Union in their task of socialist construction, in war-time China to fight an enemy, in India in

the struggle for freedom, the forms of popular participation have been tiers on tiers of committees. The cooperatives in China, the Soviets in Russia, the Congress Committees in India arranged in a hierarchy from the small unit to the largest provide models of political forms that must be explored with care.

These forms from countries more or less similar in dimensions have been shaped almost unconsciously and have been retained. They must have, therefore, good justification.

The forms indicated for India are, therefore, a vast net-work of local self-governments of municipalities, of active village committees, local boards, district boards, regional administrations, provinces and a central government. The picture is one of extreme federalism. All the units of self-government will have definite functions. For the central federal government probably the only functions left will be transport and communications, defence and foreign relations, currency and banking; foreign trade; statistics and information; and coordination of planning.

These departments themselves will be more or less autonomous in their working with only the necessary obligation to coordinate and keep in step with each other.

The more important question is the method of representation. How will democracy be brought to the widest mass and yet not transform itself into mob orgy?

Clearly the democracy must be very indirect. Even though we must try to net in all people who want to say anything about government, in actual practice a

large mass of the people will be found to have no interest in it. Their interest is probably in work and play and such other things. There will be a large number of people who want to participate in government but who do not understand distant issues. Such people will be provided for in the village committees and other lower forms of local self-government. The small minority will use its talents in the higher units of government.

The village committee may consist of 10 to 20 people. Each of these people may be responsible to group of 15 to 20 households. In such a small unit the choice of the representative will be not so much by voting as by a general sense of the people. The 15 or 20 householders would know which of them will answer their purpose best. The man will be selected almost by common consent. He will be a sort of natural leader of his group.

The 15 to 20 men that will constitute the village committees will also function not by formal voting but by taking a general sense of the meeting. This committee will be the natural electorate for the next higher group and so forth. A large village may be broken into two or more units and smaller villages may be amalgamated. In all cases the idea is to see that the electorate in any case does not become disjointed on account of largeness. The intimate sense of a group where power aspect is not apparent at all, but selection is by natural fitness and confidence has to be provided.

This brings almost every house into politics.

In each committee the members may be assigned distinct executive tasks outside the common consulta-

tion. That will make every one feel responsible for the success of the committee.

The success of this arrangement will depend on the community sense being maintained in the village. By decentralising industries, by distribution of electrical energy, and by other devices the drift to the town may be minimised and the villagers may find their centre in the village.

In such a system party-grouping that makes for false divisions and renders minority opinion of no effect will not be very pronounced. The fear of a compact majority will not weigh on any community.

Towns because of their size and because of the expertness needed in their administration cannot provide democracy to all. Even here "ward system" for keeping the peace, etc., may be attempted. But towns are primarily centres of industries, education and trade and democracy will have to be realised in industrial establishments, in colleges, in sports teams and in chambers of commerce, etc.

Representation to regional and provincial administrations can be also indirect and the various electorate can be made as small as possible and yet as broad based as desirable. The details can be worked by any body charged with framing the constitution.

CHAPTER XI

SOCIAL ENCOURAGEMENT

AFTER political comes the question of large-scale reforms in the social sphere. The far-reaching reforms in social sphere that would produce the ideal society cannot be all considered here. For the limited purpose of ensuring that society should not provide material for group exclusiveness, a number of reforms are indicated.

Social traits and institutions are the forms through which life of individuals and groups is expressed. As forms they are very sticky. Good social traits as well as bad tend to stay and can be replaced and modified only with difficulty. This being so reform in these traits and institutions should be as far as possible gradual and unobtrusive.

The traits and institutions may be mischievous in which case they must be suppressed and banished. What is regarded as 'nuisance' according to civilised opinion must be sorted out and discouraged in all possible ways. Untouchability and caste among Hindus tend to divide and society would do well to ignore these institutions in its working. But customs and practices of any community that would be considered a nuisance by other communities are not likely to be many. The problem of cow-sacrifice and music before mosque would leap to most minds. As it is,

however, Hindus cannot and do not object to slaughter of cows in the slaughter-houses and in private homes. They object to cows for sacrifice being ceremoniously paraded and the slaughter done provocatively and in public view. It cannot be maintained that such an objection is unfair and curtails the civil liberties of Muslims. It is equally clear that Muslims are not haters of music. Their ceremonies are not without flourish of music. The objection is to music distracting them at the prayer time. On both these issues which loom so large in Hindu-Muslim controversy sane adjustment is surprisingly easy. This is only an illustration of how differences apparently offensive can be adjusted without wounding the susceptibilities of the communities. But no community can afford like touchy children to fret at mere symbols. For in a shrinking world we are bound to have many points of contact; and, must, like adults conscious of each other's position, take our share of rough and smooth cheerfully. No permanent adjustment is possible on these points because in the developing life of the communities fresh inter-communal problems will be constantly arising.

People in charge of law and order will, however, be solving these problems in the light of the common constitutional guarantees like freedom of movement, association, speech and religion. Against any official or authority disregarding these guarantees and deliberately partial to one community at the cost of another complaint may be always made before the Ministry of justice and the Commission. No one could be allowed to be torpid or neglectful in handling such problems. The authority or official would greatly simplify his task by

consultation with the representative public on such matters openly and freely.

It will probably be necessary to embody certain provisions in the constitution bearing on religion. One aspect that irritates communal tempers is the attempt of followers of one faith to seek converts from another. Generally the converts are derived from the marginal types who are either immature or weak-brained or ignorant. Their conversion hardly ever means spiritual awakening. Most often it means spiritual decline. The methods of conversion are also hardly edifying. Force and fraud are the usual instruments. Conversion of a mature adult with all his faculties intact is a rare phenomenon but such conversions are the only ones significant from the point of view of the individual.

When the individual's faith can no more give him secular advantage or be a source of secular disability faith will have been restored to be an affair of one's heart—intensely absorbing to the individual but no more a problem of society. The pandit, the mullah, the padre will find his trade gradually dwindling. No one would allow an ignoramus from outside to claim brotherhood with him even as no academy of scientists would confer its fellowship on one who does not possess a high degree of scientific attainments. People will be no more in the aggressive mood to preach. The religious experiences and convictions would be communicated only to kindred souls and that with great timidity. It will be like whispering one's love to be heard only by the beloved.

In the beginning, however, the old ugly habits of conversion will be slow to disappear. For the transitional phase the constitution may have to lay down as to how and under what restriction conversion from one faith to another may be allowed. The law would not stand in the way of a major adult in possession of his full faculties freely changing his faith. But conversion by force or fraud and conversion of minors must be made a crime. Preaching one's faith should be allowed but in ways consistent with good morals as in advertisement. In boosting one's wares no direct or indirect disparagement or contempt of any particular faith would be allowed.

The vast inoffensive and picturesque world of forms in which communities express their individuality must be encouraged and helped. Variety of dresses, manners, customs, music and art, folklore and poetry, literature and language lends diversity and beauty to life which must not be lost. Society would, therefore, affectionately foster the peculiarities of different groups and grant them as much autonomy as possible in these matters. It will provide museums and institutes for study of national and communal traditions; encourage and patronise the growth of national theatres; and give communities free scope for developing their language, art and folklore. The author, the artist and the savant have a responsibility in this matter. Their work must provide the grand synthesis of communal life and reflect the shades and colours of the various communities as a lake reflects its surroundings.

Fostering of communal peculiarities cannot be guaranteed by law but would depend on education, up-

bringing and culture of the citizens. It is a long-range problem and we must start on this work at once.

Of all the national peculiarities language is the most fundamental. It is the vehicle through which the other peculiarities find expression. Linguistic groups must be given opportunity to get primary education and literacy through their own languages. On this point there is a difference of opinion in Northern India only where Hindustani has practically superseded the regional dialects like Magahi and Bhojpuri; and education even in primary classes is given in Hindustani. The dialects have gone out of fashion as medium of literature. In Northern India, therefore, Hindustani must remain the alternative language in the primary classes. Indeed Hindustani is likely to have the greater attraction on account of its prevalence over large areas and of the prospect that it will become the national language of India.

The controversy over the script has caused so much confusion that thoughtless agitators have denied the very existence of Hindustani and in its place affirm Hindi and Urdu as two rival languages. This is a mistake; as we have seen already. The script controversy is real but it is not incapable of solution. I would solve the difficulty in this way. The state need not aspire to create a common language through a sub-committee. Such an attempt may be positively mischievous. Hindi and Urdu will become identical through the creative efforts of writers and thinkers who would want to reach the widest mass. We are not going to compel the teacher or the pupil to adopt a script to which he has sentimental objections. In the

secondary and university classes, however, Urdu-reading students should be required to study a few standard works in Hindi transcribed into Persian script. Conversely, standard works in Urdu should be made available in Devanagari transliteration to the corresponding classes of Hindi-reading students. This will familiarise both classes of students with words which are in standard use. The monstrosities like "Begum Sita" would be thus avoided.

In the secondary classes Hindi-and-Urdu-reading students should be obliged to learn the Roman script. The Roman script with suitable symbols can be made to represent nearly all the familiar sounds in Hindi and Urdu and can be learnt in a matter of days. This is the sanest solution of the script question. No one is required to cut himself adrift from the accumulated literatures embodied in particular scripts. For limited purposes and without any damage to our culture we employ the Roman script. The possible uses of the Roman script that I can visualise are:

(1) In state documents and in records of legislative, judicial and executive proceedings. It would mean a great economy in paper, printing and stationery if the Roman script were exclusively used in this sphere.

(2) When a party to a suit or proceeding before a law court relies upon documents in one script, he may be required to deliver copies of such documents in Roman script to the party opposite if the latter is not familiar with the script of the original documents.

(3) In transactions between parties who do not use the same script, documents could be scribed in Roman script.

(4) Private individuals having no common script between them could use the Roman script in their communications.

These four uses are broadly-speaking 'commercial' and not literary. We do not lose spiritually by such limited employment of the Roman script. Works of merit in one script would be readily transcribed into the other if they deserve the notice of the wider public.

We have pointed out the role of the savant, the artist and the educationist. Education in its broadest sense is probably in the sorest need of reform.

Here again we cannot dwell on all the ways in which the existing methods of education must be modified to fit the people for the ideal life outlined above. For the restricted purpose we have in view education must be changed in definite ways.

At present what is called liberal education produces either parrots, or intellectuals who have no training in or no urge for practical life. The education is at best mere information and rarely does it try to educate the intellect to use new bits of knowledge in an integrated framework. The product of technical education is worse—he knows only the specialised craft and has no general framework at all.

The provision of a general framework of knowledge of world and ideas and education of the intellect to recognise significant facts and to fit detailed bits of information into this general framework are the fundamental basis on which a whole man must build. If this integrated principle is lacking man will revert to the local, the immediate and the particular which are breed-

ing grounds of exclusiveness. What is more we must create an urge for action.

The changes called for are great but we have no space to discuss them. What can be immediately done is to interpret and explain events in terms of their reaction on men and on social life. In other words every adult should be provided with a psychological and ethical framework.

Thus while studying technique its effect in relieving toil, in bringing plenty, in releasing human energy must be pointed out. Similarly it must be pointed out why the particular technique devised is not allowed to produce its good results and what should be done before the results can be good. In all this the conception of good should be firmly rooted in the individual.

Both for the technical student and the liberal scholar study of human psychology, of broad sociology and of ethics would be equally interesting. For whatever the psychological differences between men may be all are interested in the human affair. Man is the only way in which we can build bridges between different types. If this bridge-building is neglected the types would remain non-assimilable and would never understand each other—a certain method of perpetuating particularism which sustains the communal problem.

The bridge-building through man has been tried in the educational systems of Dr. Maria Montessori, and of Dr. A. E. Morgan; and in the schools attached to factories in the Soviet Union. It is being tried in India under what is called the Wardha system of education. In each case periods of study alternate with periods

of work, and work amidst different types of people. Education is humanised by contact with men. The individual loses his angularity and develops human solidarity. .

The urge to act in a beneficial way must be provided by training the emotions which has not yet been recognised as a necessary part of education.

Several of the arts can be usefully employed. Thus music and rhythmical movements and dances seem to infect every participant and on-looker with a common mood of exhilaration? Music could be encouraged to provide such common emotional feasting.

Similarly acting in suitable circumstances widens emotions. Thus a Moslem boy made to enact the role of "Rama" in a play cannot fail to catch some of the grandeur of the character he is enacting. He cannot fail to feel some of the emotions that are felt by ideal Hindus. Similarly when a Hindu boy plays the role of a great Muslim saint or hero, he will in the process become something of the Muslim saint and hero and, therefore, nearer to the Muslim. Even witnessing such plays would make for the widening of emotion.

Plays and dramas when rare and solemn as in the past were aids to elevation of character. Their substitutes to-day in the purposeless films has become a method of emotional masturbation. For while great characters infect their greatness, the insipid, commonplace characters can only infect their insipidity and commonplace placeness.

From these particularised arts we pass on to the art of literature. Literature has the greatest promise

in reforming character and in creating men of forethought, wide understanding and non-attachment. Literary models have been taken from mythologies, histories and fictions.

In each case their appeal lies in the fact that man can and loves to play many roles. Each new role presented before him seems to be temporarily himself. Of course the story must be told with some art or it will not be interesting. But granted that the story is told with art and the literary models are not too unfamiliar, the literary models will have their own influence on the reader who will insensibly try to emulate them.

In some great works of art, like the Ramayan and the Mahabharat, particularly when the characters are not visually presented before the readers, the appeal in spite of the age of the work is eternal. This is not the place to analyse the sources of this appeal. But ancient models generally become ineffective for two reasons. In the first place what is old becomes either legendary or too antic in garb. The surface appearances, therefore, become the main attraction. Secondly, as the action and setting are unfamiliar, the model does not appear to be immediately human as the reader himself.

Hence the eternal variations of the same themes. The literary artist must be for ever creating new models, at least modernised versions of old models.

The need for uptodateness is catered for today by the pulp-magazines. They present models that appear to be more immediately like the reader. The stories are transcriptions of the commonest and the easiest day-

dreams--dreams of sexual titillation of financial success of luxury. of social recognition. These transcriptions appeal to people who have none of these things as a way of escape.

As appeal of literature is unfailing the bed-time stories, the confessions, the detective tales will be seized unless great literature can provide a substitute. Here is a field for the progressivist of writers and literary creators. Let them create the models that will lead to non-attachment, to tolerance, to justice and to freedom.

It is significant that models of non-attached men are rare in world's literatures. Western writers particularly have presented models alive but too full of animalism and too much attached. In India we have models like Janak, like Rama, like Krishna of the Gita; and it is easier for us to follow up that tradition. The work appears to be too far-fetched and too remote of significance but the alternative is the pursuit of 'good time' by newspaper reading, day dreaming at films, radio music, chatter, playing and watching games-gaiety and thoughtlessness.

Whatever we may do, it is not possible for society to get rid of egoistic men altogether and if such people can control education and propaganda, separatist tendencies can flourish in spite of us. As this possibility must be reckoned with educators must try to build a resistance to suggestions of pervasive propaganda which seems to hold the field today.

Those who do not want to be swamped by the system, who want that men shall not become either

automatons or sheep driven along by demagogues, will set up alternative centres for educating people.

They will proceed in two ways. They will try to shut out stimulation from outside and teach children and adults to rely on their own resources, to be able to enjoy privacy and solitude and to avoid the crowd and the crowd amusements. To this end corrective habits will have to be instilled in the individual. He will be taught to make and do things; to enjoy arts, to play music, to study purposefully, to indulge in scientific observations, researches and experiments and so forth. Secondly they will try to develop the critical faculty of the individual so that he may note the kernel of reality in the vast mass of propaganda. Thus stock-words like 'nation', 'state' etc., must be tracked down to the concrete constituents of the same. Similarly all personifications, metaphors, and abstractions must be rendered concrete. Irrelevant association, as of soap with a picture of a glamorous girl voluptuously taking her bath, must be broken and the individual enabled to concentrate on the essential only.

Side by side with training the intellect and the emotion, the body must be trained. As a principle this is recognised in all countries. Games in schools and colleges and games in which children are drilled by dictators have been recognised methods of training the body. There are other methods, too subtle to be discussed here, like hathayoga, etc., on which full light has not been thrown yet. In any case movements of the body and trained movements have remarkable effect on man. Sports and games are sources of power but whether the games will breed combativeness and

exclusivism or whether they will lead to harmony and co-operation depends on how we organise them.

Thus if the game encourages individual distinction it is of the wrong kind. Prizes and trophies for individual excellence should be scarce. Games which challenge the resources of a group and compel fellowship are of a higher order. Such games, however, should never be between teams whose members are too homogeneous between themselves. Thus instead of a pure Hindu team and a pure Muslim team, we must have mixed teams. Similarly for other groupings. Even purely territorial teams may not be entirely free from exclusivist taint. These considerations indicate the lines of reform in the present organisation of sports and games in India which is very much communal.

Education whether of the intellect, the emotion or the body is an external aid. The educative devices have to be ultimately availed of by the individual who must make his own effort to attain love and harmony with his fellowmen and non-attachment with the transient. In all this much will be done by merely following the guidance of the educators. But the mood of exaltation that may be momentarily caught with the aid of educators must be made permanent by the individual's own effort. Keeping up at the height of emotional and intellectual grandeur is a religious act and people must try to find out their own methods to help them. In any case keeping up the height means possessing a steady awareness of a reality transcending the particular facts of life. This has been variously called law, or God or order. Its realisation has been attempted by people by physiological methods such as 'Yoga', 'hatha-Yoga'

mortification and austerities; by emotional methods such as of Bhakti; and lastly by methods of contemplation and meditation which is Jnana-karma method. It is difficult to pronounce on these methods. Probably the physiological methods are only preparatory. The choice is really between the emotional method and the method of meditation.

The usual religions that fight over God are too much entangled in the emotional method of devotion. Devotion in Islam of one God who commands; in Christianity of the Father who lends grace; and in Hinduism of the Gods conceived as personality is good only upto the point that the model is good. It has rapid effect on character but the effect depends on the model. It seems that the models are almost necessarily thought of as persons with likes and dislikes, with loves and hatreds and so forth.

As such the models only perpetuate the emotional in man. It is for this reason that religion commonly divides people. In India we know this very well. In this connection the following observation of Aldous Huxley is enlightening:

.....Whenever God is thought of, in Aristotle's phrase, as the commander-in-chief rather than as the order of the army—a transcendent person rather than as an immanent-and-also-transcendent principle of integration persecution always tends to arise. It is an extremely significant fact that before the coming of the Mohammedans, there was virtually no persecution in India. The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang, who visited India in the first half of the seventh

century and left a circumstantial account of his fourteen-year study in the country, makes it clear that Hindus and Buddhists lived side by side without any show of violence. Each party attempted conversion of the other but the methods used were those of persuasion and argument, not those of force. Neither Hinduism nor Buddhism is disgraced by anything corresponding to the Inquisition; neither was ever guilty of such iniquities as the Albigensian crusade or such criminal lunacies as the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Moslems who invaded India brought with them the idea of a God who was not the order of the army of being, but its general. Bhakti towards this despotic person was associated with wholesale slaughter of Buddhists and Hindus..”

As soon as the idea of personal god drops out of faith, the faith must be sustained only by meditation. This is an old method in Hinduism. It is almost the sole method of Buddhism. Esoteric Christianity and Moslem mystics also come to this method. This method recognises the universal principle as ordering of the universe and whoever can detect regularity and order in life participates in the fellowship of the religious men. It seems that this mystical contemplation of the first principle as an order will have to be the new faith for humanity which is fast outgrowing the personal God as science develops. Science cannot annihilate the mystery of the principle of order which will attract men for all time. Groups of people such as Theosophists are trying to realise this. This is the way of religious reform in India.

CHAPTER XII.

ECONOMIC PROGRAMME.

BY raising the question of fostering such national peculiarities as language, art, folklore and the like, we have opened up vast fields of efforts in the direction of permanent measures of communal harmony. Notwithstanding the impatience of the enthusiast we do not solve the communal problem by merely providing aids and safeguards for the communities. The major maladjustments in society are bound to leave the communities in unstable equilibrium.

The most important maladjustment is economic. In India we are familiar with the demand of the communities for a share in the administrative services. The 1931 census gives the percentage of employment under the state including the Railways; Posts and Telegraphs; army, navy and airforce; and police as 1.34 only. Yet communities fight for percentages. The reason is that Indian economy is not spacious enough to give a free field to every one. We are confined to a narrow space and as we try to expand individually, as we inevitably must, we encroach on the opportunities of others. These latter must resist such encroachment and in resisting it draw upon all the weapons in their armoury including the weapon of communal distinction. In an uncertain world whatever certainty can be achieved by fixing communal percentages is a gain in itself. It is only in the

peculiar context of India that such demands do not appear unreasonable.

What are the significant facts of the Indian economy? The per capita income in India (arithmetical average of all incomes) in 1931-32 has been calculated at Rs. 65 per annum (vide Second Part, of the Bombay Plan). The rural income is only Rs. 51 and the urban income Rs. 166.

Even in urban areas half of the total urban income is in the hands of less than 10% of the urban earners. Of incomes above Rs. 2,000 38% of the recipients get only 17% of the total income and a little more than 1% of the earners get 10% of the total of such incomes.

Now as the vast mass of Indians lives in villages the rural income should be taken to be the more typical of India than the average of all incomes. By this calculation a family of five persons in India gets a monthly income of Rs. 21 only. This can be compared with Rs. 531 for England and Rs. 555 for the U. S. A.

Aldous Huxley calculates that an income of £600 is adequate for living like men, with freedom, leisure, good health, intellectual entertainments and educative travel. If a man gets less than this income he becomes attached to the cares of the body and the lower the income the more brutal the struggle for existence. Above £600 utility of money rapidly diminishes. By this calculation Englishmen will need Rs. 3,250 per month for a family of five to live a non-attached life of decent human beings. For

England this figure comes to six times the present day British income. In his opinion Englishmen will cease to be combative only when they realise this income.

In comparison with the desirable level of income in England the Indian peasant family living at Rs. 21 a month, even allowing for the tropical climate and the lower physical needs, is too much at the level of brutes to be able to understand decent, free, cooperative living for men. Attachment is too deep-rooted in India. The other-worldly philosophy ascribed to Indians cannot gloss over this basic and brutal attachment. "Opinions are not the rules for action and men do not follow them in their conduct. The Turks believe in Fatalism and Predestination, and yet they flee from danger just as the French who do not have such a belief." (P. Bayle—quoted in P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, page 554.)

"What sin will not the starving commit? Men in want are uncharitable." Thus said the author of the *Hitopadesh*. Uncharity is the root of the vices that separate men from men.

The peasant with his Rs. 21 cannot have a feeling of loving regard for the man with Rs. 2,000 who can indulge in 'conspicuous waste'. He might have accepted his lot until a few centuries ago. But the possibilities of science and the achievements of similar classes elsewhere can no more allow him to be fatalistic. Fights for 'shares' are thus likely to be grimmer in the future than they have ever been in the past. This economic want is the abiding source of communalism and no reform can uproot it unless we cure the evil of want.

In the west responsibility for maintaining a standard of living has been now recognised by society. The failure to maintain a standard of living would result in terrible consequences. Walter Lippman sums it thus:

"...If the state fails to do that (i.e., to protect the standard of life of its people) its independence is threatened, as we can see in the case of Austria; its national unity is imperilled, as we can see almost everywhere in the exacerbation of separatist tendencies (witness the movement for Pakistan in India); law and order collapse as we can see in the extraordinary spectacle, unknown since the Renaissance, of large private armies mobilised in modern states; liberty is threatened, as we can see in all of Europe east of the Rhine."

Want when unconscious will lead to complicated devices of communalism. Want when conscious would lead to a volcanic upheaval of society. Communalism—now confined to the literate classes—will embrace the mass as the economic struggle grows grimmer.

Allied to this want is the uncertainty of income. Why jobs under the state are the targets of Indian communalists can be explained by the fact that the jobs are often better paid than elsewhere, and, what is more important, the jobs are more secure. In India, even more than in the industrialised west, employment under non-state agencies has not the same stability as under the state.

The search for certainty causes the organisation of pressure groups and of violent sectional politics...

Producers, shippers, etc., organise in pressure groups to defend what are believed to be their interests. The interest in each case is security of income.

Want and insecurity are, therefore, the major obstacles to liquidation of separatism and group-hatred.

If all people were in the same economic position, even though all of them were in want, there would be some comfort in the equality and separatism would not be as virulent. But society everywhere is arranged like a pyramid—hierarchical and authoritarian. This causes further tension.

Radical cure of communalism demands abolition of want, uncertainty and unjustified inequality.

Hence the need for an economic programme. Planning has now become a by-word in economics. It has many aspects and an independent study will be required to do justice to the subject. But we must briefly outline the economic programme that would help in solving the communal question.

The planning, in the first place, must be for plenty. At present the Indian economy is a result of the restrictive monopoly capitalism of the Empire. This economic stranglehold must go before there can be any planning.

Liquidation of imperialism is the first logical step. But plenty cannot be guaranteed if we look at the problem of production only. It is fashionable to say that we must have more industries, use larger quantities of power, employ machines and have intelligent and

trained labour. These are technical necessities that would be needed under any economy. Yet we know that while Soviet industries advanced steadily in production the capitalist world went through a depression that has virtually caused the demise of capitalism over the continent of Europe. Economic problem of production is not even touched unless simultaneously we attack the problem of distribution.

It would thus appear that plenty is tied up with certainty and relative equality of incomes. The planning, therefore, must be for socialistic production. This is not the place to explain how socialistic production, like household production of the by-gone past, is the only method of curing unemployment and of ensuring unlimited economic development. But students of economics agree that socialist planned production for community consumption reduces the problem of economics to that of mere technique and rids society of uncertainties.

To be more explicit we are called upon to relate production to effective demand. We are called upon to produce, to price the products, to distribute in income and to spend in such a way that what is paid as cost emerges as realised price of the produce.

The management of such an economy is an affair of society and cannot be left to the hazards of individual profit-making.

This does not by any means involve complete control of industries by a superbureaucracy. Any scheme in which control is wholly from above cannot make for a society of freemen. It will leave the cleav-

age between the ruler and the ruled as a yawning gap. But the present arrangement of unplanned and more or less monopolistic capitalism cannot be allowed to continue. Two alternatives have been suggested. Both of them admit the need for social control of economic forces. The first which has been described by Walter Lippmann as "compensated economy" leaves the capitalist structure intact. It relies on the theory that capitalism oscillates round a norm and the oscillation can be corrected by compensatory state action. Thus when unemployment may seem to be spreading, the state should switch on to public works. When demand for goods may be falling state should subsidise consumption or make purchases and so on and so forth. Unfortunately the consensus of opinion of economists is that capitalist production is not subject to slight oscillations but to deepening restrictiveness. Compensatory action by the state cannot cure the ills. We must, therefore, be prepared for substantial modification of existing management. We cannot avoid direct socialism over a large field.

Such vital subjects as transportation, banking, heavy industries, armament works, and industries generally where monopoly is desirable must be controlled by the state. These large-scale industries are essential for the life of the community and cannot be left in the hands of individual profit-seekers. How shall these industries be controlled? Apprehension is expressed that unless control of industry is in hands of men who have lent the capital, there will be no initiative for improving production. The fear is unjustified. Industries require a large army of

workers which is the rank and file. Nowhere under capitalism does the worker control the industry. Yet industry goes on as workers have the fear of the whip or of going without bread. Above the rank and file workers there are the foremen and the managerial staff. In modern industries they are also men who draw salaries and whose initiative has the same motive as that of the workers. The directors of industries are not necessarily the shareholders. In fact the device of the small denomination share which was intended to spread property over as wide a class as possible, has become a device for denying the vast number of distant shareholders individually holding too few shares to feel any great interest in selecting the directors and in controlling them. The development of interlocking directorate, and the penetration of banks into industries have all resulted in control of industries being completely divorced from the ownership of shares. It is some few men at the top that rule. These men are not necessarily the best planners, the most brilliant innovators. Most often, with spread of monopoly capitalism, they are interested in regression and not in progress of technique and production.

Thus the present control of industry can be described as chaotic and monopolistic. The change over must be by putting the community into the centre. The position of the rank and file can be improved vastly towards greater freedom and responsibility by adopting the suggestions made by Dubreuil of breaking all sorts of businesses into small units worked by groups of up to 20 workers under foremen of their own choice. As for the directing class, the industries may be organised

into national trusts to which each single plant is affiliated. The management and control of each single plant may be vested in a body of men selected for their ability and enterprise who may constitute an autonomous board on the lines of the Port of London Authority, or the Reserve Bank of India or the Railway Board. There may be officials and non-officials in such boards. The personnel of the central national trust may be similar. These various national trusts will be coordinated by a central planning committee. Their activities will not be at cross purposes and will be beneficent. This will be guaranteed by their working with full publicity, against maps and charts and comprehensive statistics and under general supervision of the planning committee. The provision of capital can be made, as even in the Soviet Union, to a large extent by borrowing from the public until industries can provide capital out of savings. The loan of capital will earn interest but will carry no control of industry with it.

We have noticed above the grotesque exhibition of communalism in demands such as monopoly by a Muslim butcher in the meat trade and so forth. These extreme cases indicate the ill-will with which people view others who get unearned income in the shape of profits and control employment and production merely because they have more money. The phrases such as "Bania imperialism" with which the League associates the Congress and the leadership of Mr. Gandhi point to the same discontent with profit and control vesting in individuals.

The loan of capital to the state, to the planning committee or to the national trusts will no more smack

of Bania-imperialism and the like when what the lender gets is only an interest for his money. As production expands and income of society rises we would be able to pay this little contribution to non-workers and yet live merrily. The outright expropriation of proprietors which, precisely because of its ruthlessness, will evoke widespread opposition need not happen at all.

This is substance of socialism without narrow-minded red-tapism of bureaucratic control. Such an organisation of the industries using the vital resources of the society need not cover all economic processes of the community. As a matter of fact even the large-scale industries may be decentralised so as to enable the workers to feel greater responsibility and self-government. Thus it is not difficult for an industry to arrange with a group of workers to work on a particular branch. The parent industry could lend out materials and power to such units at a price and buy back the products at a price stipulated in advance. The group of workers could then manage the job in a cooperative manner and divide the earnings among themselves. With suitable regulation of conditions of work this splitting up of industries into small units worked by cooperative groups of workers would be a very desirable innovation in methods of production.

Indeed with the use of electrical energy the units could be located at widely distributed points in the countryside and may become a method of preventing drift to the towns and of making rural life more self-sufficient. What is to be guarded against is that vital

resources of the community do not remain in private hands for exploitation on anti-social lines.

Cooperatives of workers (not employing wage labour as happens even in what are known as producer's cooperatives) could take up the less vital industries of the country. Such cooperatives for fishing, etc., are already working well in the Soviet Union. For varieties of small trades the individual workers as independent artisans would continue to thrive.

Such a flexible organisation of industry would provide as much scope for variety as is needed and yet make the production typically socialistic.

In agriculture this cooperative principle can be pushed further. Indeed private property in land instead of being made national could be vested in the village communities. In India where, even in zamindari tracts land has practically become the property of the cultivating raiyat the cooperative principle could be extended without violently breaking the individual distribution of land.

Only so much of land (a scale may be easily prescribed) should be left out of the cooperatives as would enable individuals to gratify their fancies for non-standardised houses, gardens and the like.

This socialist organisation of production is objected to by many people on the ground that planning production without consulting the consumer's choice would make for regimentation and monotony. In the opinion of such people the consumer's choice expressed through price-offers in a free-market must be preserved. With a free-market and competition price offer by the con-

sumers determines what shall be produced, in what quantities and where. The authoritarian director cannot know the demand and he may order production of things which may be an infliction on man.

There is a kernel of truth in this view. No sane man would advocate entire abolition of the free-price system. But no one can accept the consumer's choice in its entirety. Thus with inequality of incomes the price-offers do not indicate the needs of the consumers' at all fairly. The rich man's shilling exerts the same weight as the poor man's shilling. And as the rich man has many more shillings than the poor man, he virtually commandeers supplies. In such a state we must disregard the price offers as a true index of need. But when consumers have roughly equal income the case against intervention with free-pricing seems to be stronger. The crux of socialism is abolition of flagrantly unequal incomes. This can be done by means of taxation of higher incomes, by subsidising lower incomes and by other devices.

But even when relative equality has been achieved it is not necessary to go by price offers of the consumers in determining production.

Thus there are physiological and nutritional standards which society must enforce. It is not inevitable that consumer's choice would be as well informed as the social choice in the matter. Thus in respect of staple necessities of life the planning authorities can plan without reference to price-offers by consumers. As a matter of fact the planning authority would encourage consumption of things like milk and discourage consumption of things like liquor by its price policy. Then

there are communal demands which have to be met such as provision of play-grounds, parks, schools, hospitals and colleges and appliances for them. These can be also anticipated by the state. These cover large fields.

Even in what may be called neutral things like garments, cycles, motor cars and so forth, it is well known that varieties are not unlimited. In any case the basic materials are very few. The state can leave the cutting and making of clothes in individual hands. Such individuals will anticipate consumer's fancies and demands. And so on in other spheres.

In luxuries probably the state would leave the field open to free-pricing. In any case the commodities offered in the market are as designed by the producers. The designing is not done by the consumers themselves. Their freedom lies only in choosing between what the producers offer. Most often the choice is directed by subtle propaganda and even this freedom of the consumers to choose is illusory.

The planning authority can allow this freedom even under socialism. If the planning authority finds that demand for a certain commodity has fallen off at the particular price, it can, if it wants to encourage consumption of the commodity, reduce its price. If it is not so interested, it can curtail production of the particular commodity and slowly dispose of the stock. Again there can be encouragement to art designers to supply models and designs. In all these ways the consumer's fancy can be allowed as full a play as possible.

Planned production for community consumption is thus entirely feasible. The technical details of how

to calculate cost and fix prices and how to arrange distribution of income have been studied and found to be quite manageable. When such production ensures plenty, certainty and relative equality of incomes to the individual separatism will die a natural death. The sting will have been taken out of the communal controversy.

The economic development of India will provide a solution to the communal controversy in yet another way. We know men have different loyalties which often run counter to each other. We also know that loyalties can be by-passed and drowned in a larger loyalty. In the clash of group loyalties in India as anywhere else it is not inevitable that loyalty to one's community will triumph over loyalty to one's country or to the mystic conception of humanity. To any loyalty there are impeding factors. The social and economic history of Europe and America is rich in illustrations of the way how loyalties of one type can be arrested by emphasising loyalties of another type. Conditions in India provide similar instances. Here is a very simple instance although analysis will show how complicated is the relationship of loyalties. *R* a Hindu Kisan Sabhaite comes into conflict with *K* a Hindu landlord on a purely economic question of *bakasht*. The opposition here is wholly economic. The economic opposition exasperates the landlord and he knocks out *R*'s teeth and makes him his life-long enemy. Opposition has narrowed to personal antagonism. *K* the Hindu landlord expands and encroaches on some land of a Muslim graveyard. Economics has become complicated by religion. *R* the Hindu Kisan Sabhaite allies himself with the Muslims

against K, the Hindu landlord. Religion has been by-passed and drowned in a new opposition which it is very difficult to unravel.

These psychological possibilities hold out great promise to us in solving the communal problem. The question is whether we can find an incentive that may drown the communal differences. Such an incentive may be negative or positive. Negatively we know how war compels a unity of purpose in society. In India the fight against imperialism has provided a cementing force between the communities in the past. That it did not unite the communities in full and conscious participation in the struggle is largely because the fervour of patriotism could not be deepened by economic content—by showing what freedom would achieve and how it would transform us. No vision of a great future was placed before the masses in concrete terms. We will lend immense power to patriotic sentiment if our appeal to the mass were backed by a demonstration how empire inhibits our growth and how its disappearance would release the overflowing energy of our people that would transform our land. Nationalist propaganda must proceed on these lines henceforth.

In emphasising the economic development of India we thus press into service the cementing force provided by war. Our war aims are rationalised. We will fight imperialism because otherwise we cannot have the economic development which will cure the ills. In fighting imperialism we shall have drowned the communal antagonisms in the waves of patriotic fervour.

War is, however, an unstable factor and when the immediate struggle is over fissiparous tendencies

may appear again. The more abiding unity will be forged in the actual execution of a programme of economic development. Social order demands a social religion. There have been epochs in history when different complexes of ideals have swayed humanity. These have been the great socio-religious movements like Christianity, Buddhism and Islam; the enlightenment of the Renaissance; the democracy of the nineteenth century; and socialism of today. They have provided the vast agreements which hold people together. In India we suggest the next fifty years will find the most absorbing and virile idealism in an unparalleled economic and cultural development of India on socialistic lines.

There seem to be no other motives in the field to rival it. Theocratic religions are not in the card even in the east. Communal oppositions will just "wither away" in this fundamental struggle to win a decent life worthy of our great people. In revolutionising the productive base of society—and there is nothing as urgent today—we will transform all existing communal and racial oppositions from anti-social antagonisms to cooperative and mutually fructifying emulation. For example, one of the most striking consequences of the still incomplete Russian revolution is the progressive elimination of national, cultural and racial hostilities among its heterogenous peoples. Only when the physical and cultural needs are satisfied by the basic reconstruction of our economy shall the individual be free to pursue his fancies, and find the means and the opportunities of enriching and strengthening the cherished peculiarities of his group. Art will have become a creative possibility of the mass.

Thus both because the economic development becomes the focus of our dreams and because in executing the programme we shall be raising entirely new and vital questions, the virus of separateness will find no material to work upon and will just die away. We shall ask, for example; how shall we finance our plan? From where shall we get the capital goods for our industry? What shall we produce and in what quantities? What will be our export and import policy? How will distribution be modified to ensure adequate motive for an expanding production and to guarantee equality of opportunity between citizens? The problems will be debated all over the country and we shall be grappling with these common problems in a mutual participation. Half the curative effect will flow from free and universal discussion.

Economic planning for development as a healing force has been unmistakably demonstrated in the Soviet Union. Its potentialities have been now grasped everywhere and so potent is it felt that our rulers seem to be relying on it even to by-pass such a fundamental opposition as is implicit in our demand for freedom. We are aware of the mysterious planning of post-war development that is being worked up in the imperial secretariat and also in the provinces. The plan seems mainly to be intended to divert the attention of the Indian people from the independence issue. We should not grudge even a patriarchal plan so long as it does good to India. But as the plan is being drawn up at the instance of the British Government which we have found to be in desperate need of the empire, it is not only intended to by-pass the main issue of political independence but also to entrench the British interests

more firmly on the Indian soil. As the plan will be prepared in secret and put into execution over our heads, it will be robbed of all the curative value so far as the communal question is concerned. The value of any plan from this point of view depends on how largely it draws from popular opinion and how much discussion it has aroused. There is no other method of ensuring common participation in national efforts. It is the common participation that we so sorely need.

CHAPTER XIII

OTHER SOLUTIONS: SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

IT will appear that we solve the communal problem by political reforms, by social measures and by an economic programme. We also demand change in the individual towards greater love, charity and helpfulness.

So far as the solution consists in constitutional guarantees and arrangements it may not appear different from what has been tried in Central Europe where after the last Great War the Versailles treaties provided minority safeguards in the new states that emerged between Russia and Germany. M. C. Cartney in his book "National Sovereignities and National Minorities" has made a detailed study of how far the provisions of the treaties for protecting minorities were in fact conducive in practice to the removal of their grievances or to reconciling them to the majorities. His general conclusions are not sufficiently encouraging. The main reason for the failure of the safeguards appears to be lack of sanction behind the Minorities Commission of the League of Nations and lack of procedural effectiveness to enforce them. We have taken account of both these difficulties. We do not need to look to a powerless body of outsiders to supervise the working of the guarantees and we back up the constitutional measures by providing an effective procedure.

Another reason for failure of the minorities clauses was that the arrangements were theoretical and formal.

The plurality of causes of social phenomena was not emphasised. The deeper social facts were not sufficiently stressed. No positive long term solution could be devised or worked up. Here again we have made social encouragement and economic programme necessary constituents of the measures of reform. The solution is related to such fundamental questions as liquidation of imperialism and a free and exuberant development of our economy.

We avoid the narrow legalism of constitutional Pandits and rely upon the practical working of social life. In all this we are in line with the arrangements in the Soviet Union as distinct from those under the Treaty of Versailles. We have the certainty that this solution if tried in India will cement Indian unity and solidarity as the Russian solution has in Russia. This seems to be the clear indication of history.

In India, however, solutions have been attempted on lines that are far from satisfactory. As such solutions have been urged seriously and have been in the field for some time a review of them would be in order. We would thus lend greater clarity to our own solution.

The present scheme of communal safeguards consists in separate electorates for religious groups combined with weightage; reservation of posts in the Government services; and special responsibility vested in the governors and the governor-general.

The third of the safeguards, namely special responsibility, has been formally on the state book since 1935. There is no known instance, however, when this safeguard was enforced. It merely gives an illusory

assurance to the minorities. Besides as it is shrouded in vagueness it can work at best only negatively. During the brief period when Congress ministries functioned in the provinces a large hue and cry was raised by the Moslem League that the Muslim minorities were being subjected to atrocities. Here was an occasion when the governors and the governor-general should have intervened. We do not believe that there is any truth in the atrocity stories. From the point of view of the minority affected, however, the safeguard in the shape of the special responsibility was found nugatory. The minorities had no method by which redress of their grievances could have been assured. The constitutional value of this safeguard was the same as of the famous proclamation of Queen Victoria in respect of religions of the subject peoples—a pious enunciation of ideals. Yet this safeguard was introduced in the midst of a heated controversy. The argument for it was the familiar one that a white can judge dispassionately between two browns. As the British troop was essential for keeping the communal peace so the British Viceroy and the governors were essential for a fair working of the constitution. The safeguard had only one value. It proclaimed to the world that Indians could not be trusted to be just in their ordering of their own house and that the British must go on bearing the white man's burden in this benighted land. The communal temper was perhaps satisfied; but it has made the transference of power to Indians exceedingly difficult. How often has one heard the wise asking dubiously: to whom shall power be transferred? Why not to the present Executive Council controlled by the present legislature? Why

not even to Mr. Jinnah? The reason given is that the present political structure is acceptable only because power lies in impartial British hands. As the locus of power changes the present structure will become unbearable. This serves the British very well. It makes the possibility of an interim constitution and provisional national government very very remote. It demands the impossible that the constitution shall have been shaped and accepted before power could be transferred to Indian hands.

Flirting with such ideas as guarantees by third powers like Russia, the U.S.A. and China is equally senseless. These countries have no urgent cause for taking in hand the minorities problem in India. Nor is it likely that religious groups will get sympathy from them in maintaining their positions. Indeed safeguard by special responsibility whether vested in England or in other foreign powers will not safeguard liberty but only perpetuate domination. The 'monkey' would be quite willing to judge between the two 'cats'; only the cats will get impartial justice but no 'sweets'.

The solution we offer trusts Indian agencies for no outsider can have the same interest in our affairs. It enables any one to set the agencies of safeguards in motion with an assurance that the agencies will pronounce. The King's agents will not be able to maintain Sphinx-like silence while minorities cry for relief.

Safeguard by special responsibility is mischievous and has to be rejected.

CHAPTER XIV

OTHER SOLUTIONS: SPECIAL ELECTORATE AND WEIGHTAGE

IN our country the electorate has been broken into seventeen fragments, each selecting its own nominee in isolation from the other. These seventeen fragments are not merely communities usually so called, but include classes and 'interests'. Thus along with religious groups we have racial groups like Europeans and Anglo-Indians; and with them go commerce, industry, mining and planting, landholders, university, labour, women, backward classes and tribes. There is nothing scientific about this classification. They have been given recognition for sheer opportunism. The divisions overlap and some of the groups necessarily have double representation.

It will be useless to look for reason behind this division. No reasons exist. It is impossible to exhaust all possible interests and classes in the society. Those have been recognised for special treatment which the British Government thought important. Lord Minto started the game. In his reply to the Aga Khan deputation of 1906 he said: "you justly claim that your proportion should be estimated not on your numerical strength, but in respect to the political importance of the community and the services it has rendered to the Empire. I am entirely in accord with you." (J. Buchan : Lord Minto.) The separate representation first started

with the Muslims. Evidently Lord Minto was convinced of the political importance of the Muslims and the services they had rendered to the Empire. The Muslims had done nothing more than as a body led by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and the Aga Khan and influenced by the Aligarh Principals they had mainly kept aloof from the nationalist agitation and were supporting the British Raj. They were, therefore, singled out for favourable treatment. Since then the "important elements" in India have been repeatedly mentioned by the Viceroys and recent Viceregal statements have a nauseating dose of them. In each case the community, class or interest got recognition when it was found to fall in with the imperial aims. Such communities, classes and interests were raised to the status of minorities when they proved that they were not disloyal but moderate and even reactionary; were amenable to flattery, and would serve as an indispensable mechanism in the counterpoise of native against native. They humbly petition the Government and cry, as Lord Curzon said, "for artificial ropes and pulleys to pull them up".

From the very genesis of such representation it became an acid to dissolve any unity that might grow among the ruled. It is foolish to regard separate representation as a boon to the interests affected. It poisons the interests concerned and every one else.

The "interests" which are stereotyped by separate representation cannot live except by harping on grievances. The grievances are hardly ever genuine. Most often they are myths. Myths have been used in politics, such as by Sorel for his anarchic direct-action propaganda. The communal leaders do the same. The net

result is that candidates who would be returned by these particularist electoral colleges must be extremists. A Muslim so returned would be an extremist Moslem and a Hindu an extremist Hindu. The middle path, the golden mean, the necessary compromise by which societies live are flung aside. Naturally separate electorate only engenders fissiparous tendencies. The All-Indian Congress Committee in its Election Manifesto of 1936 rightly stressed this aspect of the communal electorate. Of the communal award it said: "It is unacceptable as being inconsistent with independence and the principles of democracy. It encourages fissiparous and disruptive tendencies. It hinders the normal growth and consideration of economic and social questions. It is a barrier to progress and strikes at the root of Indian unity." This was equally the view of every responsible delegate at the Round Table Conference. Sir Ali Imam presiding at the Nationalist Muslim Party Conference at Lucknow in 1931 also had the same opinion. He had been one of the members of the Aga Khan deputation in 1906 that had demanded separate representation for the Muslims. But the logic of facts was not lost on him. He said, "...If I were asked why I have such abiding faith in Indian Nationalism, my answer is that without that India's freedom is impossible. Separate electorate connotes negation of Nationalism..".

It is argued that such minorities have got certain peculiar interests which cannot be protected unless their representatives are there to guard them and that the representatives may not be there at all unless they have their separate electorate. The minorities, however, can

easily have a certain number of seats reserved for them although the candidates will be elected by a joint electorate. The principle has been employed in the case of the scheduled castes. Such representatives would be at least not narrowminded extremists although they could as well guard the interest of their own community.

But the question is whether they have such peculiar interests which would be endangered by joint electorate. From 1861 to 1909 there was no separate representation. No instances of measures have been brought to light which aimed against particular communities. The irrational which can be so easily sharpened can be best tested by demanding specific instances of oppression. None would be forthcoming. Besides microscopic representation cannot stand in the way of oppression to any particular community. In the Punjab, Sind, the N. W. F. P., Bengal and Baluchistan the Muslim majority can overcome all opposition in the legislatures that the handful of representatives of particular interests might put up. In the remaining provinces the Hindu majority could do the same. The minorities, therefore, have individually no effective protection by separate representation. The majorities do not need separate electorate to lend them strength. They will be in the majority anyhow. Even the uncertain alliances of the minorities could be of no avail. So viewed there is no case whatever for separate electorate.

Besides by the very nature of modern development the state is primarily tackling economic and social questions. In the words of Engels the development is

everywhere away from "government of persons" towards "administration of things". Things are from their very nature non-communal. Examine the normal legislative programme of any government and mark the debates on any day in the legislatures. The problems that one would find being debated would be whether electrification scheme should be introduced in Bihar and how; whether prohibition should be enforced; whether peasantry's debt should be scaled down and so on and so forth. One will have to stretch one's imagination in vain to detect what is peculiarly Hindu, Moslem or Christian in such programmes. If at any time a particular interest needs to be sacrificed and this is felt to be expedient in general interest, the representatives of the interests affected cannot stop this sacrifice by any means whatsoever. Thus the scheme of separate representation is fraught with grave mischief and is utterly inefficient to serve the particularist aims of any interest. There is nothing to recommend it. Ceylon had nearly similar problems of minorities although on a smaller scale. The Donoughmore Commission, however, rejected not only the claims of the separate interests for separate representation but also the recommendation of the Ceylon Government in this respect. The reasons given by the Donoughmore Commission are on all fours with those given above. There is less objection to joint electorate with reservation of seats but in a healthy society even this will be found unnecessary and irksome.

While separate representation cannot be supported separate representation with weightage for minorities must be unhesitatingly condemned.

Look at how weightage works in India. In the Federal Assembly British India would have 250 seats of

which 213 would be communal. Of these seats Muslims have been allotted 82 and Hindus (General) 105; i.e. 38.50 per cent and 49.30 per cent respectively. Their population percentages are 26.84 and 64.50. Thus an average Hindu has only half as much political right as a Muslim. Could there be anything more grotesque? Why must one subject the Hindu to this absurd discrimination. The problems that would be discussed in the legislatures would be again in respect of "things" which are non-communal.

In provinces the weightage works more unfairly still. We conclude, therefore, that separate representation and weightage have no justification whatever. They only divide the communities and weightage only keeps them smarting under a sense of political inequality. This solution must be rejected. The utmost that could be safely provided for would be reservation of seats for important minorities in proportion to the population together with freedom to them to contest additional seats—all within joint electorate. The controversial point is whether the reservation should be by religion which is being fast undermined by development of secular issues. The only solution free from objections is equal franchise in joint electorate. The right to vote and to representation should be granted to the individual human being as a human being and not as a member of a group. Humanity is the only abiding interest. Groups are ephemeral. Whenever group interests would assume overriding importance in human life, voting and representation would reflected this inevitably. There is no reason to make the accidental groupings of today eternal.

CHAPTER XV

OTHER SOLUTIONS: RESERVATION OF SERVICES.

IN India while there have been in existence rules about the proportion of Indian and European officers in the higher branches of the administration, there were no rules to apportion the services between the Indians themselves. There were of course conventions which governed apportionment. The majority of the higher appointments, i.e., of district rank and above, go to Europeans. On the lower rung the jobs under the state formed only 1.34 per cent of the total employment in the country in 1931. But even for such an infinitesimal percentage the small Indian literate classes competed with bitterness. In 1925, however, communal representation in services was first inaugurated and in 1934 the Government of India elaborated the principle in a Resolution which assured minorities like domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians statutory safeguards for their favourable position in services. The resolution granted 25 per cent of the jobs to Muslims and .8 1/3 per cent to other minorities.

Reservation of posts under government is an arrangement unknown to any other country. Appointments to public services are made not with a view to assure employment for the communities—the percentage of employment under government is only 1.34—but to secure efficiency in administration. The masses for whom we are perfecting an expert state machinery is

interested in nothing else than efficiency of administration. Jobs under the state should go to the best qualified. There have been tests laid down for judging qualification, merit and suitability. The tests are not perfect and infallible. They, however, provide a determinate external standard which is at least free from private prejudices of the appointing authorities. By adhering to competitive tests conducted by an impartial Public Service Commission we would get as good a choice of candidates as can be had by any other method. Feeling of unfairness would be thus entirely absent. There are no data to show that any Indian community is inherently inferior in intellect and ability to any other. But even if we accept that there may be slight inequality, participation in common tests will tend to equalise ability and alertness in all communities.

The proper method of giving every community a chance is to provide them equal physical and mental training. If this were done proportion of candidates forthcoming will be in consonance with the numerical strength of the communities. Inequality should be cured at the root and not perpetuated by rigid percentages.

There is some merit in retaining the principle of percentages for a short period during which the backward communities might be helped to catch up with the more advanced ones in education and culture. But there is a danger that like protection in industries the "infant industry" argument may be perpetuated and the backward community never grow into adulthood.

What is an extension of the percentage principle is the demand that the governments should be composite-

and not drawn from a single party. Now the majority principle of parliamentary Government would compel any government to have at least half the Parliament in support of it. If this can be ensured by a single party government would be by a single party; else other parties will have to be drawn in. It is not possible to have a coalition government when parties have no common programme. Besides it cannot be laid down in advance at what stage and in what conditions the shifting alignments of representatives should be raised to the status of a political party. This is the most important reason why the Congress could not have a coalition government with the Muslim League. In the circumstances the demand for 50 per cent share in the cabinet or even 40 per cent pressed by any party cannot be justified as politic. So long as we stick to parliamentary democracy we cannot accept such arrangements.

Reservation of posts under the Government is, therefore, a solution that can at best be allowed for a short period during which all communities can be placed on the same level in education and fitness. As a permanent measure this will lead to inefficiency in government and must be harmful to public weal. Besides it may keep the communities in unequal stages of development for ever.

CHAPTER XVI

OTHER SOLUTIONS: ADJUSTMENT OF PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES

THIS is only a minor suggestion. Modern means of communication and the augmented resources of states would make such an arrangement superfluous. It is nonetheless true that there is a natural desire among historical communities for autonomous political units of their own. In India such historical communities are Bengalis, Tamils, Telugus, Marathas, Gujeratis and so forth. They are distinguished by identity of language and ways of life. There can be no objection to such innocuous changes of boundaries and the Indian National Congress has already arranged the provinces in linguistic and cultural order for its own working. There is nothing sacred about the present boundaries of the provinces which are really an accident of British history. There is, however, considerable difficulty in rearranging provinces. Mr. Jinnah now argues that his Pakistan would comprise the provinces of Sind, the N.-W. F., the Punjab and Baluchistan and Bengal and Assam as they now stand. This accidental arrangement of provincial boundaries is sought to be perpetuated by the Muslim Leaguers, as Mr. Khaliquzzaman says, on the ground that minorities within any province should be as numerous as possible.

In this state of opinion it is wiser not to interfere with the provincial boundaries as they are to-day even

though some rearrangement on linguistic lines might not be considered inappropriate. The problem in India, however, is of religious minority and rearrangement of provinces on linguistic and cultural lines would not solve the problem.

CHAPTER XVII.

OTHER SOLUTIONS: PAKISTAN.

THE latest proposal for solving the communal problem is division of India into communal zones. There have been varieties of zonal arrangements proposed by publicists, Indian and foreign. Most of them, however, are idle speculations which lack the weight of mass support. The zonal arrangement that has come to occupy the centre of the stage is that proposed by the Muslim League popularly called Pakistan.

We have already reviewed the historical background of the Lahore Resolution of March, 1940, which formally proclaimed the goal of Pakistan. In this chapter we would examine the basis of this demand and how it will work out in practice.

Sir Mohammad Iqbal is popularly supposed to be the originator of the idea of 'Pakistan'. Much of the emotional appeal of 'Pakistan' derives from its association with the name of this great Moslem poet. Edward Thompson, author of the book 'Enlist India for Freedom', also had such a misconception but Iqbal corrected him. In his book (page 58) he says: "Iqbal was a friend and he set my misconception right. After speaking of his own despondency at the chaos he saw coming on 'my vast, undisciplined and starving land' he went on to say that he thought the Pakistan plan would be disastrous to the British Government, disastrous to the Hindu community, disastrous to the Muslim

community. But I am the President of the Muslim League and it is my duty to support it."

It is thus not possible to trace the origins of this idea. From the earliest days, however, it has been causing anguish, not only to Hindus but also to such eminent Muslims as Sir Iqbal who, however, seem to be caught by a force of evil which holds them against their will. Whatever the origins may be it is the idea as popularised by the Muslim League under Mr. Jinnah that we have to examine.

The Muslim League justifies its demand for partitioning India on two main grounds:

(1) The Moslems are politically a homogenous body and have characteristics that mark them out as a distinct nation.

(2) As a nation they must have a separate state.

We have already examined the first of these premises in Chapter III. The accepted tests of 'nationality' negative the theory of 'Moslem nation'. The woolly abstractions that Mr. Jinnah strung together in his spirited reply to Mahatma Gandhi on September 17, 1944, in justification of his claim that the Muslims are a separate nation have been already seen for what they are worth. It is needless to repeat the argument. Analysis shows that Moslems are agreed only in religion—not religion of the heart that everywhere unites people but the religion of the creeds, the rituals, the myths, the guesses about nature and origin of the universe and so forth which are evanescent, local and contingent. This exoteric vulgar aspect of religion is already dying with the triumphant advance of science and philosophy free

from religious integument. The unity forged by a thousand years of common life is more fundamental than the narrow religious difference. This has been the perspective even of Muslims since their history began in India and down to 1936. For in 1936, the Election Manifesto of the Muslim League aspired to secure a democratic self-government for India as a totality and unit.

The sudden change that came over since 1937 must be examined very carefully before we discard the verdict of thoughtful men over centuries. What new factors came in since 1937? Nothing except it be the brief interval of 27 months during which the Congress changed its habitual role of opposition and formed ministries in provinces to the utter mortification of the Muslim League. The League baulked of the prospect of power started to abuse the Congress and in a characteristic Hitler way started an atrocity propaganda. We have already seen how the atrocity stories are a gross untruth fashioned for political purposes. Be that as it may, the whole tactics of the League came to be directed to achieve an isolation of Muslims from the Congress influence. The theory of 'Muslim' nation' was forged to help the League to achieve this isolation. It has no other merit.

The second postulate that Muslims must have a separate state is disposed of when the theory of 'Muslim nation' is seen to be a dupe.

But granting, for the sake of argument, that Muslims are a separate nation, must they necessarily have a separate state? Again we must appeal to history. There have been few states that are coterminous with

a nation. Austria and Germany are distinct states even though the people in both are German. English-speaking peoples are also not united under one state.

Nor has it been found that one state has purely one nationality. Germany had a contingent of Polish minority on the east and French minority on the west and Italian minority in South Tyrol. The Soviet Union and China have numerous nationalities within them. The Versailles treaty had a tough job defining state frontiers so as to reduce the minority population as much as possible and the job could never be satisfactorily done.

In the U.S.A. and Canada also there are more than one nationality. The classic example of a heterogeneous state is Switzerland which has a population derived from German, French and Italian stock all living in complete harmony. In India the population is equally mixed and it is equally difficult to assure the Muslims a distinct homeland.

Why should a separate state be desired?

A number of minor reasons are given. Mr. Jinnah says India is a sub-continent and not a country. The implication is that India is unsuitable for government from a single centre. So argue the British publicists like Sir George Schuster. Are not these people aware that there is in fact a single Government of India functioning today in spite of the states who have no voice in international affairs and even internally in opposition to the paramount power; and of the autonomous provinces? Are not they aware that in certain respects the entire British Empire is a single political unit? Are their little minds appalled at the enormous extent of India?

They should look beyond their nose and cast a glance at the Soviet Union which strides like a giant from the Atlantic to the Pacific covering one-sixth of the world. Even the U.S.A. and Canada and Brazil should balm their alarmed nerves. Do they tremble in awe at the enormous manpower of India? China has a much larger population. Is their vision unable to pierce through the thickets of races, languages and religions of India to the commanding heights of a common life and culture? They would find greater bewilderment in the congeries of nationalities that constitute the Soviet Union.

These petty arguments do us no credit. We cannot afford to have small minds if we want to comprehend our greatness. We should suspect leaders who invite us to narrow our view.

Of the major arguments, the ideal of realising a free-Islamic life in a distinct homeland has been found to be a chimera. In the concluding paragraphs of Chapter III we noticed how impracticable it is to try to live a free-Islamic life. We noticed how world forces are so shaping that no sequestered zone can be left free to wallow in a theocratic stupor. Peoples are being forced together and the relationship that is arising is frankly non-religious.

The League, therefore, is like a child who wants the moon. It runs straight for disappointment. Nowhere else has the free-Islamic life been demanded. The 50 million Muslims of China, the 30 million Muslims of the Soviet Union, the 14 million Muslims of Turkey and the scattered Muslim population in the south-eastern states of Europe have no such ambition and cannot

expect to have an isolated homeland, where they can live according to the dictates of Islam. These roughly comprise half the Muslim population of the world. The Turkish Mission bluntly called the aspiration of the Muslims in India anachronistic. In India itself, whatever arrangement may be made, about one-third of the Muslims will remain as minorities who can have no such homeland for developing free Islamic life. Iran, Egypt, Iraq and the unimportant Arab states have no such ambition either. There is indeed a Pan-Arab movement but not a pan-Islamic one. The Pan-Arab conference does not expect Iran to join this movement, Palestine with its Jews cannot be a free-Islamic homeland. Is it then a practical proposition that about 50 millions of Muslims in an uneasy alliance with a large non-Muslim population living in Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and the western districts of the Punjab, and in the eastern districts of Bengal and in Sylhet with their illiteracy, starvation and imperial yoke blossom into the perfect Islamic state of the League dreams? The League is asking the Muslims of India to pursue a mirage.

This disposes of the positive argument for a separate state. A negative argument is provided by what is called the fear complex of the Muslims which Mr. Jinnah has done so much to develop. Let us explore this argument. We have to diagnose a complex social malaise, the irrational factor in man. It is said Muslims have a feeling that Hindus would be unjust to them. Now feeling is not necessarily—at least not solely—based on reason. It can be engineered by propaganda and suggestion even when there is no basis in fact. Is this

fear of the Muslim League based on reason even partially? For let us agree that political life must be based on reason and not on blind emotion. Central Europe and Italy have learnt it to their cost that to base a state on emotion is to run in for dictatorship, coarseness and brutality. Even so I am not aware of any attempt at finding out if the Muslims have in fact such a feeling. We must make sure that they have, for, if such feeling is not there, the bonafides of Pakistan demand would be questioned. We would then conclude that Pakistan is not genuinely demanded by the Muslims but that when the demand is made it is with some ulterior object and at the instance of some outside factors. If the demand is not made sincerely, the appreciation of the demand and its discussion passes out of the realm of reason into that of knavery, fraud and force. We in India must not allow our politics to be ruled by knavery, fraud and force. This must be our insistent note.

As the first inconsistency we have the proclamation of Mr. Fazlul Haq that nine crores of Muslims can conquer and rule India more effectively than even the Pathan and Mogul emperors. The refrain that the Hindus are a decadent and a supine race, that they are old slaves as against Muslims who are new slaves, that the Muslims have martial traditions, if it represents authentic Muslim feelings proves that Muslims have no fear. It would be unworthy of the Muslims to suggest that these are mere braggings and bluffs. They are not.

For does the Muslim peasant fear the Hindu peasant so far as his common bondage to the landlord is concerned? Does the Muslim worker expect the Hindu

worker to betray the economic interest which is inevitably common? The question can be multiplied. But since we are aware that the fear complex is of recent origin, we should examine the psychology of the Muslim leaders who control the psychology of the Muslim mass. Which of the Muslim leaders have¹ this fear? Has Maulana Abul Kalam Azad this feeling? Have Ataullah Bukhari, Mufti Kifayetullah, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and Humayun Kabir such a feeling? Had Sir Ali Imam, Dr. Ansari, Badruddin Tyabji and Shibli Numani such a feeling? These are great names and have formed the cream of the Muslim intelligentsia in recent times. Their utterances and their conduct in fighting for a common democratic free India prove beyond doubt that they have no such fear. Do the Punjab and Bengal Muslims fear Hindu domination and do the Baluchis, the Sindhis and the Pathans have such fear.? Their preponderant majority in their own territories proves that they have no such fear. Has Mr. Jinnah such fears? His past history shows he had none. Has he been seized with fear of Hindus since 1937? His utterances and those of his lieutenants 'prima facie' show that the Muslim League has come to nourish such fears. Is this evidence conclusive? Evidently not. For we must test this fear in the conduct of the man. The crucial test which should decide the issue is, to my mind, whether the Muslim League leadership would accept Pakistan on its own terms? Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalachari recently conceded what they thought was the Muslim League demand embodied in the Lahore resolution of 1940. Mr. Jinnah says that the demand has not been conceded. But we cannot rely upon his

own statement. Let us rely upon Muslim opinion which would have the evidentiary value of an admission. Mr. Khwaja, President of the Muslim Majlis, thinks Mr. Jinnah has got too much. Sir Abdul Halim Ghaznavi, President of the Central National Mohammadan Association, thought the same when on July 12, 1944, he observed: "It (the Gandhi-Rajagopalachari formula) confronts Mr. Jinnah with a very difficult choice indeed - suicide for himself and political death for the Muslims if he accepts; complete discredit at the bar of world opinion if he rejects... Now his bluff has been called..." ('Indian Nation' July 14, 1944). We may go further and seek the verdict of impartial arbitrators and judges whether the formula conceded the Muslim League demand. Mahatma Gandhi urged this seriously in his recent correspondences. Mr. Jinnah would have no outsiders to judge and has in fact rejected the formula. The formula indeed is said to be his own. Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth in a statement from Lucknow on July 11, 1944, said that the proposals are "none others than those which Mr. Jinnah himself had proposed".

What does this rejection imply? It implies that Mr. Jinnah does not want his fear to be removed by acts that he himself advocates. Fear is no more fear if we prefer to cling to it. Is it Mr. Jinnah's pleasure that he would not have Pakistan?

Another indication that Mr. Jinnah has no doubts that the Muslim mass has nothing to fear from the Hindus comes from his rejection of the idea of plebiscite in the Moslem majority areas to determine whether the people want separation. The non-Moslem population of the N.-W. F. P., Sind and Baluchistan barely comes

to 1,639,000 which is 20.3 per cent of the population. Even if we take it that the non-Muslims would never vote for separation of these tracts from the rest of India, the chance of rejection of the Pakistan idea would be remote unless a very large percentage of the Muslims of these areas are against separation. That Mr. Jinnah flights shy of the plebescite idea proves conclusively that he is not convinced that the Muslim mass in these zones have fears of Hindu domination which would urge them to demand separation from Hindustan.

The analysis leads to the certain conclusion that neither Mr. Jinnah and the League nor the Muslim mass have any fears of Hindu domination. The demand for Pakistan, therefore, is not genuine and is inspired by ulterior motives. This conclusion must be underlined.

Least there be still doubts about these ulterior objects the following comments should finally dispel them:

(1) Lord Zetland, Secretary of State, on 18th October, 1939, even before the Lahore resolution was passed, found that minorities demanded safeguards against consequences which may result from the unfettered domination of the majority. The noble Lord was not sure whether the demand was made 'rightly or wrongly' but he rushed to proclaim his assurance.

(2) Muslim League had but to declare Pakistan its goal when on 18th August, 1940, the Viceroy came forward with the announcement that they (the British) "would not be parties to coercion of such elements (e.g. Muslims) into submission to such a government (whose authority is denied by large and powerful elements like the Muslim)".

(3) On 18th November, 1941, Amery declared that Muslims cannot submit to any central government which he anticipated would be only an "obedient mouth-piece of the Congress High Command".

(4) "The Times" from London in its editorial on 14th July, 1944, comments:

"The Gandhi-Rajagopalachari proposal leaves unsolved many of the more important League doubts and fears."

"These comments show that Britishers are fashioning the 'fear argument for the Muslims which the League leadership for some reasons which they do not choose to explain accept. It is the third party then that fashions the 'fear' complex. It is not an indigenous product but was manufactured across the seas.

This inference is strengthened by one other consideration, namely, if the Muslims hate and fear the Hindus, they would like as few of them as possible to spoil the harmony of their homeland. Thus expediency as well as political ethics points to the need of reducing the minority in Muslim zones as much as possible. This can be done by exchange of populations but if this does not commend itself on account of the enormous difficulties involved, Muslim zones should be formed of such areas and districts only as have an absolute Muslim majority. Thus the eastern districts of Bengal and Sylhet in Assam may combine into an eastern Muslim zone; and Sind, Baluchistan, the N.W.F.P. and the western and southern districts of the Punjab into a western Muslim zone. Consequently the boundaries of Assam, Bengal and the Punjab would have to be radically altered.

Mr. Jinnah in his correspondence with Gandhiji (Sept., 1944) shows himself in no mood for such alterations in the boundaries. He holds the accidental present boundaries as sacrosanct. His deputy, Khaliquzzaman, justifies this on the strangest of arguments. In a statement from Bhopal on 2nd October, 1944, ('Searchlight', 3rd October, 1944), he says: "Any attempt to cut away larger slices of Hindu population from Muslim zones is bound to be looked upon with suspicion and distrust by the Muslims." He solves the minority problem by ensuring as large a minority in the separate zones as possible. Now Muslims are a larger minority in a united India than in a Hindustan from which Muslim tracts have been carved away. Why do Muslims then want Pakistan and reduce the Muslim minority in Hindustan? One would have thought a minority should be as small as possible. With League leadership all mental processes are reversed. We enter the murky world of the Shakespearean witches where "fair is foul" and foul is fair".

The League leaders argue that if the non-Moslem districts of Bengal, the Punjab and Assam are taken away nothing is left to the League. The Moslem homeland is rendered resourceless. That is precisely the argument against separation. You cannot dissect the body and yet keep the soul. We have reached the limit of human ingenuity. Moslems cannot have a free Islamic life without mundane bankruptcy.

We repeat the Muslim leadership has no fear of Hindu domination. Its conduct belies its words. Yet the League harps on the possibility of Hindu domination and our rulers who in all decency should have at least

refrained from judgment rush in with their approval of the Muslim League with unconcealed impatience. Indeed it is they who fashion the fear argument for the Muslim League. Both employ phrases that are strikingly similar. Is it possible not to sense an unholy conspiracy between the two to deny freedom to India or at least to delay it indefinitely? The Muslim League is no friend of Islam and is definitely hostile to Indian aspiration. Mahatma Gandhi is after all right in thinking that the mere presence of the third party is enough to hinder unity.

We are driven to the same conclusion from yet another aspect. The Muslim communalism started with the demand for special representation, then it came to complete separation of the electorate and now it demands complete isolation to grow. The demands have grown from stage to stage. There is evidently no finality to it. If the League demand of 1940 is conceded, Mr. Jinnah reinterprets it into something different. The next phase may be demand for Muslim domination and Muslim Imperialism. Already old invectives have become dulled by constant use. New clichés are being formed. Phrases like "Banias Imperialism" are coming to figure in the Moslem League propaganda so that Muslims might be urged to demand Muslim Imperialism as a counterblast. It may be Mr. Jinnah himself does not know what to ask for. He seems only to know that it must be different from what anybody is going to agree to. He has refused to define his Pakistan concretely. The vagueness is deliberate. He would not allow even prominent supporters of the League demand to probe into the mystery of Pakistan

and to seek to give it a concrete shape. Here is what Mr. Jinnah wrote to Dr. Abdul Latif, the originator of the Pakistan scheme and its most distinguished publicist:

"I have repeatedly made it clear to you and publicly that the Muslim League has appointed no such committee (Ref. Haroon committee for preparing a constitution for Pakistan) as you keep harping upon; and neither the Muslim League nor I can recognise any of those suggestions or proposals of these so-called schemes. Please, therefore, let me make it clear once for all that neither Sir Abdulla Haroon nor you should go on talking of this committee or that committee, and involving the Muslim League or its authority behind the proposals that may be formulated by individuals or groups." (Letter dated New Delhi, 15th March, 1941, quoted by K. T. Shah in 'Why Pakistan and Why not', page 186.)

Mr. Jinnah knows well that to make the demand concrete is to commit one's self--to pin one's self to a position from which escape is extremely awkward. Even to the sixteen points on which Mahatma Gandhi sought clarification Mr. Jinnah has returned brief replies in terms of the formalism of a law court; such as "irrelevant", "does not arise", and so on. The concrete proposals were all made by Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah only criticised them. He never formulated a proposal himself.

There is thus studied attempt at obscurantism, at flight from rational approach. This is isolationism carried to absurd lengths. If your fears can be removed by arrangements like Pakistan, let us all under-

stand, and, if possible, concede it to you. Can we go on guessing your mind with the exhausting method of trial and error until by chance we land on your mental gem and you pat us on the back and say: "You have found it, boys"? Can we allow our country to languish in enslavement during all these years of unending search? To deny freedom or at least to delay it is the unmistakable meaning of the Jinnah tactics.

It may be Mr. Jinnah fears that if the floodlight of debate and discussion is allowed to play on his scheme, the Muslims themselves may recoil from it in horror. His refusal to allow Gandhiji to address the League executive and the open session of the League could have no other reason. Strutting constitutional niceties when problems epic in dimension demand all the light that can be concentrated on them is too thin to deceive anybody. Have not Churchill, Roosevelt and other war leaders addressed assemblies and parliaments to which they had no legal right of approach? Already publicists assure us that even if Pakistan comes India will not be unrecognisable; already they are recoiling from the futility of a complete negation of mutual arrangements over subjects of common interest.

Thus while the League Resolution seems to contemplate and Mr. Jinnah in his talks with Gandhiji argued for and the Aligarh Professors (Prof. Syed Zafarul Hasan and Dr. Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri of Aligarh) actually outline completely separate sovereign states of Pakistan and Hindustan, more or less in number; the other publicists like the Punjabi in his "The confederacy of India", Dr. Abdul Latif in his "Muslim Problem in India", Sir Sikandar Hayat, Dr.

Ambedkar and others are concerned with territorial or zonal redistribution with a view to afford a stronger position to the Muslim majority units, but without denying altogether the need for a central unifying, coordinating or confederative authority for the whole of India. Not only are we told that there will be some sort of a central authority; those of the League Cabinet go on to assure us that Pakistan means little more than larger autonomy for the federating units. Thus three months before the Muslim League Session at Madras in 1941, which reiterated the Pakistan resolution Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan in his presidential address at the U. P. Muslim League conference observed:

"If the Lahore resolution was examined calmly and carefully, it will be found that all it does is to group the provinces in which Mussalmans are admittedly in a majority in zones which will be sovereign. The units comprised in these zones will be autonomous which would be sovereign. "These units will therefore retain their present character and complexion" (*italics ours*). There is going to be no exchange of population or migration of Mussalmans from other parts of India to these zone... It may be the application of the word 'sovereign' to these zones creates misgivings in their (i.e., non-Muslim's) minds .. They have been all along asking for the federation of fully autonomous states which nearly means the same thing as sovereignty .. If goodwill prevail I have no doubt some kind of confederation will come into being."

Let Mr. Jinnah correct his lieutenant the Nawab and reinterpret 'federation' and 'confederation' in his original way.

Mr. Khaliquzzaman after the whip had gone forth from Mr. Jinnah uses a more guarded language so as to be less offensive to the Quaid-e-Azam. In his statement from Bhopal on October 2, 1944, he says among other things:

"Furthermore, strong and influential minorities in Pakistan zones and their physical contiguity with Hindustan, coupled with historical contact of their peoples, and the present trend of world forces and the possibility of the creation of a system of international defence, are bound to result in agreements between states on matters of common concern such as defence, etc., and thus set at rest any fears and suspicions standing in the path of proper understanding between Hindus and Muslims, etc."

Thus Mr. Khaliquzzaman takes "common interest" for granted. Mr. Jinnah does not admit this. He calls such subjects the very life-blood of the state which the state must not abdicate in favour of an external arrangement. Besides if agreement on such subjects is so inevitable in the estimation of Mr. Khaliquzzaman, why not start with reasonable agreements outright rather than trust divorced parties to arrange them afterwards?

Thus all told even his lieutenants deny him. Mr. Jinnah has not repudiated them. He trusts to his silence as golden.

Either Mr. Jinnah does not know what he wants or he has knowingly taken a position which he will **change** in favour of another so as to keep India for ever from her birthright. In either case 'fear' is not

the motive of the leaders. It is some ulterior motive which we would not care to phrase.

Thus while we find that the leaders have no fear, their propaganda might have developed a genuine fear complex among some of the uniformed Muslims. For the benefit of such people let us analyse their possible suspicions. Have the Muslim masses any cause for fear? Have they ever experienced organised Hindu oppression? History shows that Muslims came to India as aggressors, military adventurers and conquerors; and in the flush of their new faith, the early phase of Moslem conquest and consolidation is replete with atrocities on Hindus. The pillage of the temples at Mathura and Somnath, the forcible conversion, the Jiziya are instances in point. Even when consolidation was complete we hear stories of desecration of Hindu temples and erection of mosques at their site. The mosque at Benares is a standing reminder. The alien Muslim who founded kingdoms could not have been oppressed by the subjugated people. The natives who embraced Islam in fear or for gain certainly got closer to the original Moslems of the conqueror class. The Muslim subject could not have been oppressed by the Hindu subject. After the decline of Moslem governments in India, the Sikhs, the Marathas and the Rajputs had a temporary suzerainty in India but there is no recorded instance of their desecrating or damaging Moslem mosques and otherwise oppressing the Moslems. Thereafter the two centuries of British rule kept Hindus entirely out of power. Until 1937 Hindus had been in opposition, while Moslems filled some seats in the

ministerial hierarchy. Thus the history of Muslims in India until 1937 is entirely free from Hindu oppression.

The brief interval of twenty-seven months when Congress was in power was alleged to be packed with atrocities: but we have already examined the atrocity stories and found them unworthy of credence. We found the Congress ministries adopting measures that had nothing whatever to do with religion.

The net result is that if Muslims would care to look round they will find no cause in the past to fear the Hindus.

Have they reasons to fear such oppression in the future? The Muslim may have fear of the fellow Hindu subject of his own territory. But we posit no anarchy, we posit law and order to remain with the autonomous units. We even posit in the circumstances no alteration of provincial boundaries that may offend Mr. Jinnah. No Hindu as such could commit crimes in an organised way against the Muslim in the Muslim majority areas of Sind, the N. W. F. P., Baluchistan, the Punjab and in Bengal. Governments in these areas are bound to be predominantly Moslem in composition. And it is such governments that would have charge of law and order.

Moslems may fear the Hindus politically. The argument is often repeated that the Central legislatures will be 75 per cent Hindu and there will be an unalterable majority. Will that be so? Have we not seen Hindu and Moslem members jointly throwing off the Finance Bill of the Government of India? If we analyse measures that are being considered in the Central

Assembly, do we find every single Hindu voting on the same side of the measure? Do we find the Hindu Industrialists and the non-industrialist members voting together on subjects like the Excess Profits tax, trade union laws and so forth? And do we not find Moslems voting with Hindus in any single case? In fact we find that the allegedly unalterable Hindu majority is extremely changeable.

Any one who has attended debates in the Central Assembly will be convinced that the debates and votings proceed entirely on non religious lines. Each measure has Hindu and Muslim supporters as well as Hindu and Muslim opponents.

Besides when we analyse the strictly defined field of federal subjects we would find little reason to fear discrimination against the Moslems. Look at such subjects as railways, currency, customs and tariffs, foreign exchange, banking, posts and telegraphs, defence and foreign relations. Look at the present Railway Act, the Reserve Bank of India Act, the Postal laws, the Mines and factories legislation, etc. Is there anything in these acts to suggest special application to the Muslims? Are the laws of free India going to be different in form? Will not discrimination overt and implicit be remediable by reference to courts?

The Railway Act for instance regulates the administration of the railways, imposes duties and liabilities on railway officials, governs fixation of rates and tariffs, prescribes penalties for crimes on and in connection with the railways, and so on. The underlying idea is overwhelmingly to secure good administration of the railways and not to govern the lives of any particular

class or community. The legislation has changed from particular executive orders governing persons to general municipal laws to administer things? Similarly the Mines Act is concerned with arrangement of safety in the mines, for regulating the kind of labour to be employed and so forth. These things are enacted on general considerations of social usefulness. Suppose it were the case that all underground women workers were Muslims and a law was to be enacted to stop underground work for women. This might affect the Muslims exclusively. But the ground for the legislation is not discrimination against Muslims but the consideration for women. This should not be by any means called discrimination against Muslims.

Discrimination in such legislation can be only by territories or subjects. If a territory is inhabited by Hindus and Muslims alike the religious discrimination cannot be enforced. Subjects, one need not argue, are entirely neutral and non-communal.

Not only is the tendency of the modern state to develop from government of persons and classes to administration of things, the state is not going to be made absolute with power concentrated at one point. There will be considerable devolution to the provinces and the centre may be left with the minimum of subjects which require coordination in administration. It can be even provided that residuary powers may go to the autonomous units. With separation of powers, with the provisions as to non-discrimination and with courts to correct discrimination the central authority will not be coercive to the Muslims but will be helpful to all alike.

We can be thus certain that the Muslims cannot be "oppressed" in any Federation of India. The fears that may have been generated are entirely baseless. That is why even the British spokesmen who seem to be only too anxious to foster the Muslim League intransigence cannot bring themselves to accept the Moslem League argument of fear as right. The phrase "rightly or wrongly" is pregnant with meaning.

The fear argument disposed of, we find the case for separation has no foundation. While these are the usual arguments for Pakistan the Congress seems to have admitted the possibility of partition on the obscure doctrine of 'consent' in democracy, or, as it is more commonly termed, the 'principle of self-determination'. The Muslim League has found this stand convenient and the British authorities are also saying that they would be no party to an arrangement to which large elements do not agree. As the doctrine of "consent" is very much in the foreground we should examine it with all the care it deserves.

Rousseau introduced this doctrine in his "Social Contract" which opens with the categorical assertion: "Man is born free but is everywhere in chains." The doctrine was revolutionary enough in breaking up arbitrary despotisms which encumbered the seventeenth and eighteenth century world. This was precisely its appeal. But a little reflection shows that the doctrine is only a half truth. Although it may be conceded that man is everywhere in chains, it is not possible to accept his thesis that man is born free. Man is born an unformed human being very much dependent on the care and attentions of his parents and circumstanced by a

political and social environment which determines his very evolution. Whether we like it or not we are not free to accept or reject the big facts of our life. The doctrine of sovereignty of the individuals that Rousseau originated developed into extreme individualism culminating in the advocacy of anarchy. The limitations of the doctrine were emphasised by others who ended by declaring the state to be the expression of our rational will. Hegel travelling on this road went on to assert that the Prussian state of his time was the highest manifestation of reason.

Both extremes are dangerous. The one reduces society to a joint stock company where every shareholder has one vote and from which he may drop out at will. The other transforms it into a vast prison camp where everyone is driven along at the bidding of the state official.

Can we have partition of India on the supposed ground that some people will it, or, in other words, they do not consent to the unity of India?

Let us for argument's sake accept "consent" as a correct basis. What follows? In the first place if consent and will come in we have to see whether the will for partition is in the majority. For the first great limitation to any will comes from the more numerous wills in opposition. Majority vote is the only expedient known to political science for the solution of disputes unless it be by casting lots or by arbitration, award or imposition by a third party. As the latter alternatives are not in the card we need not examine them as possibilities. The implication of the majority vote is far-

reaching. It means in effect complete nullification of the numerous sovereign wills that form the minority. The atomistic sovereignty has been blown to the winds. Let us, petty sovereigns, learn humility. Let us learn that our sovereign will may not always triumph.

Majority decision is, therefore, inexorable. What are the wills relevant to determination of the question of partition? The answer is shrouded in acute controversy. Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League argue that the wills relevant are of Muslims alone. The reason given is that the Muslims form a separate nation and there is no wider unity in India. Mr. Jinnah asserts categorically that there is no Indian union at all. In this Mr. Jinnah is clearly perverse. He must be suffering from mental myopia if he cannot see that his vote in the Central Assembly has repercussions all over India: that the fee he gets for attending the Assembly Sessions in New Delhi is paid in a currency which is equally valid in Bombay and which is controlled by a single organisation, the controller of currency; that he can travel a thousand miles between Delhi and Bombay by train not once subjecting himself to examination by customs officials; when his favourite homeland in the eastern zone is in the grip of a famine food is rushed to it from the Punjab and Bihar; that he, a politician from Bombay, can make and unmake ministries in Bengal. These things prove conclusively that there is an existing Indian union. Mr. Jinnah can certainly notice such things even if he cannot notice the unity of India as a colonial land exploited by the same imperialism from its seat in London: We cannot, therefore, fly from an existing union of India. It is the

millions of wills of this united India which are relevant to a decision of the question of separation.

Even if the Muslims were a separate entity, they are only one of the several entities that constitute the Indian polity. The Muslims constitutes 26.8 per cent of the British India population. Even if they solidly stand for partition they would find a vast majority against them. But the cry of separation is raised only from the platform of the Muslim League. As it is the entire Moslem population is not in favour of partition. Dr. Shaukatullah Ansari in "Pakistan—A problem of India" discounts the prospect of Pakistan for this lack of unanimity among Muslims. The Shias and the Momins are apparently not in favour of it. It is also curious that the Muslims in the majority zones are not quite as keen about Pakistan as Mr. Jinnah who comes from a minority province. What chance has the opinion of this small minority in an all-India setting?

The inexorable 'principle of majority vote is the first limitation on the principle of 'self-determination'. There are, however, other limitations no less important. Thus while Mr. Jinnah claims that Muslims as Muslims have a right of self-determination, even he is unable to stand by this principle in its application to provinces like Bihar, Orissa, Madras and Bombay. Why is it so? Why should not the Muslims of Madras where they are 7 per cent of the people have their own state? Why not in Orissa? Why should the Muslims in these provinces be denied the right of self-determination which is claimed on behalf of the Muslims of the Punjab for instance? Mr. Jinnah cannot wriggle out of the awkward position. There must be discrimination even between believers—

It will be no indignity to them if they exercise this right with an eye to expediency and general usefulness.

Let us consider the expediency of the problem. Why do we think of solving the communal problem? Why do we have to consider the question of partition? We are not going to be slaves of doctrines which are true *a priori*. Theories in politics are rarely a statement of unchanging principles. They are formulations of ethics which are valid in concrete situations. Relativity is the great solvent of dogmatism. Our urge for solving the communal problem does not come from sheer love of some unchanging principle. It comes from the relative urgency of liquidating imperialism. We both Hindus and Moslems are in desperate need of free development. Imperialism inhibits us. We want to solve the communal problem to be able to fight imperialism better. Against the established imperialism we rightly urge the revolutionary doctrine of self-determination for India. When this great object is forgotten or thrown aside and the Muslims want self-determination not against the British whom Mr. Jinnah is only too anxious to retain but against the Hindus who are their comrades in thralldom the plea of self-determination loses its revolutionary and uplifting character and becomes a mischievous tactics to keep us more firmly in chains. For by breaking our united front; by stressing on disharmony we lose the strength to fight imperialism. Mistake at such a juncture becomes a crinic. The only valid tactics of subject peoples under colonial systems is to fuse and to unite their forces in order to give the shattering blow to imperialism. We must not in India walk warily to our doom. Britain will be only

too anxious to divide us if we want. Burma separated from India and Aden from Bombay. Have these isolated victims any better chances of securing freedom than when they were parts of a united India? Look at these petty instances in India itself which have their own lessons. During the Congress ministries an I.C.S. officer from Orissa was being thrust upon the province as the governor. He had been a servant of the ministry only yesterday. Now he would be its lord. As an arrangement it had nothing to recommend it and it was positively embarrassing to the ministry. There was opposition in Orissa but as Congress was a united body opposition was not confined to Orissa alone but spread over all other provinces and the measure had to be dropped. Would it have been possible if Orissa had been an isolated unit which had no powerful backing?

There may be some merit in thinking of separation when we have attained our freedom and in the new situation do not find it possible to live together.

To indulge in speculations about separation today is to fritter our energy and to weaken the fight for freedom. We must not be our own betrayers.

On the contrary if Britain tries to divide us as she most certainly would, we must meet such attempts by strengthening our ranks and intensifying the fight against imperialism.

So much from the point of view of our immediate struggle for freedom. Even apart from it and even when we have won our freedom arguments of expediency and usefulness will be entirely against partition. Thus partition must be judged from the point of view of

democracy of Islam notwithstanding. Let us not lose sight of the magnitude of the discrimination: fully one-third of the Muslim population is being denied this right of self-determination at the hands of Qaid-e-Azam, the arch-Muslim. Let justice be done even if heaven falls. Justice, however, cannot be done and heaven will never fall because the material limitations are enormous. Muslims in these areas are far too few and far too scattered to be able to form a state. The same argument applies to the Muslims in an All-India union. Solving the minority problem by guaranteeing the Muslims their own separate state is impracticable. We would merely duplicate the minority problem. If Mr. Jinnah, the great fighter for Islamic life, has no objection to living without having a Moslem state for his coreligionists in the province of Bombay, smaller Muslims should be able to live in the non-sectarian state of the free India.

Nor can it be argued that Mr. Jinnah accepts Hindu domination in Bombay because the Hindus are not likely to oppress him as there would be reprisal from Bengal. This is too naive an argument to do credit to Mr. Jinnah's astuteness. Theory of hostages can never work between states which are entirely separate. If minority in one state is oppressed at best the minority in the other states may also be oppressed. This may mean oppression for all minorities. Two wrongs cannot make one right. How will the pressure be brought about except finally by war? No state will go the length of war for every single act of discrimination of its nationals abroad, nor will the propaganda machinery allow the fact of discrimination to leak out. Mr. Jinnah hazards too much by accepting Hindu domination. That

he accepts it is because he must accept it on other grounds.

Mr. Jinnah to be honest must abandon the argument that Muslims are a separate nation as a basis of the demand for partition. As the effect of partition will be the separation of certain provinces from an All-India Union, the argument for separation must be that these provinces are separate entities. From religion we must fly to territory as a basis for partition.

Can this transition be achieved? The answer is an emphatic 'No'. The present boundaries of the provinces are an accident of British conquest. Any one with eyes to see will notice that the British policy has been throughout to strengthen paramountcy, to centralise administration. Old political vestiges everywhere vanished under the steam-roller of a centralised administration. Our constitutional history is one of devolution from a central body to the specialised limbs rather than of coalescence of independent units into a corporate body. For these provinces to demand separation from the existing union is like the hands and feet seeking to fly apart from the body to live their own independent life. Such miracles may not happen even at the bidding of Mr. Jinnah.

The fact that there exists a union of India coupled with the principle of majority decision makes the demand for partition an artificial cry. It can never be achieved. Self-determination must be moderated.

Now if "self-determination" is not an irrevocable principle, if it has only a limited application; Indian Muslims are not obliged to exercise this supposed right.

of the eyes in passion for her secret lover, the Muslim League shouts for Pakistan in one breath and in the other for a coordinated Indian policy in matters of food distribution. An amusing instance is provided by a Muslim Leaguer on the opening day of the Autumn session of the Central Assembly (1944) when he tried to censure the Government for not having properly coordinated the surplus food areas with the deficit food areas. This is how truth breaks out of the husk of subterfuges.

Nor must we lose sight of the fact that modern industries tend to expand. The economic measures to be fruitful must be on a proper scale. The "law of size" as the Americans call the principle of increasing returns dictates an ever growing and integrated unit of operation.

The river systems determine the unit which would make river administration beneficial. The Indus and the Punjab rivers cannot be made to yield their benefits unless there is coordinate administration right from their sources to their mouths. Erosion, flood, irrigation, forests all demand an integrated administration of this region. So does the Ganges-Brahmaputra system demand such an administration. Similarly the headwaters of the Indian rivers can be made to generate Hydroelectricity to provide an inexhaustible power resource for India. India's water-power resource is estimated at 27,000,000 H.P. which is the third in the world as against 43,000,000 of Canada and 35,000,000 of the U.S.A. It would be preposterous to deny the use of this waterpower to the areas of Muslim majority.

The power should be taken as far as transmission lines can take it. We again cut across communal divisions.

Again the iron and steel resources of Bihar and Bengal can be developed best if the Punjab and Baluchistan are equally available as market. But the most important economy comes from a centralised defence. Simple mathematics will tell us that the more compact an area, the smaller the length of the frontiers and the easier to arrange for customs barrier and defence. If we break up India we have to duplicate the defence arrangements. In the middle ages when there was no central police every lord had his own retainers. The total strength of the retainer force was several hundred times the total of a modern central police force. So much human power was being wasted on non-economic work. There was the same waste over equipment. Everything had to be duplicated and triplicated. What is more the chances of war were more numerous. The heptarchy states in England were mutually fighting. By amalgamation these mutual fights were stopped and with that much unnecessary and avoidable waste. To crown it all the larger the Union the more likely it is to be respected and the lesser the chance of aggression on it. All these arguments overwhelmingly justify as large a political unit as possible. They all demand that the integrity of India shall not be questioned.

We have set forth the advantages in general terms as the scheme of partition is still vague and nobody knows—not even Mr. Jinnah—what shape Pakistan will take. Dr. Rajendra Prasad has examined several schemes of partition urged by individual publicists but they have no merit as they do not correspond to the

“geological limitation” and the laws and facts of national economy.

Geologically the existing frontiers of the states are absolutely irrational. The gods that shaped this earth-surface did not distribute the blessings evenly. We find coal and gold in the icy-wastes of the Arctic to which man is only now having access. There are states with rich deposits of coal and iron and there are states which have nothing but barren rocks. As the geological formation determines our development we are always trying to rationalise the caprices of the earth and in the task we often have to wage wars. Look at the scramble for oil, for rubber, for tin and other vital minerals. In the circumstances the more extensive the territory of a state the greater the chance of correcting the errors of irrational distribution. This is an elementary mathematical principle. The Soviet Union and the U.S.A. are classic examples of geologically balanced countries. They are also countries which are less likely to be centres of war and aggression. Small countries of Europe, including Germany have a difficult task. Some of them acquired colonies to cure their deficiencies. Germany and Japan were less fortunate and these have-nots have embroiled the whole world into devastating wars. Britain corrected her deficiencies by her straggling empire spread over the two hemispheres.

India demarcated geographically from the rest of the world and politically united is also relatively balanced although still poor in petroleum and in certain other respects. When Burma was a part of India, she was more balanced still. India broken into bits will only reproduce the caprices of the earth and every part will

be thrown into unstable equilibrium and their prosperity will be greatly imperilled. The evils of Balkanisation will be multiplied manifold.

People are deliberately trying to have a balance between agriculture and industry. India should be able to achieve this balance remarkably well when she is a unit. If she breaks up instead of a powerful and well-balanced economy there will be small specialised economies very precariously poised that would be unable to stand shocks from abroad. Economic and cultural development cannot be entirely even all over the country. There are poor and depressed regions and there are prosperous ones. There are the desert wastes of Baluchistan and the rich agricultural soil of Bengal and North Bihar. There are the prosperous industrial areas in Bombay, along the coalfields and in the richly endowed mineral tracts of Singhbhum which are in the vanguard of progress. There is the deficit province of Sind which lives on the generosity of the other provinces. Partnership in a great union has the advantage that conditions in the deficit regions may be improved by contribution from the surplus regions. Equalisation is the inevitable effect of a common political life. Contrast of wealth and poverty is moderated. This is in itself a great gain. It should not be spilt away in a doctrinaire pursuit of a half-baked political maxim. Even Moslem Leaguers are not blind to this advantage of equalisation for the distress caused by this war has demonstrated the necessity of India functioning as a whole. Like the girl with her two smiles, the smile of her lips in courtesy to her boring friend and the smile

will for union that they will soon emerge as an Islamic Federation. We are not told the reasons for such expectation. If the units do not come together will they be compelled to unite by an act of war? In that case what happens to the vaunted doctrine of "self-determination" to which Mr. Jinnah is prepared to sacrifice the prosperity of India? If they remain mutually separate not only India is Balkanised but the Muslim homeland is torn into fragments which would pronounce its doom. The prospect, as Mahatma Gandhi said, is terrible to contemplate.

The immediately relevant question is, however, of the territorial extent of Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah has indicated his choice. He wants the whole of the existing provinces of Sind, the N.W.F.P., the Punjab and Baluchistan on the north-west and Bengal and Assam on the east. The Muslim and non-Muslim population of these provinces according to the census of 1941 is as follows:

(Population in thousands)					
		<i>Muslim.</i>	<i>Non-Muslim.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Muslim Percent.</i>
Bengal	..	33,005	27,302	60,307	54.73
Assam	..	3,442	6,763	10,205	33.73
N. W. F.	..	2,789	249	3,038	91.79
Baluchistan	..	439	63	502	87.50
Sind	..	3,208	1,327	4,535	70.75
Punjab	..	16,217	12,202	28,419	57.07
Total of Pakistan		59,100	47,906	1,07,000	55.23
Rest of India,		20,298	1,68,506	1,88,804	10.75
Hindustan					
		79,398	2,16,413	2,95,809	26.84

A few things are apparent at once. In British India the Muslim minority is 26.84 per cent. In the proposed Hindustan it will shrink to 10.75 per cent. This Mr. Khaliquzzaman should be able to see is a departure from his political ideal that the minority should be as numerous as possible. The best position for Muslims, if Mr. Khaliquzzaman's guidance were accepted, would be to continue in an all-India union for in such a union they form 26.84 per cent of the people. But perhaps Mr. Khaliquzzaman has one theory for Hindus and another for the Muslims.

Again while 55.23 Muslims will have a non-Muslim hostage of 44.77 in Pakistan; 89.25 non-Muslims in Hindustan must content themselves with a Moslem hostage of 10.75. The hostages are hopelessly unequal by any standard of judgment. Even numerically the smaller Pakistan will have 48 million non-Muslims while the vast Hindustan will have only 20 million Muslims. Analysis shows that Mr. Jinnah ranks one faithful equal to three non-believers.

As discussion can proceed only on plane of equality, Mr. Jinnah can secure his Pakistan where one Muslim is equal to three non-Muslims only by methods other than discussion and agreement. Mr. Fazlul Haq was right in having a premonition that Thaneshwar and Panipat would repeat themselves. Here we tread upon the irrational fringe of passion. The exasperated non-Muslims cannot be prevented from preparing to offer their "weak" opposition to the "invincible" followers of Islam. And between their martial preparations for war John Bull will sit sedately on a prostrate India which neither the Muslims can conquer nor the Hindus

Pakistan of Mr. Jinnah's League. The only Pakistan that is being fought for is the Pakistan of League conception and the League has nowhere defined it.

We want more light than we get from the twilight glimmer of the September correspondence between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah. Mr. Jinnah made no proposals himself. Judging from his criticisms of the Gandhian proposal we find Mr. Jinnah is definite on two things only: (1) that Bengal, Assam, the Punjab, the N. W. F. P., Sind and Baluchistan as they are at present shall become separate states and (2) that between the rest of India and these states there shall be no coordinating authority of any kind.

There are many gaps in our knowledge. Thus nothing is known about the position of the native states in this scheme. Mr. Jinnah tells Gandhiji that he is not concerned with the India of the princes but only with the British India which, however, is intricately woven with the Indian states. By keeping silent and indecisive about the states Mr. Jinnah does not avoid taking sides. He helps to maintain the Indian princes in their archaic world of medieval absolutism in relation to the peoples. He delivers the state peoples to eternal servitude and keeps them away from political power. He serves the British imperialists to maintain these political breakwaters against the sweeping tide of popular revolution. This negative attitude towards the Indian states exposes Mr. Jinnah's reactionary role. He makes no contribution to the solution of the Indian problem.

As Mr. Jinnah wants Pakistan to solve the minorities problem we would like him to tell us how concretely

he would treat the minorities in Pakistan. Mahatma Gandhi wanted clarification on this point. Mr. Jinnah flung in his face the Lahore resolution which talks of effective and mandatory safeguards. Mahatma Gandhi asks him to define the safeguards. Mr. Jinnah says they cannot be enumerated now. After Pakistan has separated the safeguards will be decided upon in consultation with the minorities. The defenceless small minorities are being asked to sign a blank cheque even while they are being subjected to mental torture for they are told they would be only strangers in "a Muslim homeland" and that they would not be even consulted on the issue of separation. Mr. Jinnah does not even think it worth while to tell Gandhiji how working of the safeguard will be guaranteed to the minorities in Pakistan. Here is the second big gap in our knowledge.

It is unnecessary to point out the other gaps, namely the kind of arrangement in respect of matters of common interest, the probable social and economic goals of Pakistan and so forth. Minorities would like to walk into Pakistan only with eyes open.

As for territorial extent of Pakistan and for the relation between the constituent units of Pakistan there is the same difficulty. Will the units separate from Hindustan as a full-blooded federation? Will it be possible to combine the eastern Pakistan with the western zone in a federation across a thousand miles of hostile land? Probably the Resolution does not conceive of a full-blooded federation to start at once. Does it expect that the units once they start as separate sovereign states will develop such irresistible

minorities and this should satisfy Pakistan's craving for hostages. It retains very great advantage over Hindustan by any standard.

With such an adjustment Hindustan rescues 29.3 million non-Muslims from the tyranny of a religious polity where rights of citizenship will vary with religion. For if the rights do not vary, free Islamic homeland will be meaningless. It is true that with 29.3 million non-believers 9.5 million believers have also to go out of the holy land of Pakistan. But this is inevitable. Even the criminal laws condone evil acts which are done to avoid greater evil. Surely the well-being of 29.3 million people has a greater claim to attention than that of 9.5 millions. Pakistan swollen to 107 million people by unhealthy accretions slims to a population of 68.2 millions—relatively healthy and compact.

The Pakistan zones when so demarcated will, even if we concede the maximum possibility of federation in these zones, be poor and resourceless. General consequences of separation will be unfortunate both for Hindustan and Pakistan. But concretely Pakistan will be the greater loser. The north-west block is not well-endowed economically. Desert conditions assert themselves as we move west and south of the proposed north-eastern boundaries of these zones.

The Punjab will have lost the headwater of the Sutlej and also of the Beas, the Ravi and the Chenab. This will affect the irrigation scheme of the Muslim zone. Coordination cannot be guaranteed between separate states. The Punjab and the whole of this zone are poor in coal, iron, copper and aluminium and

the loss of the water-power resources would be disastrous to the zone. Industrially the area will have very poor prospects. The entire zone will become homogeneous with agriculture as almost the sole occupation of the people. Agricultural countries are bound to be poor. Agriculture is also subject to greater hazards and agricultural prices are markedly unstable. In the 1929—31 depression agricultural prices were the first to fall, fell furthest and were the slowest to recover. Even agriculturally the Punjab will have lost its best cotton, its best cattle and the like with the loss of the eastern districts. Sind as a separate state will be financially deficit and inevitably make for an impoverished administration. The Punjab has a very important place in the Indian army and the Punjabis, who are predominant in the Indian army are the Muslims from the poorer districts of the Punjab. They are the would-be nationals of Pakistan. We remember the bitter observations of a high official in the Punjab. He said the richer and better irrigated districts of the Punjab (these will go out of Pakistan) have not cared to send recruits to the army. The benefits of the British canals have not been repaid. It is clear therefore, that it is the Punjabis of the future Pakistan that get a considerable part of the income from the army. It is estimated that the Punjab gets 30 crores of rupees from Hindustan in the shape of army payments. When the Punjab goes out of Hindustan this source of income will dry away. Hindustan will not need the Punjabis for their army even with their much-advertised martial attributes. The N.-W. Railway is a strategic railway for India and

lose so long as John Bull does not retire and give them a free field. 'Quit India' Mr. Jinnah thought was aimed at the destruction of the Muslims. He should be able to see that it is the only condition of his winning Thaneshwar and Panipat afresh.

The picture would be less terrible if we were permitted to pierce the sacred frontiers of these autonomous units.

We would see at once that Baluchistan, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province are contiguous areas and each has an overwhelming majority of Muslims. Even in the districts the Muslims are in preponderant majority. These three provinces with a total population of 8,075,000 have a non-Muslim minority of 1,639,000, i.e. of 20.3 per cent. In these three provinces Muslim homeland is more feasible than in the remaining others. Thus Assam as a separate Muslim state has surprisingly enough a Muslim minority. Either Mr. Jinnah has no patience with figures or he is out for a Muslim crusade. In case of Assam at least Mr. Jinnah should recognise that frontiers ought to be mutable. In fact in Assam Pakistan is at all conceivable in the single district of Sylhet, which is 60.71 per cent Muslim.

In Bengal the non-Muslim minority is 45.27 per cent. The non-Muslim population is, however, not evenly distributed. Roughly half of Bengal comprising the western and northern districts is predominantly Hindu. The districts with a Moslem majority which are the only ones that could conceivably go to Pakistan are Nadia, Murshidabad, Jessore, Rajshahi, Rangpore, Bogra, Pabna, Malda, Dacca, Mymensingh, Faridpur,

Bakarganj, Tipperah, Noakhali and Chittagong. These districts joined to Sylhet will give us the eastern Pakistan.

The Punjab is a more complicated affair. It is the only homeland for the Sikhs, who would not be willing to be strangers in a Muslim homeland. It has a considerable non-Muslim minority of 42.93 per cent. The communal distribution is not uniform over the districts. The northern and eastern districts comprising the existing divisions of Ambala and Jullundur and the districts of Gurdaspur and Amritsar would certainly go out of the Muslim homeland. The remaining districts of the Punjab may join with Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. to form the north-western homeland of the Muslims.

After the above adjustment Pakistan and Hindustan will have a communal composition as follows :

(In millions)

	<i>Muslims.</i>	<i>Non-Muslims.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Percentage minority.</i>
Pakistan .	49.5	18.7	68.2	26.001
Hindustan ..	29.8	197.8	227.6	13.00
Grand Total of Br. India	79.3	216.5	295.8	26.84

Pakistan begins to have a less unpleasant complexion. By this arrangement the minority percentage in Pakistan drops from 44.77 to 26.00 which is nearer the percentage of the present Muslim minority of India, namely 26.84. Even so Hindustan is left with a Muslim minority of 13.00 per cent only against 26.00 per cent of Non-Muslim minority that remains with Pakistan. Pakistan has a weightage of 2 in respect of

is run at a loss. Pakistan would not find it possible to maintain it in that state. Other communications are difficult in this zone and the useful sea coast will be small.

The most ruinous burden will be that of defence. This resourceless Pakistan will have two frontiers to defend. It cannot count on the friendship of Hindustan after separation. It must not expect that Muslim states on its west are going to be its friends. There is no pan-Islamic fervour anywhere in the world except among a handful of Indian Muslims. Christian Europe did not find it possible to call a halt to their race of armament. The Russian bogey will not have been disposed of. In this isolation Pakistan will be bled white in providing an adequate defence. At present with the backing of the whole of India the western defences are not formidable. What will happen if Pakistan had to bear this burden alone and had enemies to guard against on the east.

The eastern Pakistan will not be very much better. This region will also have lost nearly all its tea, all its headwaters, almost all its coal, and iron, major portion of its jute and paddy lands and almost half of its jute industries. It will have lost Calcutta which is mainly Hindu and its suburbs and surroundings. Shorn of Calcutta it will have shrunk commercially and its eastern port of Chittagong cannot compensate for the loss of Calcutta. This zone will be also poor industrially. Defence if anything will be a greater burden for this zone than even for the north-western zone. This Pakistan will be hedged in all round by

hostile non-Muslim lands. In words of Mr. Allahabux, it would be an 'isolation quarantine'.

Our estimate is based on the most generous assumptions that can be made. Thus we have taken for granted a federation of the north western zone. This is perhaps too optimistic. This zone has five languages and the population is not homogenous. If separate sovereignties of the petty states in this zone were to pull in diverse directions, economic prospects would be gloomier still. Thus Sind and the Punjab might find a bone of contention in the use of the Indus waters. The Punjab, a land-locked state, may have no appreciable foreign trade while Sind will have better chances. Sind might impose tariffs on goods entering the province and the Punjab may have to suffer. Both these provinces having agricultural interests might find each other competitors for markets and not parties who have complementary things to exchange.

We have said enough to indicate the magnitude of the disaster particularly to Pakistan consequent on separation. The comparison is entirely unfavourable to Pakistan. This is of course the present position. The chances of altering the present position are better for Hindustan than for Pakistan and the disparity is likely to grow progressively.

Even when we are all reasonable and willingly agree to separate questions like determination of boundaries; irredentism of population homogenous in every way but cut across on medieval religious considerations, and so forth will make the transition painful and the continuance of the two hostile lands in close juxtaposition fraught with the ever-present menace of war

And while we shall have impoverished ourselves materially we would spiritually be heading towards dictatorship and fascism and towards smugness and ignorance that dwarfs our personality. The spiritual consequences of separation would be profound.

For by separation we want to establish homogeneous homelands for the Muslims. From their very nature the homes will be small. The spaciousness of a united India cannot be there nor the varieties that make up our common homeland today. The smallness and the homogeneity are both fraught with consequences. From smallness comes stupidity. There would be fewer massive minds to fertilise the spirit. The influence of great minds is not to be measured by area. One great mind in a state of 1,000 square miles has not the same influence that 5 great minds have in a state of 5,000 square miles. Every citizen of the latter state gets five times as much sustenance as every citizen of the former with the result that one will be five times as well off spiritually as the other. The creative ability of an all-India leader invigorates every province. If the provinces were entirely isolated his influence will exhaust itself in the small provinces where he may have happened to be born. We know the difference between the cosmopolitan and the provincial; in a small state every area is provincial.

Apart from the sparseness of great minds a small state will have fewer problems, problems of smaller magnitude and less various problems. The human genius will be wrestling with soft material. It cannot become great and powerful. Small states and large minds go ill-together.

Homogeneity of the population has the same effect. Contact of different peoples and races gives the necessary shock to the mind that generates progress. The decadent race revives by contact with the vigorous race. The new strain learns mellowness from the old. Renaissance has often come from such racial contacts.

Homogeneity is also conducive to totalitarianism. In a state where there are strong and various sentiments such as when there are different historical communities or nationalities, the government will meet resistance at many points. It will be able to interfere only in those affairs of the citizens that are common. It could not go further and trample upon the cherished peculiarities of any group without incurring the odium of discrimination and exposing itself to the charge of injustice. Why should you affect one group and leave out others? There will be awareness of justice. The acts of the state will come up for popular judgment and there will be stable barriers in the way of state interference. Such a society is not amenable to totalitarianism and dictatorship.

But if the people are homogenous a would-be 'Feuhrer' could carry the state regulation into every sphere of the people's life. The 'Feuhrer' would tell the citizens: "Here I am in no way different from any of you. I find this measure quite acceptable. Why should not you?" And the citizen who has nothing to mark him off from the 'Feuhrer' would be unable to resist him. The maglomaniac will thus invade his very home, his very personality. Totalitarianism will meet no resistance.

By carving small homelands for themselves the Muslims will rush to their spiritual ruin. Hindustan will not be as much affected. We will all, however, lose something. Why should we not, therefore, preserve the integrity of our great land; redeem it by our joint efforts; share in its plenty and glory ourselves in the realisation of the universal man that is our variegated India? In more sense than one, united we stand: divided we fall. Pakistan is an unmixed evil and must be fought as a yet another product of imperialism. It is not for nothing that Mr. Jinnah could not bring himself to answer Mahatma Gandhi, when in his first letter of 15th September, 1944, he wanted Mr. Jinnah to tell him whether states would be materially benefitted by fragmentation or whether they would only become a collection of poor states, and whether 'partition' would be conducive to independence and welfare of India as a whole. If Mr. Jinnah had given an honest answer Muslims would have turned away in horror from Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah disposed of these searching questions by saying they were irrelevant. With a slight variation of a famous Nazi propaganda about prices he says to the Muslims:

"We do not want rich states, We do not want poor states. We do not want independent states. We do not want happy states. We want Pakistan states."

For our decision against Pakistan we have the endorsement of thoughtful men present as well past. Of the present we have said enough. Let a few voices guide us from the past.

Here is Abraham Lincoln, the saviour of American democracy. He was born in a free land and knew the

meaning of democracy as comfortable Mr. Jinnah and even tortured Pandit Nehru in this slave land do not know. He answered by war the demand for separation made by the southern states—and they were states which had voluntarily formed the American Union, not provinces which owe their existence to a devolution from a common centre. He sacrificed the doubtful democratic tenet of self-determination but he saved American democracy for a great future. As history has pronounced him right, let us learn from his wisdom:

“Physically speaking we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other; nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced and go out of the presence, and beyond the reach of each other; but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible then to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced among aliens than laws can be among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always, and after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you.” (Quoted by Dr. Shaukatulla Ansari in ‘Pakistan—A problem of India’.)

‘This is Lincoln’s warning against the futility of Pakistan.

Or shall we want deeper wisdom? Let us go to the man who travelled from formal political democracy

to the more real economic democracy; who fought the battles of the common man and won them and organised a state that commands the exuberant love of whole congeries of races. Listen to Lenin the thinker in action and the actor in thought :

“The various demands of democracy and among them the right to self-determination have no absolute value, but are parts of the world-wide democratic (socialistic) movement. In concrete instances the interests of the part may conflict with the interests of the whole. If that is so, we must repudiate the part.” (Works, Russian Edition, Vol. XIX, pages 199-200.)

And more aptly, when he reconciles the contradiction between “right of secession” and “right of fusion” and after advocating right of secession of oppressed countries from the oppressing imperialisms, defines the duties of socialists of the oppressed nations:

“On the other hand, the socialists of small and oppressed nations must stress the second part of our general formula (i.e. of right of secession and right of fusion)—the ‘voluntary union’ of the nations. In all cases, however, he should fight particularism, exclusiveness, a narrow conception of nationalism; should insist upon the importance of wider issues; should favour the subordination of special interests to general interests . . .” (Works, Russian Edition, Vol. XIV; pages 203-205.)

Here is Lenin’s amusement at our making a fetish of ‘self-determination’. This master tactician votes against the ‘isolation’ of Pakistan and exhorts us to fight for our freedom as a united people.

Perhaps we would like to hear the wise man of contemplation—whose wisdom is not sprung from preoccupation with immediate problems, but who has looked through the immediate struggles to the unending vistas of time. Here is Lord Acton one of the sanest thinkers of recent times:

“The co-existence of several nations under the same state is a test as well as the best security of its freedom. The combination of different nations in one state is as necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society. Inferior races are raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior. Exhausted and decaying nations are revived by the contact of a younger vitality. The fertilising and regenerating process can only be obtained by living under one government. It is in the cauldron of the state that the fusion takes place by which the vigour, the knowledge and the capacity of one portion of mankind may be communicated to another.

“Small nation states in order to maintain their integrity have to attach themselves by confederation or family alliances to Great Powers and thus lose something of their independence. Their tendency is to isolate and shut off their inhabitants, to narrow the horizon of their views, and to dwarf in some degree the proportion of their ideas. Public opinion cannot maintain its liberty and purity in such small dimensions and the currents that come from larger communities sweep over a contracted territory. In a small homogenous population there is hardly room for a natural classification of society or of inner groups of interests, that set bounds to sovereign power.

"The government and the subjects contend with borrowed weapons. The resources of the one and the aspirations of the other are derived from some external source and the consequence is that the country becomes the instrument and scene of contests in which it is not interested." (History of Freedom and other Essays, pages 290-95.)

Here is Lord Acton's sage advice for us to continue in the wider unity of India even after we have achieved our immediate aim of wresting our freedom from British imperialism.

And lastly let the intuitive vision of a mystic penetrate the penumbra of emotions that surrounds the demand for Pakistan. Here is a parable from Khalil Gibran:

The Two Hermits

Upon a lonely mountain, there lived two hermits who worshipped God and loved one another.

Now these two hermits had one earthen bowl, and this was their only possession.

One day an evil spirit entered into the heart of the older hermit and he came to the younger and said, "It is long that we have lived together. The time has come for us to part. Let us divide our possessions."

Then the younger hermit was saddened and he said, "It grieves me, Brother, that thou shouldst leave me. But if thou must needs go, so be it," and he brought the earthen bowl and gave it to him, saying, "We cannot divide it, Brother, let it be thine."

Then the older hermit said, "Charity I will not accept. I will take nothing but mine own. It must be divided."

And the younger one said, "If the bowl be broken, of what use would it be to thee or to me? If it be thy pleasure let us rather cast a lot."

But the older hermit said again, "I will have but justice and mine own, and I will not trust justice and mine own to vain chance. The bowl must be divided."

Then the younger hermit could reason no further and he said, "If it be indeed thy will, and if even so thou wouldst have it let us now break the bowl."

But the face of the older hermit grew exceeding dark, and he cried,

"O thou cursed coward, thou wouldst not fight."

India is our "earthen bowl". Shall we break it in the name of justice?

From Kahlil Gibran we learn that separation is demanded and justice is invoked only because in some quarter for some reason there is the desire that the constituent peoples keep fighting.

We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting 'Pakistan' as a solution of the communal problem. Short of complete separation and consistent with co-ordinate administration of essential common subjects we should be prepared to give the six units of Pakistan as thoroughgoing an autonomy as possible. We should even respect their wish for formal equality by giving them equal representation with the other units in one of the Federal Chambers of India. The Ameri-

can Senate and the Soviet Council of Nationalities may be our guide. But we cannot discriminate between peoples and we cannot make representation of units communal. There will have to be a lower chamber like the House of Representatives or the Congress of Soviets. The only merit of 'Pakistan' demand is that we are urged to look for political expedients unlike those in England. In this search we wholeheartedly agree with the Pakistanists. Any arrangement which preserves the essential ingredients of democracy, namely, more or less equal right of representation for the people as people in the legislatures and administrations and broad correspondence with popular opinion symbolised by some sort of elective principle direct or indirect, will serve our purpose so long as the essential matters of common interest are administered in common and with effectiveness and success.

All the tests of validity that we have adopted go against Pakistan. Pakistan must be unhesitatingly rejected. It is a defensive weapon of Imperialism which we have to liquidate.

CHAPTER XVIII

METHOD: "MASS EDUCATION AND A CONSTITU- ENT ASSEMBLY"

WE have exhausted the solutions of the communal problem that are in the field. In considering them we have elucidated and amplified our own solution of this vexed problem.

How are we going to give effect to our solution? It is necessary to bear in mind that we aim at two things: (1) certain measures to be embodied in the constitution and (2) certain other measures of social and economic nature to be taken by the state.

The first set of measures can be embodied in the constitution only by framers of the constitution. Who shall frame the constitution? It may be a gift from the British. Such a constitution, however, will be utterly useless for our purpose. Our analysis of the nature of British Imperialism has convinced us that the British will never abdicate of their own free will. When Sir Stafford Cripps talked of the constitution being framed by Indians themselves, he did not forget to add that the British would be a necessary party to framing the constitution. If Britain is a necessary party and Britain means to perpetuate her hold on India the constitution will be only an adulterated one. The principle of counterpoise will never have been dropped. The communal problem will never be solved. The constitution, therefore, must be entirely framed by Indians,

as it is Indians alone who have any urgency to solve the communal problem.

Even when we have eliminated the British the problem of framing the constitution will not have been solved. We may be betrayed by a wrong tactical approach. Thus we are already exhibiting a pathetic belief in an agreement between leaders. Is it possible that leaders will come to a reasonable agreement that does not betray the people? We have already seen how the presence of a third party rules over all chances of a reasonable agreement between the leaders. If the third party retires will it make agreement possible? There is little chance of such a miracle happening. Leaders are a stable body of people. Thus merely because the third party withdraws the personnel of the Muslim League leadership is not going to be changed. Mr. Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi will still need to come to an agreement. If we are going to respect our leaders we would certainly not invent new ones overnight. Now the existing leaders must carry their past with them. What they have preached for a lifetime must stick to them. This is the law of inertia or even of 'karma'. Leaders with a revolutionary past and leaders with an anti-revolutionary bias cannot agree, and, even if they do, the agreement is not going to be progressive. That is why we must not build hopes on our leaders agreeing during British connection and even after their abdication. There is no procedure provided if leaders fail to agree such as that majority view will prevail. By their very nature leaders look upon themselves as final and complete repositories of power. They can only enter into treaties.

That is why in no country has it been possible to frame a constitution by agreement between leaders. We should not encourage such idle pursuits in India and waste our efforts. Even if the miracle happened and leaders of today could agree among themselves and frame a constitution, we must not allow the agreement between them to be finally imposed on India unless the people have a chance of pronouncing on their agreement and accepting it. This is the limiting condition of democracy and it must not be flung away for any reason whatsoever. So long as we do not abandon democracy, and that is the basis of approach in this book, in favour of untried and dangerous alternatives, the relentless implications of democracy have to be accepted..

Perhaps an interim agreement between leaders is desired in order to present a united front to Britain. The recent Rajagopalachari formula clearly hinted at this. The suggested agreement invites Mr. Jinnah to join in the demand for independence. Both because a hasty agreement may be mischievous and because it is against all laws of psychology that patriotism and urge for freedom would be generated by pacts and invitations, even insistence on interim agreement between leaders is not politic. If the Congress adopts the solution here offered and if this solution is not enough to induce the League or Dr. Ambedkar's Depressed Classes Conference to join hands with the Congress in the fight for freedom and in implementing the solution it would be clearly established that these parties do not want to solve the communal problem and are not interested in the freedom of India. The principle can-

not be moderated to secure their doubtful support. If they accept the solution and fight for freedom unity would be forged without special efforts on the part of any party. On other terms unity is futile.

If leaders cannot deliver the goods we must look over their heads to the people themselves. Let the people act. Let them frame their appropriate organ which would give effect to their will. Such a body will have to be elective and derive from the people. We must rule out the possibility of 'plebescite' in such a matter. Plebescite is too cumbrous and too crude. You cannot answer a whole host of complicated questions by a simple yes or no. Popular vote will not decide the constitution. It should decide the persons who would frame the constitution for the people. We inevitably land upon a "Constituent Assembly". This is not the place to define the nature, the constitution and the functions of the Constituent Assembly which needs a separate study by itself. The substance is, however, agreed. It should be an elected body which reflects the popular will.

Such an Assembly dissolves a number of difficulties at once. We break the permanent citadels of leadership. We cure society of the political disease of 'leaderitis' which afflicts colonial societies most. We provide a machinery that pronounces the final word. We do away with the possibility of a clique getting into power for the whole mass of the people cannot be bribed or bought off.

'Constituent Assembly' must be our battle cry. The 'Achaláyatan' of leadership must be broken.

The second set of measures is to be taken by the state. It is not difficult to see that these measures particularly the economic ones will never be taken by an imperialist government. Such measures are aimed at destroying the very foundation of imperialism. They will only be taken by a government which is derived from the people.

In any case both over the Constituent Assembly and the governments that may be formed the people's control will only be indirect. There is no escape from this. Democracy striding over the subcontinent of India cannot be the same as in the petty city-states of Greece. As the democracy is bound to be indirect it is necessary that the people and their elected representatives must be imbued with the ideas we have formulated in this book. It is not enough that the ideas are reasonable and correct. They must grip a revolutionary political party and such a political party must educate the mass into these ideas thoroughly and extensively. Only thus shall we enable the people to choose a sane Constituent Assembly. Only thus will the governments have the urge to implement the necessary measures. In the concrete context of India such a revolutionary party is the Congress. It has done enough to arouse a vague sentiment of freedom among the people. This sentiment has to be given a content and must be deepened. It is a tremendous task. Congress need not look for allies from other political parties. There is a limit beyond which it cannot sacrifice its principles. It need not seek to appease a chronic grabber. It will not shun alliance with parties that agree to its minimum programme. But an academic

essay in national front will not carry it far. We are a vast subcontinent and to educate our people into a sound political ideology will be an uphill task. But there must be no impatience and no wavering. The programme must be taken in hand and must be pushed forward resolutely and vigorously. Pandit Nehru had a sound instinct when he devised the programme of "mass contact". His followers, however, preferred to shout in the cities. This neglected branch of the Congress programme must be revived. It is possible to go far in this direction even when our freedom to agitate is severely circumscribed.

We have hinted at certain other tasks that will be undertaken by non-governmental agencies. We have also demanded certain changes in the private life and thought of the citizens. All this part of the work will be merged in the vast programme of 'mass education' and 'mass contact'. There are no short cuts and we cannot afford to tire out. Those who are keen on solving the communal problem will meet their success only after freedom has been won. For the moment—nay, for years to come—it will be their lot to march the weary way of preparing the country into an acceptance of a correct programme. The programme must be made familiar, must be driven home into people's minds.

CHAPTER XIX

EPILOGUE

IN the chapters on the causes of the communal problem we gave large space to British Imperialism. It was necessary to emphasise its role so as to dispel the illusion from the liberal minds that Britain would willingly part with power. It was necessary to show that the communal problem is a British creation and would wither away for lack of sustenance when the British withdrew. We are, therefore, obliged to emphasise the need for liquidating British Imperialism. We cannot expect the present government to carry out those social and economic measures that will rob communalism of its sting. We cannot expect the present government to call a genuine Constituent Assembly. Those who take it into their heads to refute it will have to assert that the British Government will not side with reaction, that it is capable of being neutral during the elections, that it will see to it that the will of the people is really expressed. Such assertions are so absurd that no one would venture to advance them openly, but it is possible to smuggle them into our midst under the cover of a liberal flag. The Constituent Assembly must be convened by someone; someone must guarantee the freedom and fairness of the elections; someone must invest such an assembly with full power and force. Only a revolutionary government that has replaced the present regime is capable of doing these things. Our immediate

programme must be to form a provisional national government. As soon as we have decided to do so we have restored sanity in our method. The communal problem which Mr. Jinnah stands on its head must be given the natural pose and made to stand on its feet. Here is the appropriateness of the "Quit India" campaign. We started with the thesis that solution of the communal problem gets its urgency from our concrete political programme of winning India's freedom. We end with the note that winning the freedom is the very condition of solving the communal problem. Those who are not striving to win this freedom are not anxious to solve the communal problem. We cannot enter into a pact with Mr. Jinnah so that he may join in the demand for independence. Those who know the value of independence and who long for it will not need a pact and wait for an invitation. India has had remarkable patience with men like Mr. Jinnah and Dr. Ambedkar. But it is better that the word were said. It is better that Mr. Jinnah and Dr. Ambedkar were given their true names--that they are an excrescence of British imperialism and one of its many fronts that must be fought. Perhaps we feel isolated with Mr. Jinnah and Dr. Ambedkar gone. But they belong to the other side and exchange of courtesies is not going to make them our friend. Precisely as we feel isolated, we must redouble our efforts to capture the minds of the Indian people by demonstrating to them in the hundreds of thousands of villages and towns that our solution of the communal problem is the sanest, the most sympathetic and tactically the most appropriate. We must take them along in our campaign to liquidate imperialism.

It is needless to entangle ourselves in discussions about the precise machinery to which power shall be transferred. Mr. Jinnah loves to harp on this question. As the body to whom power is to be transferred is only going to be provisional and short-lived, as the Constituent Assembly will ultimately perfect the constitutional structure of the government, perhaps we shall cut the Gordian Knot by declaring that the power should be transferred to the existing Executive Council or to whatever arrangement may be at hand. As to who will be the persons forming the provisional government it is equally needless to speculate. Whoever they may be they would find it impossible to go against the popular opinion. Ultimately the provisional government is bound to pass into the hands of leaders who command the allegiance of the widest mass. It so happened in Russia where Kerensky became the head of the provisional government but who did not command popular allegiance and was hurled away from power and the Bolsheviks came in.

There would be overwhelming pressure on the persons to whom power may be transferred. They will not go wrong or they will be hurled away and the rightful persons brought in. The only condition is that our work of educating the masses must have created in them intolerance with patch-work and an indomitable will to see things done in the way they want.

In such a situation Mahatma Gandhi's blank cheque to Mr. Jinnah does not after all seem as absurd as we first think. What is needed, therefore, is not to speculate about the machinery or the persons in whose favour power will be transferred. These will be found

